The Chronicle of Dokdo

1905

by YEH YOUNGJUNE
Translator Michelle Seo

YEH YOUNGJUNE

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The Chronicle of Dokdo *1905*

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Foreword

If a problem arises due to a territorial conflict, there must be two parties involved: we and they. If we could solve a problem by persuading the other country that claims its territorial rights on our land with sufficient explanation, it would be no longer a barrier between the two nations.

The Dokdo issue with Japan should be resolved in this kind of manner. Unlike Japanese politicians and scholars who have armed themselves with sophisticated logic, we can prove that Dokdo is not a part of Japan with solid evidence. Furthermore, it would be icing on the cake if we could provide sufficient evidence that could contribute to establishing reasonable grounds to persuade other nations.

In order to accomplish this goal, I think, we should first be honest with ourselves. We should establish a line of reasoning on the basis of facts. If our grounds are based on claims or beliefs, it would rather work adversely to prove our territorial rights. Unless we are truthful, it is impossible to convince others.

Voicing our own assertions with groundless evidence to push forward a justification is an aged attitude. There are many

Koreans who guarded our nation with patriotic compassion or are deserved to be praised with their contributions to Korean history.

However, now we are living in the world where international law contributes to mediating conflicts between countries. At this point, we should collect our wisdom to protect our national interests in a strict and sober forum of international law. We should also concentrate on convincing others to set aside regional conflicts in order to promote peace and stability in the world.

I often met the author of this book, YEH YOUNGJUNE, when he worked as *The Joongang Daily* correspondent in Tokyo. He is a journalist who has great interest in a variety of complex international problems between Korea and Japan ever since the dawn of the modern era. While he was reporting on Dokdo issue, Mr. YEH focused on studying historical conflicts. When he came to see me with the manuscript for this book, I believed that there was a possibility for his efforts to bear fruit.

The point that we initiated our investigation regarding the

Dokdo issue is the territorial incorporation of 1905. Journalist YEH paid close attention to continental expansionism and the role of Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎, who was at the forefront of the Japanese Imperialist diplomacy, in preparation for war against Russia. Nevertheless, little research has been conducted about his life and career.

In the early 1900s, Japanese expansion to the continent was realized by becoming allies with Britain, which deterred Russia from expanding to Asia. As described in this book, if we trace the past career of Yamaza, we will be able to understand the historical background that shows how Japan, which joined in the imperialists' competition later on, managed to throw Russia out of the Korean Peninsula and thus monopolized it.

In this process, Yamaza Enjiro incorporated Dokdo into Japan as an initial step of its exploitation of the Korean Peninsula. In other words, since he played a key role in the territorial incorporation of Dokdo, Yamaza is the person who is the most responsible for today's problem.

This book is helpful for understanding the whole process of the Japanese Imperialists' exploitation of Korea that began

from the territorial incorporation of Dokdo. It contributes to revealing important historical factors involved in the process of incorporating Dokdo into Japan. Moreover, the author suggested the need of further historical investigation on the role of Yamaza, who played a pivotal role in Japan's exploitation of Korea.

Territorial issues are very complex problems. Depending on a country's interests and point of view involved in the issue, its claim would be quite different from that of the other country. Although verification of facts from uncertain ideas is too difficult, ironically we need to find convincing evidence among uncertain ideas.

We need to approach the facts of the historical events without bias so that we could persuade others with the truth behind the facts. I was pleased when I found such possibility in the work of a Korean journalist. I highly recommend this book in that it was written with the spirit of journalists that plays a crucial role in discovering the truth

Choi Seo-myeon
President of the International Korean Studies
February 23, 2012

Preface

I happened to read several books about Genyosya玄洋社, which has been known as the root of the Japanese Right Wing, in 2007 when I was working as a *Joongang Daily* correspondent in Tokyo. I was perplexed when I found the name of Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎 among many people's names introduced in these books. If his last name was a common name like other ordinary Japanese last names such as Suzuki鈴木 or Yamamoto山本, which are equivalent to the Korean last names such as Kim金, Lee李 and Park朴, I might have paid little attention to his name. Perhaps his name might have been lingering somewhere back in my brain and it might have risen to the surface all of a sudden: "Aha! He must be the same person that I read about a long time ago."

However, it was when I heard his name, Yamaza, from Professor Naito Seichu内藤正中 while interviewing him in 2005 that I came to clearly understand who he was. That was also the time when Shimane島根 Prefecture in Japan enacted 'Takeshima竹島 Day,' which raised controversies affecting the relationship between Korea and Japan. Before such issue arose, Professor Naito was able to tell me about Yamaza's role in the process of the territorial incorporation.

The most persuasive grounds on which Japanese claims its territorial rights on Dokdo rests on Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo in 1905. When it comes to the territorial issue, there is a sharp conflict between Korea and Japan in terms of justification and ratification. Korea views this territorial

incorporation as the initiation of Japan's exploitation; that is, the prelude of the Eulsa Treaty in November 1905 and Japan's forceful annexation of Korea in 1910. On the other hand, Japan contends the territorial incorporation is irrelevant, since it became a part of the Japanese land through justifiable means of a fisherman Nakai Yozaburo's中井養三郎 petition to the government and therefore Dokdo should have been excluded from the land that Japan had to return to Korea at the end of World War II, unlike other land Japan had occupied.

When I found Yamaza Enjiro who contributed greatly to the exploitation of the Korean Peninsula by way of implementing numerous diplomatic tactics in collaboration with the Genyosya Ronin, I came to doubt if I could find a clue to solve the territorial issue in his story. While I was conducting related research, I came across a book entitled *The Frontier of Continental Diplomacy* published in 1938, which is a biography of Yamaza Enjiro. This book does not include any episode about the incorporation of Dokdo. This is perhaps because he might have considered it as a trivial career in his life in comparison with other important tasks he accomplished. Moreover, taking into account the fact that this book was published in 1938, we can conclude that an inhabited island of Korea was not his concern at that time as the Japanese government had ambitions over the entire Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, the book clearly explains his beliefs, ideas and diplomatic goals. Accordingly, it is sufficient enough to speculate the purpose of his pushing forward with the territorial incorporation of Dokdo and his suggestions and role in the process of discussion within the Japanese government.

Although it is useless to make an assumption regarding past events, I asked myself questions: What if Nakai Yozaburo did not meet Yamaza Enjiro in September 1904? Or what if Yamaza reversed the opinion of the Ministry of Home Affairs ? If so, there would not be any issue about Dokdo today between Korea and Japan.

This book was written for general readers who are interested in the Dokdo issue. I hope to revisit the territorial incorporation of 1905: Let us examine for what purpose and through what kinds of discussion such important decisions were able to be made. While readers are reading through this book, I hope they can find the answers themselves. Accordingly, I minimized my intervening in the flow of this book with my personal explanations; instead, I simply intended to reconstruct historical events for the readers' convenience. This is because I felt it a pity when I read previous books or academic papers on the Dokdo issue that appealed to patriotism and compassion, since they reduced the credibility to be persuasive.

For the readers' convenience, I divided the book into two sections: The first half focuses on the process of territorial incorporation prior to 1905 by reconstructing the history using the sources discovered so far. Nakai Yozaburo was the central character in this part. In addition to this, I introduced historical events that show problems in the process of territorial incorporation of Dokdo. In the second half, the life of Yamaza Enjiro who played a key role in territorial incorporation was examined. Particularly, I focused on the investigation of how he

developed his career in Korea and associated with the people around him to study how he influenced the Russo-Japanese War. Other than Nakai's recollection, there are no primary sources about Yamaza's role in the territorial incorporation, like official documents of the Japanese government, Yamaza's journals, personal letters私信 and memoirs, left remaining. As a result, studying the whole life story of Yamaza could be the best possible way to gather the reasons why Yamaza was actively involved in the territorial incorporation. If readers agree with the points that I have addressed in this book to a certain extent, I would feel less embarrassed with my reckless courage to publish it with my banal writing skills.

As I finished writing this book, there are many people whom I would like to thank. Most of all, I would like to thank Mr. Choi Seo-myeon崔書勉, the president of the International Korean Studies. Regardless of his age, his passion to immerse himself in conducting research was supportive in addition to the comprehensive knowledge to make him the equivalent of "a walking encyclopedia." He helped me develop a holistic view without restrictions to examine the international relationship between Korea and Japan. Even when I went to his home to ask questions late in the evening, he was kind enough to answer all my questions. I would also like to thank all the senior journalists who highly encouraged me to write about Dokdo after having listened to my debates on various occasions. I truly appreciate everyone at the Korea Press Foundation for their support.

February 2012

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Where have all the Gangchi gone?

Scientific Name: Zalophus Japonicus
Biological Classification
Otariidae > Mammalia> Carnivora / Pinnipedia> Sea Lion
Habitat: in the range of East Sea and the vicinity of Sakhalin Island of Russia
ICUN Red List: Complete Extinction
Color: Black or Dark Brown

It is also called the "Black Sea Lion".
Body Size: male: approximately 2.5m; female: approximately 1.4m

Gangchi, sea lions that inhabited the coast of the East Sea and consumed squids and fish, are known to be extinct. According to zoologists, sea lions can be classified into three major subspecies: California sea lion *Zalophus californianus* in the waters off California, Galápagos sea lion *Zalophus wollebaeki* in the Galápagos Islands and the Gangchi off the coast of the East Sea. However, recently there has been considerable debate on whether these sea

lions should be categorized separately from one another, making each one a unique species. Among these three types of sea lions, only the California sea lions have been able to maintain a comparatively stable population; while the Galápagos sea lions are at risk of becoming endangered, and the Gangchi are known to be extinct. The Gangchi had a slightly larger body frame than the two other types of sea lions. *(Dusan Encyclopedia)*

Dokdo, which has long stood in the middle of gushing turquoise blue waves of the East Sea, was indeed a paradise for the Gangchi. Even though no traces of the Gangchi can be found today, we can speculate that they would have been tenacious animals who held onto life as did the Korean people on the Korean Peninsula. Even in times of harsh storms with cold and violent waves, they are thought to have travelled bravely by weaving through the deep blue sea with indomitable perseverance. At the converging point of cold and warm currents and shelters on a number of rocks around Dokdo, the Gangchi was able to find abundant food available, which made it a most suitable habitat for their breeding ground. The Gangchi found shelter at Seodo, the west islet of Dokdo, where a cave had formed naturally by wave erosion. The Gangchi had a wide range of habitats from the sea of Okhotsk and Sakhalin Island in the north through the East Sea to the coast of the Japanese Archipelago in the south. Nevertheless, their numbers around Dokdo were definitely overwhelming.

There is a rock named 'Gaje Rock' near Dokdo's west islet. Perhaps this name might have been designated because it was

the place where a herd of sea lions used to climb in order to sun bathe. 'Gaje' is synonymous with Gangchi in Korean. Therefore, Dokdo was also called 'Gajido'可支島 sometimes.

At this point, Dokdo can appropriately be referred to as the "Home of the Gangchi." Singer Jeong Gwang-tae's lyrics in his song, *Dokdo is Our Land*, are: "Along the waterway 200 *ri* away/ southeast from Ulleungdo/ there is a lonely island/ home of the sea birds." If this song had been composed in the 1950s when a number of Gangchi still inhabited the vicinity of Dokdo, the phrase "Home of the Sea Birds" could have been replaced with "Home of the Gangchi."

Furthermore, evidence in Japan clearly demonstrates that there was a time when a large population of Gangchi could be found in Dokdo: 'Ryanko Daewang', a stuffed specimen of a large male sea lion on display at the Sanbe Nature Museum三瓶 in Ota大田 City, Shimane島根 Prefecture. The explanation board for 'Ryanko Daewang' illustrates as follows: This male sea lion was called 'Ryanko Daewang' due to its humongous size that made hunters fearful while capturing it at Takeshima Dokdo. This sea lion was not afraid of confronting the hunters' bullets; instead, it attacked their boat and chewed at the net. It was so powerful that the hunters thought of it as a creature to be feared. Nevertheless, it was finally shot to its death in late July 1931. Its skin, fur, and skeleton were brought to Japan and stuffed to re-create its look. A record also shows that it was exhibited at the Napryang Exhibition that was held at the Osaka ___ Zoo. It is one of the

Ryanko Islands the Japanese name for Dokdo at that time

world's largest sea lions with a body length of 2.88 m, a torso circumference of 3.1 m, and its estimated weight is more than 750 kg. In addition, 'Ryanko Daewang' is the only adult sea lion specimen that can be viewed in the world.

It is reported that out of all of the Gangchi at Dokdo the 'Ryanko Daewang' was the most courageous, largest in size, and did not fear bullets, which made hunters tremble with fear. However, the bullet that Nakawatase Jinsuke中渡瀬仁助, a sea lion hunter with 30 years' experience, shot had pierced its head and ultimately killed it in late July 1931. Although its specimen was previously preserved at the Tennoji天王寺 Zoo in Osaka, it is exhibited today at the Sanbei Nature Museum.

Sanbei Nature Museum 'Ryanko Daewang'
Source: Dokdo Headquarters

In addition to this museum, there are several other places in Shimane Prefecture in Japan where sea lion specimens have been preserved, such as Izumo出雲 High School, Taisha大社 High School and Matsue Kita松江北 High School. All of these specimens came from sea lions captured at Dokdo in 1905.

Unfortunately, the only way we can visualize the Gangchi today is through stuffed specimens or old faded photos found in Japan.

In 1992, an 8 mm video portraying the hunting activities of Gangchi was discovered in Japan.

It is very symbolic that the Gangchi can only be found as an exhibition in Japan although they once made their home at Dokdo and swam peacefully in the East Sea. The tragic end of the Gangchi reminds us of our history in the early 20th century when our sovereignty was lost in the wake of the conflicts among the imperialist powers.

In addition, the fate of the Gangchi, who once ruled Dokdo but have since disappeared without a trace, resembles the tough history of Dokdo. Where have all the Gangchi gone?

Since the Edo江戶 Period, sea lion hunting had been popular in Japan. At that time most sea lions were caught right off the coast of Japan because of its abundant population along the coast line, making it possible to avoid the violent winds and waves of the sea. According to documents recorded in the Edo Period, the Gangchi were not considered as food to be consumed, but were rather valued for their oil and leather. One Gangchi boiled in a caldron yielded about several *mal* [about 18 liters] of oil. Gangchi oil was used for burning lamps as well as for materials to make soap or glue. After extracting all the valuable parts, the meat and bones were used as fertilizer.

Gangchi were captured from all over Japan: from Kushi釧路 in the east side of Hokkaido北海道 to the Izu伊豆 Peninsula located in the middle of Honshu本州 and to Naruto鳴門 in Shikoku 四國. Nevertheless, their numbers gradually declined due to

excessive hunting and thus led to a situation where no Gangchi could be found off the Japanese coast in the early 20th century. Consequently, Japanese fishermen went to Dokdo in search of the disappearing sea lions.

This fact can be also confirmed through the second edition of *The Joseon Hydrographic Report* published by the Japanese Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Navy which includes the following article:

Ulleungdo, Alias Dictus: Matsushima Dagelet Island

"Its major fishing business is to catch abalones and as a result a large amount of dried abalones is exported annually. A sea animal called the Gangchi inhabits Takeshima Dokdo, which is located further southeast of this island, and our local people have been capturing them since the 37th year of Meiji 1903. The hunting season is about six months long between April and September and currently there are three boats (with each boat able to load five sea lions) for this job. In addition, Japanese fishermen catch about 1,130 *geun* [600 gram] per day using two diving apparatuses and two steamers."

This article indicated that the months between April and September were most ideal for hunting sea lions. However, the actual peak season was summer between May and August because herds of sea lions habitually arrived at Dokdo for breeding purposes. Due to the Gangchi's steadfast agility under water, the only way to catch them was to wait patiently until they went on land to rest.

Another record that shows Gangchi hunting activity is the activity log of the Japanese battleship Nitaka(新高) documented on September 25, 1904.

Liancourt Rocks

While Koreans documented it as Dokdo, our 'Japanese' fishermen called it Ryanko Islands. Although the channel between the two islets is wide enough to anchor a ship, it is common for small boats to be pulled over to the land above. When stormy winds gush to this island, most boats head towards Matsushima (Ulleungdo) to escape the storm with the aid of the wind. The fishermen who crossed from Matsushima to hunt Gangchi used a wasen(和船: Japan's wooden boat) that can load as much as 60 to 70 *sook*. They built a temporary shelter and stayed there for about 10 days each time, and thus made a substantial amount of income on each occasion. In addition, there were times when the number of fishermen was between 40 and 50, but no one reported a lack of fresh water.

The word 'wasen' refers to a wooden boat traditionally used by the Japanese people. The boat would not be used by Korean fishermen. Accordingly, we can conclude that the people who hunted Gangchi at Dokdo were Japanese fishermen. Through this report, we can also find that hunting Gangchi generated a significant amount of income for these fishermen.



Battleship Nitaka Activity Log

Since the end of the 19th century, Japanese fishermen from the Sanin region occasionally came to Ulleungdo to fish. According to the *Joseon-Japan Fishery Treaty* that was signed between Joseon and Japan in the 26th year of King Gojong's reign, Japanese fishermen were granted permission to fish along the Korean coast for a certain amount of fee.

squatters reached about 200 people at its peak.

this story, Nakai Yozaburo, was indeed one of these fishermen.

Gangchi photographed in June 1934

a dark and thick shadow began to cover Dokdo. The Gangchi at Dokdo, like the Korean people, struggled to maintain their way of life and endured targeted cruelty at the gun point of the Japanese advancing from the sea far in the east.

Nakai Tozaburo, who was at the forefront of Gangchi hunting, was a skillful fisherman who figured out the waterways by observing the wind. Now the Gangchi at Dokdo had to confront its fate to be killed or to be captured and humiliated as circus animals sold to please the eyes and ears of the Japanese audience. Perhaps this tragedy foreshadowed the forthcoming destiny of the people of Korean Peninsula.

Nakai Yozaburo and Gangchi

A Japanese Fisherman Coveting Dokdo

Naka Yozaburo

Everything originated from a plan of a fisherman. Nakai Yozaburo1864–1934.

It is truly ironic that the heated diplomatic issue spanning over the past 100 years was initiated by the greed of one Japanese fisherman. Of course, this may be an oversimplified explanation. Nevertheless, the fact that Nakai contributed to what would develop into a serious conflict between Korea and Japan cannot be overlooked.

Now let us examine the achievements of Nakai Yozaburo more carefully. On the basis of all the existing records, he was not, in fact, an ordinary fisherman. In other words, he was not a fisherman who simply caught seafood with his family in order to sell them at the market. He was a maritime businessman full of ambition attempting to explore new markets by adopting the most cutting-edge technology before anyone else at the time. In modern terms, it would be appropriate to compare him to a venture capitalist of today. He must have had talents that were incomparable to others when it comes to accomplishing tasks. Once he set a goal, he persistently worked to realize it as projected. It is possible to know about his past career in more detail on the basis of a résumé he submitted to the Shimane Prefecture office in 1910 and *The Biography of Nakai Yozaburo* authored by an educator who dictated what Nakai had said.

Nakai was born on January 27, 1864 in the Tohaku東伯District of Tottori Prefecture鳥取 as the third son of a farmer. His family made a living through both brewery and farming. Soon after Nakai graduated from primary school in his hometown, he

moved to Matsue松江, Shimane島根 Prefecture, which was a large city nearby, to learn from a renowned scholar of Chinese classics, Uchimura Yusuke内村友輔. Although he relocated to Tokyo for a more advanced program in Chinese classics in 1884, it did not take long for him to quit his studies and change his course in life. Perhaps the modern industrial atmosphere that flourished in Tokyo was too overwhelming for him to focus only on the exploration of the seemingly tedious, yet profound, world of Chinese classics. To Nakai, a young man from the Sanin山陰 region, which is a remote area in Japan, his entire experience of Tokyo must have been intriguing enough to the extent of making him consider an alternative career path. Having abandoned his original goal of studying Chinese classics, he was determined to become a business entrepreneur. There is an episode of his last moment reading a Chinese classic book at the age of 23 where he recited the following Chinese poem: "If we find a green mountain in any places where people go, why do we bury ourselves only in our hometown on death?" 人間到處有青山, 埋骨何必故鄉也

While studying in Tokyo, he travelled to the Ogasawara islands on someone's recommendation. At this time, many Japanese fishermen used modern fishing technology to catch whales and tuna. He also planned to visit Australia to investigate, but a crook had swindled out of him thousands of yen that he had saved up for travel expenses. Despite such discouraging events, in 1885 he started his own fishing company that used diving apparatuses in Nagasaki with his younger brother. This company used diving devices to catch fish and clams deep

in the sea. An air tank was connected to a hose that supplied oxygen from the deck of a boat. This innovation was considered to be technologically advanced for its time. Japanese boats equipped with diving devices even sailed to Jeju Island to catch considerable amounts of fish and clams. This method was very competitive as the harvested amount was much larger than that of women divers who had to dive into the water and hold their breath without oxygen tanks.

The fishing ground where Nakai first went was Vladivostok in Russia. The total revenue he reported was about 3,000 yen when he harvested 5,000 *geun* [3 million grams] with four diving apparatuses in 1892. For a while his business appeared to thrive; however, he soon began to falter and fall behind other competitive Japanese fishermen. Prospects worsened when the Russian government completely prohibited the use of a diving apparatuses for fishing purposes to protect its seas in 1893. Being trapped under such predicaments, Nakai decided to explore the fishery ground around the sea of the Korean Peninsula near Chungcheong-do and Jeolla-do. However, this expedition failed to generate profits so that he had to return to Japan and settled down at Saigocho西郷町, Shimane Prefecture, on Oki Islands. Between 1895 and 1902, he continued the business of diving-based fishery, travelling back and forth from Oki Islands to the coast of the Sanin regions and to the costal seas of Ulleungdo and Dokdo. It is known that Oki Islands is the closest place in Japan to Dokdo.

During this time, Nakai came to realize there were a number

of Gangchi populating around Dokdo. He happened to find many sea lions when navigating around Ulleungdo and Dokdo. He calculated that hunting Gangchi could be a new promising business. On his way to Ulleungdo, he once documented his regret by stating that he should not have neglected this island when he accidentally discovered that there were countless numbers of sea lions.

Accompanied by ten other fishermen, Nakai built a shelter at Dokdo in May 1903 to initiate aggressive measures for hunting the Gangchi. Rumors of a looming Russo-Japanese War circulated around this time and this resulted in rises in prices of leather and oil. Nakai was over zealous, furtively calculating that Gangchi hunting would be worth as much as mining gold. However, his first year of Gangchi hunting was disappointing due to the lack of equipment and weapons, such as guns and explosives. He reported to the office 849.13 yen in profits. In contrast, the team of Hashioka Tomojiro橋岡友次郎, who arrived later than Nakai, reported 1,960 yen in profits. In the following year, 1904, he filed a report of cessation for his diving fishery business to concentrate more on Gangchi hunting. Although he departed for Dokdo on April 1, he soon realized it was too early to hunt for Gangchi so that he went back to Oki Islands and returned to Dokdo a month later. Unfortunately, he encountered another problem as competing fishermen were already hunting the Gangchi. When Nakai arrived at Dokdo for the second time, several fishermen from Oki Islands, including Hashioka, Iguchi Ryuta井口龍太 and Gato Shigejo加藤重蔵, were hunting the Gangchi.

In addition to these fishermen from Oki Islands, there was Iwasaki岩崎 from Yamaguchi Prefecture accompanied by fishermen from Ulleungdo. Supposedly, other competitors were already engaged in reckless overfishing. The Shimane Prefecture newspaper縣誌 reported in 1904 that considerable ecological damage was sustained due to the excessive hunting of the fishermen from various regions.

It seems that Nakai was not able to reap as much profit as he had anticipated. According to a record, Nakai's profits were 2,723 yen with 17 fishermen while Hashioka made 4,235 yen with only 11 fishermen. Perhaps the hunting techniques of Nakai's team members were not as skillful as others. In order to solve this issue, he formulated a clever strategy.

"Let us make Dokdo part of Japanese territory."

Nakai Yozaburo, a fisherman of Oki Islands in Shimane Prefecture, went out to Dokdo to hunt Gangchi in the summer of 1904 as well as 1903. Upon returning to Japan as the fishing season ended, he came up with a plan to monopolize the hunting grounds for Gangchi. He believed that obtaining exclusive rights and therefore a monopoly over the rich fishing areas surrounding Dokdo would be valued as much as owning a gold mine. If anyone was allowed to hunt Gangchi without restrictions, he concluded that his share of profits would reduce dramatically. In addition, when realizing the possibility of all Gangchi vanishing in a matter of a few years, he became dreadful with fear.

In September 1904, Nakai headed to Tokyo. This trip was made to fulfill his ambition to acquire exclusive rights to the fishery ground around Dokdo. He needed to consult with an official at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce that had jurisdiction over matters regarding the fishery business in order to take the necessary steps.

Through historical documents, including Nakai's own personal records, it is possible to gain insight into the specific details that provide clues as to whom Nakai met with and what he had done 100 years ago in Tokyo. Now I am going to reconstruct his past in Tokyo, as well as the response made by the Japanese government. The problem with the remaining material is not only the appearance of several different expressions, but also the wide discrepancy arising out of different interpretations. In order to be more accurate, I attempted to quote the original terms as

they are, but added explanations when necessary.

First let us explore the historical records regarding Nakai's activities in Tokyo. There are two important past historical materials that have been widely known. Most books and research papers published in our country refer to these two sources. One of the two is a report that Nakai wrote himself: *A Takeshima Administration Summary*. This is an official report that Nakai submitted to the Oki District Office along with his résumé. It is significant because it is Nakai's handwritten report recorded in 1910, which is five years after he moved to Tokyo. However, there are only a few details included. For the sake of convenience, I will use the abbreviated term 'Summary' to refer to this report hereafter.

The second historical source is *A Talk with Nakai*中井談 that

▼ Seminar pamphlet printed in 2009

「中井養三郎と竹島」特別展・講演会が開催されます

隠岐の水産業者中井養三郎は、竹島のアシカ乱獲の様相を見て、アシカの減少を防ぎアシカ猟を安定的に継続するため、明治 37 年に竹島の領土編入及び貸し下げを政府に願い出たことで知られます。

展示では、竹島が島根県所管地となった経緯と島根県が新所管地に対し行政上行ったことを、島根県所蔵資料を主として明らかにし、さらに竹島のアシカ達の姿を今に残る写真でご紹介します。

特別展（資料提供：島根県竹島資料室）
期間　平成21年6月13日（土）～28日（日）
場所　隠岐島文化会館（コミュニケーションホール）

講演会
期日　平成21年6月24日（水）午後7時～
場所　隠岐島文化会館
（2階集会室）

講師：佐々木茂さん
（Web 竹島問題研究所 研究スタッフ、
松江東高等学校教諭、中町出身）

写真：（『島根県写真帖』所収　明治 39 年撮影　個人蔵）

【お問い合わせ先】隠岐の島町役場　総務課　行政係（竹島対策係）　電話2－2111

is a part of a book entitled *Takeshima and Ulleungdo* written by Okuhara Hukuichi奥原福市, 1873~1935 (otherwise known as Okuhara Hekiun奥原碧雲). As can be inferred in the title, it is a note that records actual conversations the author had with Nakai. Okuhara, an influential figure in education who was a principal at the Yatsuka八束 District School, published *Takeshima and Ulleungdo*, which are the records that he kept from when he accompanied Nakai on an exploration trip to Dokdo in March 1906. Okuhara dictated the story he heard from Nakai during their trip to Dokdo. Although the book was published in 1907, the manuscript was completed on May 28, 1906. It was a year and half after Nakai had arrived in Tokyo with his plan to monopolize Dokdo.

The third historical piece is a relatively recent source discovered in November 2006: a book written by Okuhara entitled *A Success Story of Nakai Yozaburo: Takeshima Administrator.* This book was made from contributions that Okuhara had sent to a magazine publisher named *Seikou*成功, Success. He wrote about what he heard from Nakai while travelling with Nakai for his investigation of Dokdo. Okuhara completed the manuscripts for the book on May 20, 1906, which was only eight days prior to the publication of *A Talk with Nakai.* Basically, this success story was quite similar to *A Talk with Nakai.* Perhaps he wrote both manuscripts



写真1
「竹島経営者中井養三郎氏立志伝」

▲ A Success Story of Nakai on Shimane Prefecture Home Page

simultaneously for different purposes. However, since the sheer volume of the biographic manuscript is much larger and more detailed, we are able to understand the circumstances more accurately. If we reconstruct the whole story by comparing and contrasting these three sources, I believe it is possible to recreate the entire picture depicting Nakai's activities in Tokyo. In this book, I attempted to develop the story on the basis of the success story because it provides more detailed facts than the other two sources discussed above.

As I previously indicated, the first person that Nakai visited was Maki Naomasa牧朴眞 (also known as Maki Bokushin), who was the Fishery Bureau Director of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Director Maki had occupied that position for eight years since 1898. Having started out as an official in the Legislative Bureau, he worked in several influential positions. He was elected twice as a representative of the lower house, and was appointed to the secretary of home affairs at the Government General Office in Taipei. He also served as governor for Aomori Prefecture. In June 1899, he toured the Korean coast, encouraging Japanese fishermen to encroach towards the sea off Korea by organizing the 'Fishermen's Union of Exclusive Fishing at Korea Sea' 韓海通漁組合.

Before arriving in Tokyo, Nakai prearranged a meeting with Director Maki through a Fishery Bureau clerk, Fujita Kantaro 藤田勘太郎, who was also from his hometown, Oki Islands. The success story accounts why Nakai met with Fishery Bureau Director Maki and what had happened before and after the visit.

as follows:

The emergence of more powerful competitors consequently led to excessive hunting. Nakai felt there was a need to restrict the number of Gangchi captured issuing permits to manage a designated area in an effort to prevent its extinction that was certain to occur in a few years. Moreover, according to the hydrographic map, Dokdo was a part of Joseon. So, protection from sudden foreign attacks would be difficult, making any capital investment into such business quite risky. For these reasons, Nakai planned to monopolize the fishing grounds by filing a petition to the Joseon government to lease it. Soon after the fishing season, he travelled to the capital with a dream of making a fortune.

Through arrangements made by Fujita Kantaro, the clerk from Oki Islands working for the Fishery Bureau at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Nakai met Director Maki to discuss his plan. In agreement, Maki recommended him to find out the

From this writing, we can understand that he wanted to monopolize the Gangchi fishing grounds by acquiring a lease contract for it by arguing that regulation was necessary in order to curtail excessive hunting in that area.

Here, we can address the important point that the official agency to which Nakai attempted to file his petition was not the Japanese government, but the Joseon government. This is because he concluded that Dokdo belonged to the territory of

Joseon, which was the Korean Empire at that time, on the basis of the navigation map.

Another record that Okuhara documented with the same source, *A Talk with Nakai*, contained somewhat similar expressions: "Nakai Yozaburo decided to file a petition to the Joseon government in order to lease the fishing grounds with the belief that Ryanko Islands was a part of Joseon territory. Soon after the fishing season ended, he went to the capital straight.…" Four years later, Nakai recorded his thoughts in the *Summary*: "I thought this island Dokdo was Korea's territory since it was attached to Ulleungdo so that there were plans to be taken care of in Tokyo prior to visiting the Japanese Residency-General in Korea." Here it seems that the Japanese Residency-General in Korea was mistakenly used for the 'Korean government' because the Japanese Residency-General in Korea was established in 1905 according to the Eulsa Treaty. It did not exist at the time when Nakai met Director Maki at the Fishery Bureau. Nevertheless, when considering the situation that when Nakai was writing his *Summary*, the Japanese Residency-General in Korea was already established and administered international affairs on behalf of Korea, it is possible that he made such a mistake. In short, the fact that Nakai attempted to submit a petition to the Korean government instead of the Japanese government commonly appears in the three remaining sources.

If so, why did he visit the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in Tokyo rather than Korean officials? Prior to initiating negotiations with the Korean government, he seemed to have first discussed the matter with the Fishery Bureau Director, who was more likely to play a key role in decision

making. Perhaps he was trying to find out what his chances of leasing the fishery grounds were, what the procedures that he had to go through were, or what he needed to do in order to succeed with his plan. Or, maybe he wanted to know whether he could receive any support from the Japanese government. Most of all, when considering the fact that during this period the Japanese Fishery Bureau encouraged Japanese fishermen to press forward to the coast of Korea, it would have been reasonable for Nakai to discuss such matters with a government official before submitting a leasing petition.

Of course, Nakai might have misjudged which nation Dokdo belonged to merely on personal opinion. However, considering that Nakai was more knowledgeable of Dokdo than any other Japanese, we should not underestimate the weight of his judgment.

Nevertheless, Director Maki agreed to support Nakai's petition to lease Dokdo. In order to make sure, he proposed Nakai to re-confirm the location of Dokdo. This moment was recorded in the *Summary* where Nakai recorded as follows: "Because of Director Maki's suggestion, I came to doubt that maybe it was not under the Korean jurisdiction."

Although we do not know the exact words spoken between Director Maki and Nakai, Nakai visited Kimotsuki Kaneyuki 肝付兼行 with his recommendation. Kimotsuki was a survey engineer who had been serving as the Hydrographic Department Director of the Ministry of Navy for 16 years. He was promoted to

lieutenant general later. The problem that arose from the meeting between Nakai and Kimotsuki was significant.

Nakai immediately met with Hydrographic Department Director Kimotsuki to ask for instructions.

Director Kimotsuki reported that there was no evidence confirming any kind of territorial belonging of the island, and when measuring the distances from the coasts of both countries, Japan and Korea, to the island, he stated: "The distance between the coast of Japan and Dokdo is closer than that of Korea." He also said, "Although there is no evidence showing that Joseon was involved in the administration of this island in the past, there is a case in which the Japanese have already engaged in the administration of this island and therefore, without question it is reasonable to incorporate it to the Japanese territory." While Nakai was listening to this comment, he became highly motivated to submit petitions for the territorial incorporation of Ryanko Islands and its lease contract to the three government ministers: the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.

▲ Hydrographic Department Director Kimotsuki

The reason why Director

Kimotsuki thought Dokdo was closer to Japan was because it was 108 nmi away from Takobana in Itsumo, while it was 118 nmi far away from Jukbyeon in Korea. Accordingly, Dokdo was closer to Japan. This claim was made on the basis of a survey that measured the distance between the coasts of both countries and Dokdo. However, it is susceptible to criticism because it involves an arbitrary interpretation which overlooked the fact that the distance between Ulleungdo and Dokdo is only 55 nmi, whereas the distance from the closest Japanese island, Oki Islands, is 85 nmi.



▲ 'Territorial Incorporation of Ryanko Islands and its Leasing Petition' submitted by Nakai

Through this process Nakai's original plan to obtain a lease for Dokdo's fishing grounds from the Korean government changed into an issue of the territorial incorporation of Dokdo. It is reasonable to assume that such ideas surfaced during the meeting that was held with Fishery Bureau Director Maki and Hydrographic Department Director Kimotsuki, and not solely from Nakai himself. Under the pretext of incorporating Dokdo into Japan's territory, Nakai anticipated obtaining a signed endorsement for an exclusive fishing license. Finally, this fisherman from Shimane Prefecture, Nakai, officially filed his petition for the territorial incorporation of Dokdo along with its

lease contract on November 29, 1904.

Several complications arose during the course of Nakai's petition for territorial incorporation until it was successfully approved. Nakai first appeared at the local office of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Upon explaining the justification grounds in support of Dokdo's incorporation, Secretary Inoue's immediate response appeared to be quite reluctant: "Japan and Russia are currently waging war and thus it is not an appropriate time to incorporate an island into our territory." Inoue informed Nakai by saying: "I cannot help but decline your petition." More details of what Inoue said can be found in the *Summary* that Nakai authored.

An official in charge at the Ministry of Home Affairs stated: "If we claim as our territory desolate rocks that are suspected to be Korean land in this situation, it would harbor more suspicion in the views of other nations, revealing our strong motivation to annex Korea. While the benefits that we may obtain are relatively insignificant, the problems that may arise would be significant. No matter what your justification is for this petition, it will be declined for obvious reasons."

To find a solution to this problem, Nakai visited Director Maki once again. Carefully listening to his detailed argument, he also answered that there was no alternative way in which he could help him, particularly when it comes to diplomatic issues. Even though Nakai was very disappointed, he refused to be set back. When hearing the news that Governor Ihara Noboru of Shimane Prefecture was travelling to Tokyo, he met with Fujita Yukitoshi,

the chief treasure of the Agriculture and Commerce Office in Shimane Prefecture, who accompanied the governor during the trip. Perhaps the two might have known each other before from business associated with fishing. To his further disappointment, Fujita's answer was somewhat similar to what he had heard previously. Fujita said, "There is nothing to do other than returning home and waiting for another chance."

However, Nakai was not the type of individual who was easily dissuaded from pursuing an agenda. His persistence can be seen in the following story: When Nakai visited a jurist, Kuwata Kumazo桑田熊蔵, 1868~1932, to consult his problem, Kuwata immediately wrote a letter to Yamaza Enjiro on Nakai's behalf. Kuwata wrote: "If neither the Ministry of Home Affairs nor the Fishery Bureau is willing to get involved in this matter because they think it is an issue of diplomacy, it would be better for you to visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly to explain the situation in which you were placed in order to clarify it." With this recommendation letter, Nakai met with Yamaza, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Finally, the seemingly hopeless matter seemed to have unraveled clues during this meeting between Nakai and Director Yamaza.

▲ Yamaza Enjiro

Since Nakai thought this was his last chance, he addressed his

opinion and position regarding the administration of Ryanko Islands (Dokdo) with absolute passion. The director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was ranked right below the vice minister, who was superseded by the minister. This shows that his position was very influential in practice. There were only two directors at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in those days: the Political Affairs Bureau Director and the Trade Bureau Director. Yamaza's response to Nakai's explanation was as follows:

The director who listened to his explanation nonchalantly opened his mouth slowly and said, "Diplomatic issues should not be a concern of any other person. Although an issue like incorporating rocky islands used to be considered insignificant, in view of the geographical and historical impacts as well as the current situation, I admit that territorial incorporation would bring considerable amounts of profits to Japan."

The Political Affairs Bureau Director thought that the current situation rather required urgent territorial incorporation, which would allow for the construction of a watchtower and wireless or undersea cables for effective surveillance of enemies. He said in excitement, "We do not take what the Ministry of Home Affairs said into consideration, particularly when it comes to international affairs" and highly encouraged Nakai to submit the petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with haste.

I will explain the importance of what Director Yamaza said with regard to erecting a watchtower and wireless or undersea cables in detail in a later chapter. In conclusion, all barriers that had

obstructed Nakai were completely taken care of after the meeting with Director Yamaza. Although the Ministry of Home Affairs showed reluctance to avoid possible international conflicts, surprisingly the most influential character at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared his support to this petition. This was a promising sign that his goal was about to be fulfilled. Nakai visited the Ministry of Home Affairs with Dr. Kuwata to meet Secretary Inoue, who previously had dismissed the petition, but now was willing to support its approval this time around. The only thing left for him to carry out was to take all the administrative steps required.

Through these processes, the original plan motivated by the greed of a Japanese fisherman developed into a totally unexpected result. In the four-month term from September 1904 to January 1905 the plan was modified in a way that Nakai himself could not have imagined.

Territorial Incorporation under a Different Name

As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed its intention to strongly endorse territorial incorporation, Nakai Yozaburo's petition process began to be expedited. The Ministry of Home Affairs that took charge of this matter sent an official letter to the Ministry of Navy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce at the central government as well as Shimane Prefecture. This is because it wished to assign a suitable name to this new island. Taking into account the intentions behind the questions in this letter, we can conclude that Japan already had its plan to incorporate Dokdo into its territory. An administrative decision regarding which particular regional government should be in charge was virtually made. It was reasonable to place Dokdo under the jurisdiction of Oki Islands in Shimane Prefecture, which was the closest to the island geographically.

The only problem the Japanese government had was to come up with an appropriate name for the new island. In those days, Dokdo was commonly called Ryanko Islands by Japanese fishermen. This name was derived from the Japanese pronunciation of 'Liancourt Rocks,' which Westerners identified as Dokdo. When the Japanese government was about to incorporate this island into its territory, it did not want to use a foreign name officially. For this reason, prior to its territorial incorporation, Japan's central government asked Shimane Prefecture to designate a most appropriate name in light of its geography and history. However, this effort led to more aggravation and confusion.

In the 17th and 18th century of the Edo period, Japanese literature recorded Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Takeshima竹島 and Matsushima松島, respectively. Although it is difficult to trace the origins of these names, perhaps the Japanese who travelled to Ulleungdo named it Takeshima upon observing abundant bamboo trees. In Japanese tradition, it is common to use two related terms in pairs such as pine trees松 and bamboo trees竹. According to this tradition they might have given the name Matsushima, which means the island of pine trees, to Dokdo. It was confirmed that Takeshima and Matsushima were commonly used to refer to Ulleungdo and Dokdo respectively until the latter half of the 18th century.



▲ Copy of a part of Siebold Map
Source: Kawakami, *A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima*

When a French naval battleship discovered Ulleungdo in 1787 while it was heading towards the East Sea, Captain Laperouse named it Dagelet, after the name of the discoverer. Two years later, in 1789, Britain's James Kolnet also named it Argonaute after the name of the battleship that he was on board. The problem is that although both battleships surveyed Ulleungdo's longitude and latitude points, their results were different from each other. Argonaute was further west to Dagelet; as a result, an incorrect map showing two Ulleungdo islands in the East Sea happened to be distributed in Europe.

In 1840, a Dutch doctor and naturalist from the Netherlands named Siebold published a map of Japan in which he drew two independent islands: Dagelet and Argonaute. However, on the basis of his experience living in Japan for seven years, he understood the fact that Matsushima was further east of Takeshima in the East Sea. He therefore concluded that Argonaute located west referred to Takeshima, and Daglet to its further east was Matsushima. He recorded both western and Japanese names on the map.

The name of Liancourt appeared in 1840, nine years later than the publication of Siebold's map. A French whaler that proceeded to the East Sea in an effort to capture sperm whales discovered Dokdo and named it Liancourt Rocks, which was also called Liancourt Volcanic Rocks列岩. Through a change in pronunciation it has been commonly known as Ryankoru Islands or Ryanko Islands in Japan. The name of Liancourt has been widely used in western maps and documents. In 2008, when the U.S. Library of Congress was working on the revision of key words for classification purposes, it attempted to change the

key words of Dokdo to Liancourt, but did not due to the protest of the Korean government and the people.

At this point, Westerners became more confused, believing that maybe there are three islands in the East Sea: Argonaute, Dagelet and Liancourt Rocks. The Russian battleship *Pallas* in 1854 and the English battleship *Hornet* in 1855 appeared in the East Sea subsequently. The results of their surveys revealed that there is no island like Argonaute at the longitude-latitude coordinates on the Kolnet map. As a result, Argonaute was deleted on western maps and only Dagelet remained. Another name for Dagelet that was recorded on the Siebold map was Matsushima. In other words, the equation of 'Argonaute=Takeshima' was completely

▲ Coastal Area Map of Japan in the Admiral Perry's Expedition of Japan

was confirmed.

Japan's government dispatched a battleship, Amagi 天城, for investigation in 1880 and found out that Matsushima, which appeared on the western map, was actually Ulleungdo. Soon after, the official documents of Japan adopted unified terms, Matsushima for Ulleungdo and Ryanko Islands for Dokdo.

Under such circumstances, Japan's incorporation of Dokdo was being processed. Shimane Prefecture, which received an order with regard to renaming, sent this matter to the governor of Oki Islands. In response to this question, he sent a letter as follows:

> the island, the document number of 1073 on the 15th of this month

concluded: it would be no problem if it belongs to Oki Islands, and when it comes to its name, Takeshima 竹島 is appropriate: it has been orally transmitted that there were two islands in the [illegible] Ulleungdo called Takeshima, it is certain that its name on maps is Matsushima. If we name Ulleungdo Matsushima, then we hope to call the new island Takeshima, since there are no other islands that can take its place.」

Through this process, Ulleungdo which used to be called Takeshima in the old documents became Matsushima, and Matsushima which previously indicated Dokdo became

Takeshima. If the governor of Oki Islands had thoroughly studied the historical evidence, there would have been no such confusion. In fact, an opportunity to fix Siebold's mistake disappeared. Here we can conclude that the fact that the people of Oki Islands, which are closest to Dokdo, rarely knew its original name clearly shows that the Japanese did not even recognize the existence of Dokdo.

Shimane Prefecture never questioned the letter from Oki Islands' governor, nor did the Ministry of Home Affairs when receiving a letter from Shimane Prefecture. Without suggesting any other opinions, the name of the island was registered as Takeshima.

On January 10, 1905, the Ministry of Home Affairs requested to hold a Cabinet meeting with a confidential official letter to Prime Minister Katsura Taro桂太郎 with the name of Minister Yoshikawa Akamasa芳川顯正. Four months after Nakai's petition was received, Prime Minister Katsura made the following decision at the cabinet meeting held on January 28 with 11 other cabinet members:

"Upon the investigation of the inhabited island in the attached document of the petition, it is located at 37° 09'30" North, 131° 55' East, which is 85 nmi away from the northwest of Oki Islands. This shows that there is no evidence that it was ever occupied by another country. A year before the last year in the 36th year of Meiji, one of our fishermen named Nakai built a fishing tent and moved fishermen with full equipment of hunting Gangchi and he requested a lease for hunting Gangchi

by means of territorial incorporation. Taking this opportunity, we need to ensure the territorial belonging of the island and its name, giving it the name of Takeshima. It is purported to subject it to the governor of Oki Islands in Shimane Prefecture. On the basis of this evidence, it is a documented fact that a fisherman named Nakai actually moved to the island and engaged in fishery. In accordance with international law, occupancy should be acknowledged. It is reasonable to consider an assignment of governing rights to the governor of Oki Islands in Shimane Prefecture, and I here acknowledge that this was approved at the Cabinet meeting."

Since 2006, there have been annual celebrations of 'Takeshima Day' in Shimane Prefecture on February 22. Where does the



▲ Cabinet Decision of Dokdo Territorial Incorporation [National Official Document Library of Japan]

date of February 22 come from? This is the date when the incorporation of Dokdo determined by the cabinet meeting took effect through notification. However, the fact that the official announcement was made at a local government level instead of the central government level has aroused controversy.

As a follow-up decision to the Cabinet meeting, the Ministry of Home Affairs ordered Shimane Prefecture to post the incorporation of Dokdo through Directire No. 87 on February 15, 1905. According to this instruction, the Shimane Prefecture governor announced Notice No. 40 and published a very brief article in the Shimane gazette on February 22, 1905.

We identify the Islands at 37° 09'30" North, 131° 55' East, 85 nautical miles northwest of Oki Islands as Takeshima, and these islands are under the jurisdiction of the governor of Oki Islands in Shimane Prefecture.

The reason why the Japanese government handled such matters locally instead of through a nationwide public announcement is debatable. Even though common sense tells us that a public declaration would have been more beneficial in terms of enforcing ownership, Japanese officials did not actively inform everyone at this time. This can be confirmed from the fact that there were no major Japanese newsletters that publicized it other than the local gazette published in Shimane Prefecture.

Researchers in support of Japan's position argue that it was done on the grounds of the previous case of *terra nullius*. Prior to the territorial incorporation of Dokdo, the Japanese government had

incorporated Minamidorishima南鳥島 located 660 nmi southeast of Ogasawara小笠原 in July 1898. Even then, a public notice was posted on the Directive in the Tokyo office instead of being announced in official newspapers published by the central government.

However, depending on the angle in which it is viewed, opinions may differ: It is suspicious that the Japanese government chose not to widely disclose its incorporation of Dokdo. Such view was bolstered when Choi Nam-seon criticized the furtive manner, stating that whether knowingly or unknowingly an edict was posted on the government office door. In order to have legal effect, making territorial incorporation completely secretive was not possible. Accordingly, a public notice was required. However, it appears that the Japanese government did not want to reveal it openly so that it chose a surreptitious way to post it at the Shimane Prefecture government office. The previous example of the Minamidorishima incorporation could have been an opportune excuse to avoid future controversies. Japanese government officials were anxious about the severe resistance expressed by the Korean people and afraid of the consequences they had to face when such news was



▲ Shimane Prefecture Notice No. 40

publically revealed to the Western powers. This assumption parallels the reasons that the Director at the Ministry of Home Affairs addressed in opposition: "This would make other nations suspicious about our country's ambition to annex Korea."

As a result, the territorial incorporation of Dokdo was not known within Japan for a while. There were no other media outlets that announced the decision of the Cabinet meeting. Only a short article entitled "New Islands of Oki" was published in the Sanin Newspaper山陰新聞, which was a local paper in Shimane Prefecture.

Even after four months since the territorial incorporation was passed in the government gazette, the word 'Ryankorudo Rocks' was still being used instead of Takeshima. In an extra column of the gazette on May 28, 1905, it was reported that Admiral Togo Heihachiro東郷平八郎 annihilated the Russian Baltic battleship: "Four enemy ships including Nicolas I surrendered near 'Ryankorudo Rocks' without damage on our vessels." It seems like there was someone who pointed out this mistake. The gazette on June 5 issued a correction notice of the used term 'Ryankorudo Rocks' to 'Takeshima.' This indicates that neither the naval authority involved in the strategic operation to advance to the East Sea nor the editor in chief was aware of the official name change to Takeshima.

When considering such circumstances in Japan, it must have been very difficult for the Korean government to immediately know about Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo. In fact, it

took a year and three months for the Korean government to be finally aware of this change. I will explain this point more in detail in a later chapter.


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▲ an article about the incorporation of Dokdo on the Sanin Newspaper, Japan

Through these processes, Dokdo was incorporated into Japan in accordance with its domestic laws. Japan later annexed Korea by conquest, but was defeated in World War II, and thereby the territories of Korea were somewhat reverted to as they were previously. Nonetheless, Japan continues to press its claims on Dokdo as its rightful land. Since the territorial incorporation of Dokdo occurred before the annexation of 1910, Japan contends that it has no correlation with the forceful annexation of Korea. The most important grounds of Japan's persistent claim on Dokdo lies in the territorial incorporation of 1905. Of course, it is another problem as to whether it is a reasonable claim in view of international law. In short, the issue regarding the territorial incorporation of 1905 that has become the source of conflict between Korea and Japan for more than six decades was initiated by a petition filed to the Japanese government from a fishery business entrepreneur about a century ago.

The Ministry of Home Affairs' Opposition to the Incorporation of Dokdo

Up until now, we have studied the process of Dokdo's incorporation in detail beginning from the petition filing procedures initiated by a fishermen's business ambitions to the final steps of Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo. In the previous chapters, we identified an important fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs at first informed a dismissal with respect to the petition of territorial incorporation that Nakai had submitted. This could be a compelling example clearly showing how Japan viewed Dokdo during the time of Nakai's petition. If so, let us carefully investigate the background in depth so that we can find out more about why the Ministry of Home Affairs was opposed to Dokdo's incorporation.

Back in 1876, the 9th year after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Meiji Government began modern map publication and land registration地籍 works. This was part of new internal reforms in order to establish a modern nation.

In this process, controversy arose as to whether the map should include Takeshima (Dokdo) as registered land for Japan. On October 5, an official in charge of the Geography Department 地理察 at the Ministry of Home Affairs sent an official document to Shimane Prefecture to engage in consultations regarding this problem. This official expressed his acquired interest when he heard a rumor from the local people: "There is a desolate island 孤島 called Takeshima across Oki Islands and a sea route to it that a merchant ship from Tottori used to travel to the island with the guidance of local people. It seems that Shimane Prefecture decided to ponder over this matter without a final conclusion.

A counselor who was responsible for this matter in Shimane Prefecture, Sakai Jiro境二朗, sent the results of his investigation on October 16 to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which included cases in which the Oya大谷 and Murakawa村川 families of Yonako traveled back and forth between Tottori Prefecture and Ulleungdo with a map and fishing license issued by the Shogunate, Japan's feudal government. This document is so-called the "Publication of a Map of Takeshima竹島 and Another Island" 日本海內竹島外一島地籍編纂方伺. Its key point was to question as to whether TakeshimaUlleungdo and another island should be included in the Shimane Prefecture map.

"In the past, governmental jurisdiction over it was ill-substantiated and since we cannot be certain about a sea route stretching 100 miles, it is impossible to travel to the islands by boat. (omitted) However, if it is estimated that they are located west from Oki Islands隱岐國, particularly from Sanin山陰, it would be best to include it as registered land by marking them on the map. We hope to receive your orders regarding this matter."

The Sanin region covers both Shimane and Tottori prefectures. Ulleungdo is geographically closer to Shimane Prefecture Oki than Tottori Prefecture.

The Ministry of Home Affairs also conducted an independent investigation for five months. Beside the materials submitted by Shimane Prefecture, all documents related to 'Takeshima matters' were carefully examined. 'Takeshima matters' refer to the diplomatic negotiations exchanged between Joseon and Japan

regarding the territorial rights of Ulleungdo in the year of 1693 of King Sukjong's reign, which was the Tokugawa Shogunate period in Japan. Due to the Ahn Yong-bok安龍福 incident, this is called the 'Ahn Yong-bok Dispute' in Korea.

The result of the investigation concluded that 'Takeshima and another island' were not land belonging to Japan. In the view of the Ministry of Home Affairs, this was an expected outcome. This is because the An Yong-bok incident in January 1696 was settled by the Tokugawa Shogun, which concluded that TakeshimaUlleungdo was Joseon territory without ambiguity and thus prohibited Japanese voyage to TakeshimaUlleungdo.

When the Ministry of Home Affairs reached this conclusion, it submitted its report to Dajokan太政官, which was the highest government level at that time. Dajokan does not refer to a name for an official position but a top governmental cabinet composed of officials such as prime minister, vice minister and third minister. Since 'Decisions on Map Registration' was an important matter that decided whether an area should be included or excluded from a map, it had to be finalized by Dajokan rather than by the Ministry of Home Affairs' sole endorsement. At that time, the Ministry of Home Affairs not only sent a copy of the document submitted by Shimane Prefecture, but also attached the copied documents exchanged between Joseon and Japan in the Shogunate period. These were official documents exchanged between Tsushima Prefecture對馬島, which was the official diplomatic negotiation channel to Joseon during the time of the Shogunate, and the Department of Rites of Joseon.

Dajokan confirmed the view of the Ministry of Home Affairs through the review of the Investigation Department after it had received written inquiry from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Dajokan Order was indeed the same with the original document that the Ministry of Home Affairs had sent.

We decided that Takeshima and another island in the Sea of Japan are to be excluded from the Map of Japan.

日本海竹島外一島版圖外ト定ムト



▲ Dajokan Order (National Official Document Library of Japan)

With regard to Takeshima and another island, make it sure that they have no relations to our country.

伺ノ趣竹島外一島ノ儀本邦關契無之儀ト可相心得事

This order was approved with the signatures of several officials, including Iwakura Tomomi岩倉具視, vice minister of Dajokan. It was sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs on March 29, 1877 and again to Shimane Prefecture on April 9.

The most controversial point in this document is what another island in the expression "Takeshima and another

island" indicates exactly. The Dajokan decision regarding Takeshima$_{Ulleungdo}$ cannot be a problem because it admitted Ulleungdo was a part of Korea. It is important to question whether 'another island' refers to today's Dokdo because this is directly related as to whether the Japanese government considered Dokdo as its territory at that time.

The evidence in the attached document that was delivered from Shimane Prefecture to Dajokan through the Ministry of Home Affairs provides the grounds for judging if 'another island' refers to Dokdo.

First, there was a supplemental map identified as 'Isotakeshima Ryakuzu磯竹島略圖', which was sent to the Ministry of Home

▼ Isotakeshima Ryakuzu



Affairs from Shimane Prefecture. Isotakeshima and Matsushima are both drawn on this map. It is clear that Isotakeshima refers to Ulleungdo and Matsushima the Japanese name for Dokdo at that time was for today's Dokdo. Not only the name of these islands but also the shape, distance and size contribute to confirming that 'another island' is in fact Dokdo. As depicted in the picture, the two large islands (east and west islands) with several surrounding small islets clearly show that they are consistent with today's geological features of Dokdo. In addition, the fact that it describes "It is 40 *ri* from Matsushima to Isotakeshima" also shows that 'another island' indicates Dokdo.

More evidence comes from a record that explained the circumstance of Isotakeshima in a supplementary document composed by Shimane Prefecture which was sent to Dajokan. The document concerns both Isotakeshima and Matsushima, resulting from the recognition that Matsushima$_{Dokdo}$ was not a separate island from Isotakeshima$_{Ulleungdo}$ but rather a part of it.

We call it Isotakeshima or Takeshima.

It is located 120 *ri* northwest of Oki Islands, and its parameter is about 10 *ri* with rugged mountains (omitted). Another island called Matsushima covers an area of about 30 jeongbo [293,520.661㎡]. It is located on the same coordinates, 80 *ri* from Oki and its distance is approximately 80 *ri*. There are sea animals but few bamboos and trees.⌟

Based on this paragraph, it is evident that 'another island' was no other than Dokdo. Considering this fact, it is assumed that

the Japanese government at that time, in particular, Dajokan officially admitted that neither Ulleungdo nor Dokdo was the land belonging to Japan. The most reliable evidence Dajokan rested on was the Shogunate's decision in 1696 to admit Ulleungdo as Korean territory.

The Dajokan Order was made 27 years before Nakai submitted his petition for territorial incorporation of Dokdo in 1904. This conclusion was discovered while exchanging official documents among Shimane Prefecture, the Ministry of Home Affairs and Dajokan. Accordingly, an official who was in charge of processing the petition at the Ministry of Home Affairs did not contradict this decision. During an interview with Nakai regarding Ryanko Islands, which is Dokdo, a public official at the Ministry of Home Affairs, Secretary Inoue井上, stated, "The reefs are suspected to be Korean territory." It is also assumed that his statement, "No matter how much you try to explain your position, your petition will be likely to be rejected.", may have been said in such a decisive manner due to the Dajokan Order.

From Japan's perspective, it is certain that the Dajokan Order is a detrimental material. When taking the historical material regarding Takeshima竹島 into account, it is contradictory for the Japanese government to change its official position and claim ownership on the land that they had denied only 130 years ago: "It竹島 has no relation to our country."

In some cases, the Japanese government also claims that the Shogunate and Meiji governments only acknowledged

Ulleungdo as belonging to Joseon, but not Dokdo. Even if they admitted 'another island' was Dokdo, they merely declared that 'another island' had no relations to the country, which does not necessarily mean that they acknowledged Dokdo as Joseon's territory. This means there are no contradictions between the Dajokan Order and the approval of territorial incorporation since Japan preoccupied an inhabited island, Dokdo, in 1905 and according to international law, Dokdo had become Japanese territory. However, as examined in the previous section of supplementary documents attached to the Dajokan Order, it is undeniable that Japan's government already recognized Dokdo as an island attached to Ulleungdo. In other words, on the basis of recognition that Ulleungdo is Korean territory without question, Dokdo attached to Ulleungdo is also Korean territory.

Recently, another claim uses the ghost island on the western map, 'Argonaute,' as supporting evidence to indicate 'another island.' The most representative Japanese advocate who asserts Japan's territorial rights over Dokdo is Professor Shimozo Masao 下條正男 from Takushoku拓殖 University. He wrote an article in the 'Web Takeshima Research Lab' in April 2011. As described previously, the name of Argonaute was given to Ulleungdo when Britain's battleship Kolnet was navigating the East Sea. Nevertheless, due to a mistake in measuring latitude and longitude, it was reported that there was another island in the west of Ulleungdo. That is, a ghost island appeared to exist to the west of Ulleungdo. According to the western map at that time, it shows two names recorded for each island: Argonaute's other name is Takeshima竹島 and for Dagelet, which is Ulleungdo,

Matsushima松島. (See map on page 48)

Professor Shimozo maintains that with regard to 'Takeshima and another island,' Takeshima is the ghost island, Argonaute, while 'another island' indicates Dagelet or Ulleungdo. Accordingly, Ulleungdo and the ghost island of Argonaute are the two islands that were confirmed in the Dajokan Order declaring, "They are not related to this region." In other words, there was no mention of Dokdo at all in the Dajokan Order. Professor Shimozo revised his interpretation for 'Takeshima and another island' several times. In the book he authored in 2004, he pointed out: "if another island refers to today's Takeshima, it is evident that it has no relation to our nation (Japan)." He then admitted that 'another island' is Matsushima, which is today's Dokdo, in a TV program broadcast in 2006. He changed his view once again claiming that the Dajokan Order must have referred to Dagelet and Argonaute, which means Ulleungdo and Takeshima, respectively. At first glance it would seem convincing; however, when investigating the map (Isotakeshima Ryakuzu) and supplementary documents, it is evident that 'another island' refers to Dokdo. There is no comment about this in Professor Shimozo's paper. Did he truly overlook the publicly accessible map and the supplementary document of the Dajokan Order? Professor Shimozo arranged for the travel of lawmaker Shindo, a representative of the Liberal Democratic Party, who attempted to enter South Korea with the purpose of investigating the Dokdo conflict on August 1, 2011, but his entry was refused. Professor Shimozo also attempted to enter South Korea via Incheon International Airport one day earlier on July 31, but his entry was denied.



▲ Kawakami's book: *A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima*

I have one more thing to mention with regard to the Dajokan Order. The first person to suggest the Dajokan Order as material to refute Japan's territorial claim on Dokdo was a professor at Kyoto University, Hori Kazuo堀和生. In his paper published in 1987, *Japan's Territorial Incorporation of Takeshima in 1905*, he cited the Dajokan Order. Professor Hori's paper empirically refutes all controversial points appearing in Kawakami Kenzo's paper, *A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima* in which Kawakami studied historical materials and records as an official of the Investigation Department at the Treaty Division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This paper has been considered as the authoritative bible when it comes to studying the history of Dokdo. However, in his paper there is no indication with regard to the Dajokan Order or its reference. Was he unaware of the existence of these documents?

I had meals with Professor Hori several times and he once said to me: "A long time ago when I investigated historical materials related to the Dajokan Order at the National Official Document Library, I checked to see who had previously looked at the materials and saw Kawakami's name was included in the list."

Japan's Understanding of Dokdo as Korean Territory

Unlike the simple original plan that a fisherman of Shimane Prefecture, Nakai Yozaburo, had to monopolize the fishing ground of Dokdo, he came to meet four key government officials in the process of submitting the petition for the territorial incorporation: Secretary Inoue at the Local Bureau of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Director Maki Naosama at the Fishery Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Director Kimotsuki Kaneyuki at the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Navy and Director Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎 at the Political Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Among these four important characters, the first person Nakai consulted was Director Maki who proposed Nakai to consult with the Ministry of Navy for a better judgment, because there was a possibility that Dokdo was not Korean territory. One step further from this point, Director Kimotsuki, an expert in hydrographic survey, recommended that Dokdo should be incorporated into Japan since there was no evidence confirming Korea's territorial rights. On the other hand, Inoue at the Ministry of Home Affairs was going to dismiss the petition for territorial incorporation at first. It was Yamaza at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who played a crucial role in resuscitating the case of Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo that would have otherwise never occurred.

When taking the series of events into consideration, not all the Japanese government officials appear to have worked consistently in agreement from the beginning to push forward with the territorial incorporation. This can be explained by

the fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs was going to decline Nakai's petition at first. In addition, the answer Fishery Bureau Director Maki gave in the second meeting was so skeptical: "I could do nothing but dismiss your proposal." This view is contradictory to some Korean scholars' assertion that it was the Japanese government that directed Nakai to carry out the incorporation of Dokdo from the beginning. However, taking the situation after the Russo-Japanese War into consideration, it becomes evident that the discussion that Nakai initiated influenced the government bureaucrats to expedite the territorial incorporation and thus encouraged Nakai to submit the petitions.

In conclusion, in the situation where there was no consistent government policy established regarding this matter, it was Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza who contributed to making a dramatic change in policy to subside controversies. If he prioritized diplomatic concerns like other bureaucrats, Nakai's petition for the territorial incorporation would have been dismissed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. If so, today's issue on Dokdo would never have occurred. In this sense, the meeting between a fisherman from Shimane Prefecture, Nakai Yozaburo 中井養三郎, and Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought about a fateful consequence that led to the territorial incorporation of Dokdo.

Among the four officials, it was only Secretary Inoue who judged that Dokdo could be Korea's territory. If so, what kind of ideas did the other three officials, Maki, Kimotsuki and

Yamaza have? Did they believe it was an uninhabited island or an island without an owner? If so, did they think it is reasonable to incorporate Dokdo into their country? If not, even though they certainly understood it to be Korean territory, did they rush to incorporate it into Japan without investigation? The answers to these questions would be helpful when consulting with the international legal validity to a certain extent, but it is still difficult to find correct answers to the questions on the historical record. Unfortunately, Director Yamaza did not leave any records describing the detailed process occurred in imposing the territorial incorporation. No official government documents, memoirs or journals have yet to be discovered. Maybe it was intended not to leave such records at all.

However, there is some evidence that provides a clue that the three might have already known the fact that Dokdo was part of Korean territory. Although it cannot be decisive evidence, it certainly provides a solid ground for confirming such beliefs.

The first evidence is *The Fishery Guide around the Korean Sea* 韓海漁業指針 that was published by Black Dragon Society 黒龍会, Kokuryukai in January 1903. This book is a directory that shows details on the current situation of the fishery business and fishing ground around the coast of the Korean Peninsula. The book was published in support of the Japanese fishermen who wished to enter the sea along the Korean coast.

The Society was eager to promote a public opinion that Japan should more aggressively advance into the continent, such as

the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria and Siberia. By dispatching an activist group called the 'Continental Ronin Club'大陸浪人, it operated in espionage encouraging spying activities on the continent. Japan's Right Wing of today originates from this Society. In Korea, this organization was notorious in that they controlled Iljinhoe 一進會, a pro-Japanese association from behind so that they could work for expediting Japan's annexation of Korea. The author, Kuzuu Shusuke葛生修亮, indicated in the preface of his book that he wrote it on the basis of his traveling experiences of whaling business in Ulsan navigating from Busan to the shores of the Tumen River, to Mokpo and to Jeju, as well as to Gunsan. Kuzuu was a member of the 'Joseon Ronin Club' 朝鮮浪人, which conducted exploring activities using Busan as a base. He later became a 'gansa'幹事, a head of this organization. This book describes more detailed explanations about Dokdo (Ryanko Islands).

Ryanko Islands 30 *ri* Southeast from Ulleungdo

It is a desolate island that is apart from the coast of Korea as far as from Oki, our country. On clear days it can be seen from a higher point of the mountain on Ulleungdo. Both Korean people and Japanese fishermen called it Ryanko Islands and its length is approximately 10 *jeong*町. Its coast is curvy but convenient to anchor a ship so as to escape storms. However, it is difficult to find firewood and water on the island: Even after digging several *cheok* [about 2 meters], no water was found. On this island, there are a considerable number of sea horses海馬 (Although sea horses indicates sea elephants in definition, what they meant

was Gangchi.) and abalones, sea cucumbers and gelidium near the coast. Several years ago once when fishing boats with diving apparatus from Yamaguchi Prefecture travelled to this area, a number of sea horses blocked their way. In addition to this, a shortage of water caused them to return home without a satisfactory catch. The season at that time was between May and June, which is the breeding season of the sea horses. This may be the reason there were a number of Gangchi that interfered with the boats. In addition, there is a fishing ground for sharks nearby: to hunt these sharks over May and June, many boats for hunting sharks from Oita Prefecture appeared over the past several years. Last spring when we asked the fishermen about their harvest, they said: "Although the last couple of months fishing results were not so satisfactory, we do not doubt it must be a promising fishing ground because the season and the state of fish caught in the net, as well as the pattern of shark inhabitation, shows its potential to be a profitable fishery business. I believe this island is worth exploring for the fishermen."

The most important fact is that this brochure explains Ryanko Islands(Dokdo) as an appendage to Ulleungdo. We now need to pay a close attention to the fact that the author was a member of 'Joseon Ronin Club' that was better informed about the circumstances of Korea. If such a person pointed out Dokdo was an island attached to Ulleungdo, this clearly shows that the Japanese fishermen who were familiar with Korea's geography already recognized that Dokdo was Korean land even prior to the territorial incorporation of 1905. Although this book was

▲ Dokdo picture from Ulleungdo (2008 Joongang Daily): evidence showing the visible distance of Dokdo

published in 1903, its manuscript was completed in 1901. The author, Kuzuu, also published almost the same article in the volume one of the second edition of the gazette issued by the Black Dragon Society in 1901.

Furthermore, a phrase in *The Fishery Guide around the Korean Sea* stated: "On clear days Dokdo can be seen from a higher point of the mountain on Ulleungdo." This visibility by the naked eye has been one of the crucial arguments that Korea and Japan disagree about. Another material that also mentioned the distance visible between Dokdo and Ulleungdo is *Geographical Records from the Annals of King Sejong*, which indicates: "The distance between

Usan Dokdo and Muleung Ulleungdo is not far from each other so that Dokdo can be seen from Ulleungdo on a clear day." Ever since Kawakami Kenzo 川上健三, an investigating agent at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attempted to deny the visibility in the 1960s by a mathematical formula between these two islands in *A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima*, Japan has persistently maintained this view. Nonetheless, this guide book for fishery business published in 1903 undoubtedly describes Dokdo as viewable from Ulleungdo.

It is notable that the person who wrote the publication statement for *The Fishery Guide around the Korean Sea* was Fishery Bureau Director Maki whom Nakai Yozaburo first met to discuss his plan. Director Maki appeared to be conversant in fishery affairs from his inspection experience with the fishery grounds near the Korean coast. Particularly, he seemed to have sufficient information about Ulleungdo and Dokdo where a considerable

▼ *Recent Business Directory of Korea*





number of Japanese fishermen launched fishing businesses. Even though in 1901, he wrote the publication statement for the guide book for fishery business, which explains that Dokdo is a part of Gangwon-do, three years later he suggested that Nakai confirm whether it was Korean land with the Ministry of Navy because there was a possibility that it may not be a part of the Korean territory.

Yamaza's case is somewhat similar to Maki's. Yamaza authored the preface of the book entitled "*The Recent Business Directory of Korea*" 最新韓國實業指針 published by Hobunkan寶文館 in 1904. This book described businesses in Korea at that time, such as farming, fishery, sericulture, ranching, trade, currency and transportation. The author of this book, Iwanaga Shigeka岩永竜華, once served as the chairman of the Japanese Settlement Corporation in Shineuiju新義州. The same explanation that Ryanko Islands is a part of Gangwon-do also appears in the Fishery Section in Chapter 13 of this book. It seems to refer to the 1903 edition of *The Fishery Guide around the Korean Sea.*

"Ryanko Islands is located in the middle of the sea between Ulleungdo and Oki, 30 *ri* apart.

There are no inhabitants on the entire island. Although it is convenient to anchor a boat, it is difficult to find firewood and water. In the sea nearby, many abalones, sea cucumbers and gelidium are caught. Even though there are a number of sharks, it is not so easy to have good results for fishing due to the interference from a considerable number of sea horses海馬 on this island."

The date Yamaza wrote the preface for the book is July 23, 1904, which is two months before he met Nakai Yozaburo. In this preface, he clearly states the fact that he once read *The Recent Business Directory of Korea*. If so, he must have read the phrases about Dokdo that was a part of Gangwon-do. Ironically, two months later he supported the enforcement of territorial incorporation of Dokdo. Let us refer to the part in Yamaza's preface of the book:

"Although the foundation of an amicable relationship between Japan and Korea was confirmed through a Japan-Korea Protocol, such a relationship is limited to the government level. In order to promote a closer friendship between the two nations, I am certain that many Japanese businessmen should enter the Korean Peninsula so that they may foster more amicable relationships among the people (omitted). Moreover, I regret that our business and industry were underdeveloped on the peninsula in the past because the foundation of our policy against Korea was unconvincing. I believe this book will be a very useful guide for developing our business on the peninsula. Although we certainly cannot overlook competition against other countries, I hope to gradually develop a special relationship between Japan and Korea so that we can triumph over people of another country (Korean people) in free competition. I welcome this book with all my heart in that it is a tool that will contribute to accomplishing such hope."

In the preface, Yamaza stated that he hoped to develop a special relationship between Japan and Korea. It is important

to read between the lines of this statement because this book was written in the middle of waging the Russo-Japanese War. After Japan was victorious over Russia, Japan completely removed Russia's influence from the Korean Peninsula by making Korea its protectorate state. Yamaza highly encouraged Japanese businessmen to participate in Korea even before the war was over under the assumption that Korea would become a protectorate state. I will further discuss Yamaza's characteristics and the policies he adopted with commitment in a later chapter.

There is a strong possibility that Director Kimotsuki at the Hydrographic Department, who asserted to Nakai that Dokdo was an island without any inhabitants, already knew Dokdo was Korean territory. In the *Joseon Hydrographic Report* 朝鮮水路誌 published by the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Navy in 1899, Ulleungdo was recorded as Matsushima松島, and Dodko was recorded as 'Liancourt Volcanic Rocks.' However, in the *Japan Hydrographic Report* 日本水路誌 in 1902, neither Ulleungdo nor Dokdo were introduced. Of course, it is possible to dispute that hydrographic reports are mere records that were made for navigation rather than an explanatory document showing territorial rights. Even so, what is the

▼ *Joseon Hydrographic Report*



interpretation of Dokdo's being included only in the Joseon Hydrographic Report but not in that of Japan? The supervising editor responsible for the publication was Director Kimotsuki, who was an authoritative survey expert and admiral. In the preface of the *Joseon Hydrographic Report* of 1899, the director's name at the Hydrographic Department, Admiral Kimotsuki Kaneyuki肝付兼行 was found. In a meeting with Nakai, he was in charge of publishing the hydrographic report which pushed for territorial incorporation stating, "There is no clear evidence that Dokdo is Korean territory."

On the basis of what we have studied, it is plausible to assume that the three government agents involved in the territorial incorporation of 1905 may have already recognized Korea's ownership of Dokdo. Nonetheless, they intended to incorporate Dokdo into their territory after Nakai's visit to request a lease contract for the fishing grounds near Dokdo.

Old Man Kim's Testimony on the Truth of Imperial Edict No. 41

Much research has been conducted to denounce Japan's claim on Dokdo in various fields of study. Among these scholarly endeavors, one of the most distinguished approaches is a linguistic approach. Some may be perplexed with the implications of the linguistic method other than the research of history, geography or international law; however, linguistic approach is deeply related to investigating Dokdo's territorial rights. If readers continue reading this book to the end, their doubts will be settled.

As indicated in the previous section, Japan constantly refers to the arbitrary territorial incorporation of 1905 as key evidence in an attempt to justify its perspective. Their reasoning is that since it was appropriated in accordance with international law, it is effective until today. However, if Dokdo was an island occupied rather than *terra nullius*, the whole situation becomes quite different.

Accordingly, it is necessary to examine whether Korea had sovereignty over Dokdo in the year of 1905 and before. There is encouraging evidence that the Korean Empire declared Imperial Edict No. 41 on October 25, 1900, four years earlier than Japan's territorial incorporation. This edict was approved by Emperor Gojong and published in the official gazette on October 27: The name of Ulleungdo was changed to Uldo鬱島 that is an official 'gun郡' which is a larger administrative district. This change promoted Ulleungdo to an independent administration unit, which was directly ruled by county magistrate (gunsu) appointed by the central government instead of being ruled by dogam島監,


官報
第一千七百十六號 光武四年十月二十七日 土曜
議政府總務局官報課
宮廷錄事
勅令
勅令第四十一號
光武四年十月二十五日
御璽
議政府議政 沈相薰
勅令第四十一號
第一條 鬱陵島監은 島內全島를 管轄하고 官制中 地方官에 關한 規定은 本島에 適用치 아니함
第二條 本島의 官制는 別로 定하는 바에 依함
附則
本令은 頒布한 日로부터 施行함
光武四年十月二十五日
勅令第四十一號
議政府議政 沈相薰
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光武四年十月二十五日
御璽
議政府議政 沈相薰

▲ Imperial Edict No. 41 at a Gazette

a local representative elected among the local people. As the first 'gunsu', Bae Gye-ju裵季周, then 'dogam', was appointed, and a deputy director, Choi Seong-rin崔聖麟, was dispatched from Seoul.

The second article of Edict No. 41 is the most meaningful because the administrative boundary of Uldo was decided. If Dokdo was included within the administrative boundary of Uldo, Japan's ground for claiming Dokdo as its territory would be unjustified. This can be evidence which shows that the Korean Empire officially announced its territorial rights on Dokdo prior to Japan's territorial incorporation, making Japan's claim invalid. However, a problem arises because there is no indication of Dokdo in Article 2. The following is a part of the whole article consisted of a total of six articles in Korean and Chinese in combination:

Imperial Edict No. 41

The renaming of Ulleungdo to Uldo and the changing of the post of dogam to county magistrate (gunsu)

Article 1: Ulleungdo shall be renamed Uldo and shall fall under the jurisdiction of Gangwon-do (Gangwon province). The post of dogam shall be changed to county magistrate (gunsu) and incorporated into officialdom, and the county shall be a class-5 county.

Article 2: The location of the county office shall be Taeha-dong, and as regards the districts, all of Ulleungdo as well as Jukdo and Seokdo(Dokdo) shall be placed under the jurisdiction of Uldo-gun (Uldo county).

(omitted)

One of the islands under the jurisdiction of Ulleungdo in the second article is Seokdo, which we refer to as Dokdo today. This is not my personal idea, but the official perspective of the Korean government appearing in its formal foreign affairs documents. When Japan's government sent a verbal note regarding its territorial rights on Dokdo in 1953, Korea's government replied to this note pointing out Dolseom, which is another name for Dokdo. In Article 2, Jukdo indicates an island next to Ulleungdo, which is called Chikusyo Islands竹嶼島 in Japan. Even today this island is called Jukdo, which is the largest island among the 44 islands attached to Ulleungdo and is 7km from the Dodong port. Without question, Ulleungdo entirely includes all small islets and rocks in its vicinity. If so, how can we say Seokdo is Dokdo? Such a relationship can be explained by employing the linguistic method mentioned previously.

The etymology of Seokdo can be found in the coastal area of

▲ Ulleungdo, Jukdo, Gwaneumdo

Jeolla-do. At that time, most fishermen staying on Ulleungdo were the people from coast of Jeolla-do. This fact can be verified by confirming the data established on the basis of field investigation. From late April to May 10, 1882, Inspector Lee Gyu-won stayed on Ulleungdo for about ten days investigating 140 Joseon people. On the basis of their regional origin, there were a total of 115 from Jeolla-do, including 94 from Heungyang 興陽 and 21 from Nakan 樂安, accounting for about 82%. Especially, among the fishermen from Jeolla-do there were 38 from Heungyang Samdo 三島 or Geomundo 巨門島. Next to Jeolla-do, there were 14 fishermen from Gangwon-do, ten from Gyeongsang-do and one from Gyeonggi-do. It was documented that 78 Japanese

loggers illegally cut trees during this period. Joseon's government had implemented an evacuation policy on Ulleungdo for a long time, but when Inspector Lee Gyu-won reported the situation of Ulleungdo in detail, it changed its policy to redevelopment. In accordance with this new policy, the number of people who immigrated had dramatically increased. When Edict No. 41 was promulgated, the total number of households increased to about 400 with 1,700 residents.

In the Jeolla-do dialect, 'dol 石' is often pronounced as 'dok.' Accordingly, when those who moved from Jeolla-do observed the rocky island from a distance, they might have named it 'Dokseom.' Others from either Gangwon-do or Gyeongsang-do might have called it 'Dolseom.' In either case, in the process of recording it in Chinese it is assumed that the name of 'Seokdo' was transliterated to best reflect its meaning of 'rock.' This is quite similar to our naming of Songdo松島 for Solseom and Uldo欝島 for Bamseom, respectively.

The fact that 'Dokseom' was changed to 'Seokdo' when translated into Chinese character is not an arbitrary claim, but a proven assertion. According to the *Korea Toponym Pandect*, in the Jeolla-do area, there are many words for locations such as dokgol石谷, dokdari石橋 and dokgogae石峴. They are examples that transliterated the Korean word 'dok' into the Chinese character '石' its pronunciation in Korean is 'seok'. In addition, islets in Jeolla-do, Wando-gun, Nohwa-myeon, Gomak-ri is still called 'Dokseom' by local people, but transliterated into 'Seokdo'. Similarly, the word 'Dokdo' is used to indicate 'Dokseom' by adopting the same

phonetic sound of 'dok.'

The first document in which Dokdo appeared is the report 'Bongansosokdokdo' 本邦ヨリ竹嶼迄 by the third County Magistrate of Ulleungdo (Ulleungdo), Sim Heung-taek. However, Sim Heung-taek was not the one who first used the Chinese transliteration of '獨島.' The daily report of a Japanese battleship, Nitaka 新高 Activity Log, stated: "On the basis of Japanese settlers on Ulleungdo, 'Liancourt Rocks' is written as Dokdo 獨島 by Koreans while our fishermen call it Ryanko Islands. It is important to pay close attention to the phrase "Written as Dokdo by Koreans." Therefore, we can conclude that the word '獨島' was used before 1904. In summary, the original Korean name of 'Dolseom' was used interchangeably with 'Dokseom' in the colloquial language due to the influence of Jeolla-do dialect, and when it was transliterated in letters it became 'Dokdo.' Similar cases can be found in several words used before 1904. 'Dokgol', the localized Korean term of Deokje-ri located in Jeolla-do, Jangheung-gun, Jangheung-eup, is written as '獨谷' in Chinese characters.

Of course, Japanese researchers of Dokdo are reluctant to accept this linguistic explanation. They interpret 'Seokdo' in Edict No. 41 to mean Gwaneumdo 觀音島, an attached islet to Ulleungdo. They claimed that it is unreasonable for the second article of Edict No. 41 to have failed to indicate Gwaneumdo while it pointed out Jukdo. Nevertheless, there is no sufficient information regarding why Gwaneumdo was recorded as 'Seokdo.' Controversies may arise in regards to the assumption that equates 'Dolseom=Dokseom=Seokdo=Dokdo.' Although

it seems convincing in its line of reasoning, acceptance is [illegible] because assumptions may have developed from arbitrary interpretations.

If so, it would be better to examine the testimony of a living [illegible] instead of words, the critical explanations. Fortunately, I contacted Professor Kim Su-hee at Yongnam University who proved the relationship of 'Dolseom=Dokdo' in a 1960's [illegible] and he addressed this point in a seminar regarding Dokdo issue held in 2011. Here I describe a memoir of an old [illegible] from Geomundo in Jeollanam-do who travelled to Dokdo to hunt Gaje(Gangchi) and catch abalone and seaweed until 1904. This article was published on March 19, 1962 in the *Mingukilbo* [illegible] fisherman from Geomundo mostly settled on Ulleungdo, let us read more carefully as to which name he used to identify Dokdo.

Mingukilbo March 19, 1962

"Dokdo: Our Land from the Past"

The memoir of a fisherman, Kim Yun-sam, whose family has lived on Geomundo for 140 years beginning from his grandfather's generation

(Yeosu) The old island in the East Sea, Dokdo has been confirmed as our land; yet, the vivid memory of an old [illegible] fisherman living on Geomundo (subordinate Korea territory) over Dokdo. An 87 year old fisherman, Kim Yun-sam(金允三), who [illegible] (Geomundo-dong) looked very young and healthy

People on Geomundo, whose other name is Samdo-三島, engaged in floating trade even when advanced technology did not exist at the time. At the age of nineteen, Mr. Kim went out to the sea for business on a boat worth of thousand seok [a 60kg straw-bag] that connected pieces of carved wood. "We set sail north bound along the streamline of the West Sea, setting up the sail made from reeds against the wind. Along with the seasonal winds, we sailed to Shineuiju (called Euiju at that time) via Jemulpo Incheon port for a full load of rice and crops, and then through the South Sea, we sailed to the East Sea up to Wonsan where we exchanged them with pollack and sea products. We sailed back home with the exchanged goods. Although we were unable to schedule specific dates for voyage, the seasonal winds blowing regularly allowed us to sail. We sang a song with 20 other sailors, 'We deplore, sailing to Hamgyeong-do in tears, but there is a treasure island beyond Ulleungdo…' We almost died on several occasions on the way due to violent storms." Several thousand seok worth of trading ships that arrived at Ulleungdo through Wonsan cut down logs to build a raft in the summer of 1895 when Mr. Kim was 20 years old. He

獨島는옛날부터우리땅
千石짜리옛목배로來往
老漁夫金允三氏의回顧
海狗잡이出漁

▲ newspaper article in 1962: Fisherman's Testimony

saw an island far from a distance in the middle of the East Sea. When asking an old fisherman what its name was, he said, "That island is Dolseom石島 (another name: 獨島). From the time of Kim Chi-seon (about 140 years before), my grandfather who resided on Samdo 三島 (Geomundo), some fishermen caught Gaje and took it away." Currently the great grandson of Kim Chi-seon, 57 year old Kim Cheol-su, is residing in Jangchon village. Scores of men arrived at Dolseom, sailing on raft for 200 ri in two days having left the boat loaded with pollack at Ulleungdo. The island was composed of rocks without any inhabitants. There were two large islets and a numbers of small rocks. Between the two big islets, they embarked on a raft for about ten days and caught Gaje海狗, ottosei and picked seaweed and abalone from the rocks. After returning to Ulleungdo, they sold this seafood to Japanese people who greatly valued Gaje for consumption as meat and made shoes with its skin. "The last time I traveled to Dolseom was in 1904 when I were 28 years old. Although I have not been there since then, due to the troubling time, my memory was still vivid." In addition, the wood for the house of 35 year old Kim Yun-sik is pinewood that was brought from Ulleungdo a long time ago. "When Japanese people paid for the Gaje that we caught, they did not know about the existence of Dolseom," said old man Kim Yun-sam. He was upset adding, "It is awful that Japan now claims the island to be its land; though, we never saw any Japanese boats on that island."

Korea's First Response:
"The news is completely outrageous."

At 100 ri east from the sea off Ulleungdo there is an island which we call Dokdo. This island is attached to Ulleungdo; nevertheless, Japanese people came to investigate it to fabricate territorial claims.

距洋東百里、有一島、曰、竹嶼、倭人勒稱其領地、審査以去、

▲Hwang Hyeon

The foregoing passage appeared in the fifth volume of *Maecheonyarok*梅泉野錄 by Hwang Hyeon黃玹, 1855–1910, a patriotic scholar and hermit with a great reputation in the end of the Korean Empire. In the above sentences, he used the word "勒稱," which means 'arbitrarily stating' or 'unreasonably claiming.' It seems that he became aware of this news through the article published in either 'Capital Gazette' or 'Korea Daily Newspaper' when he lived at Gurye in Jeolla-do. Upon hearing the news that Japan contended Dokdo to be its land by ignoring its appendage to Ulleungdo, Hwang Hyeon commented about this incident briefly as follows: Emergence of an Extraordinary Event無妄之行.

County Magistrate of Uldo-gun, Sim Heung-taek, reported to the Home Department內部: When a group of Japanese government officials came to Uldo-gun, they said that the island attached to Uldo-gun rightfully belonged to Japan and they wrote down which pieces of land were fertile or narrow and small while investigating household statistics. In response to this report, the Home Department replied that although conducting a census while touring on foreign land is tolerable, it is unbelievable to

claim Dokdo as a part of their territory. It is outrageous to receive such report at last. 'Korea Daily Newspaper, May 1, 1906'」

The regional district chief of Ulleungdo reported to the Home Department as follows: "Dokdo which is located 100 *ri* by sea from our district is attached to this region. On March 4 lunar calendar, a group of Japanese officials came to my office and said, "We came to inspect Dokdo since it is now Japanese territory." 鬱陵報告內部 (omitted) 'Capital Gazette, May 9, 1906'」

Japan's incorporation of Dokdo was first known to Korea through the report of County Magistrate Sim Heung-taek of Uldo-gun. It was May 9, 1906, a year and four months after the cabinet meeting which concluded to incorporate Dokdo as a part of Japan. During this period Korea's central government was unaware of such important decisions. It is possible to understand how shocking it was from the expressions used in a newspaper headline such as "An extraordinary event occurred" and "It is outrageous". If so, how did the Korean government respond to Japan's unreasonable contention? Let us scrutinize it in more details.

On March 26, 1906, the year following the end of the Russo-Japanese War, Shimane Prefecture, which was supposed to govern Dokdo as a result of Japan's incorporation, dispatched an investigation team consisting of public officials and civilians under the responsibility of Zinzai Yoshitaro神西由太郎 to Dokdo. The team was a sizeable investigation team constituting 45 members under the leadership of public officials including

Higashi Bunsuke, Oki Island public administrator島司. As a civilian member, Nakai Yozaburo中井養三郎 was included in the investigation group. The memoir of *A Talk with Nakai Yozaburo* to which I referred in the previous section was a record written by Principal Okuhara Hekiun奥原碧雲, who accompanied this tour. He recorded what he heard from Nakai on the deck during the tour. Thanks to this documentation, we are able to understand in detail, how the petition process for territorial incorporation was motivated and accepted by Japanese bureaucrats.

Having arrived at Dokdo on March 27, the following day of their departure, the investigation team studied the east and west islets. Because the weather worsened with surging waves when attempting to board the ship after the investigation, instead of returning to Shimane Prefecture, the team had to sail to

▼1906 Shimane Prefecture Dokdo Investigation Team Nakai Yozaburo (Back row third from the left)

Ulleungdo at a close distance in order to escape a storm. The third day of their departure on March 28 several government officials along with Zinzai visited Sim Heung-taek and informed him of Japan's territorial incorporation. Although some view that the team visited Ulleungdo to finalize annexation, which was conducted confidentially for more than one year, this claim is quite far from the truth. The visit to Ulleungdo was not originally planned; it was an emergency case due to deteriorating weather. This can be verified when reading the Japanese newspaper. The investigation team questioned the regional chief, Sim Heung-taek, the current circumstances through the translation of Police Director. Zinzai said: "I am a public official serving Shimane Prefecture of the Great Empire of Japan. Your island, Ulleungdo is located close to Takeshima竹島 which is under our jurisdiction, and since there are many Japanese travelling to your island, I cordially request to take good care of them. We would have brought a suitable gift if we had planned to visit you from the beginning; however, we happened to come to this island to escape a storm so that I have no gift ready. Fortunately we caught a sea lion at Takeshima, we would appreciate it if you do not mind receiving it as a present. 'April 1, 1906, Sanin Newspaper (山陰新聞)'

Being shocked by the appalling news, the next day district chief Shim immediately reported to Lee Myeong-rae李明來, the governor of Gwangwon-do and district chief of Chuncheon, who was his immediate supervisor.

Dokdo, which belongs to our island, is 100 ri away from us. At Jinshi (7:00~9:00 am) on the 4th of this month a steamship

▲Commemorative Picture of the Shimane Prefecture Dokdo Investigation Team with the officials of Ulleungdo

moored to the Dodong port. A group of Japanese officials notified us saying, "We came to see Dokdo since it is now a part of our land." The members of this team were Higashi Bunsuke, district chief of Oki in Shimane Prefecture, Zinzai Yoshitaro, deputy director, Yoshida Heigo, Tax Supervision Director, police sub-station chief, Kageyama Kanhachiro and a policeman, assembler, doctor, mechanic and a dozen followers. They first asked about the number of households, population and land production, and then the number of personnel and expenditure. Hereby, I submit this report for your investigation." Lunar March 5 (Solar March 29) the 10th year of Kwangmu (1906).

Lee Myung-rae, acting governor of Gangwon-do, who received

this report, seemed to immediately realize the importance and urgency. On April 29, he reported it to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Highest Council of State, Bak Jae-sun at that time who was one of the 'Five Eulsa Traitors' who signed on the Eulsa Treaty in November 1905.

Even the pro-Japanese were unable to accept the fact that Dokdo was incorporated into Japan. Although the story of the Japanese officials was groundless, he ordered for the situation of Dokdo to be closely investigated. He was also determined to find out what the Japanese did at Dokdo through Order No. 3 on May 10.

I have read the internal report [illegible], but the contention that Dokdo is Japan's territory has no merit, so I request you to re-investigate the situation of the island and to report all details of Japanese activity on the island.

This order was made by the Deputy Prime Minister, who was the high-level official in the Highest Council of State at that time. He denied Japan's incorporation of Dokdo and clearly affirmed that it is a part of the Korean Empire. However, there is no record left to indicate how the governor of Gwangwon-do and regional district chief of Uldo responded to this re-investigation order.

It appears that Sim Heung-taek reported the same content to the Home Department of the central government aside from the report that he sent to the acting governor, Lee Myung-rae. The articles that I referred in the above 'Capital Gazette' and 'Korea Daily Newspaper' are the copy of the official document that Sim Heung-taek remitted to the Home Department. As can be seen



▲Lee Myung-rae extra- edition and the Order from Deputy Prime Minister

in this article, the Home Department issued an order which stated that Japan's colonial claim on Dokdo was unreasonable and outrageous. Although Lee Ji-yong李址鎔, a pro-Japanese, was the Home Minister, he did not accept it either.

In this way, the fact that Japan incorporated Dokdo to its territory was known to the Korean government as late as a year and two months after the incorporation. Moreover, it was not officially announced by the Japanese government as the first Koreans to be aware were informed by regional officials from Oki who happened to land on Ulleungdo to escape a storm.

However, the Korean government did not protest to the Japanese government. Perhaps they couldn't because the diplomatic sovereignty of the Korean Empire was already deprived. According to the Eulsa Treaty forced onto Korea by Japan, Korea fell into a colony state. Nonetheless, the fact that Korea did not protest does not necessarily mean that Korea acquiesced to Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo. As we have seen in the foregoing passages, the Korean government rejected it stating it was groundless.

As a result, the Japanese scholars' assertion that Korea's lack of opposition to Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo can be translated as acknowledgement, is vulnerable to criticism. If the Korean government had maintained its diplomatic sovereignty without question it must have filed an official complaint to the Japanese government. This can be assumed from the responses of both Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister.

Let us explore an additional fact with regard to the Sim Heung-taek's report. The one who first revealed about the existence of Sim Heung-taek's report was a deceased historian and professor, Shin Seok-ho申奭鎬. He found the copy of this report at the Ulleungdo regional office in August, 1947 when he was a professor at Korea University. He published a paper that discussed the historical background of Sim Heung-taek's report and its impacts.

Both the fact that regional district chief Sim affirmed, "Dokdo is an island attached to Ulleungdo" and the remarks that the

Korean Empire made upon receiving the news provide crucial clues to revealing its sovereignty over Dokdo. When we related the words "our regional district" appeared in the Sim Hueng-taek's report to Imperial Edict No. 41 in 1900, its importance cannot be undermined.

While Imperial Edict No. 41 raised the status of Ulleungdo to 'Uldo鬱島-gun', it is clear that Jukdo竹島 and Seokdo石島 were included in its jurisdiction. In the Korean view of the two islands, Seokdo indicated Dokdo. However, Japan does not agree with this view. Japan contends that Seokdo indicates Gwaneumdo, which is attached to Ulleungdo, and has no relationship with Dokdo. However, the word, 'bongun sosok (attached to Uldo-gun)' in public documents clearly supports that Dokdo was under Uldo district chief Sim Heung-taek's jurisdiction.

Because of its importance, Sim's report was mentioned when diplomatic documents were exchanged between Korea and Japan in 1953 regarding Dokdo issue. During this time, Japan requested Korea to provide the original document but this created an issue because professor Shin's document was a copy. However, it is understandable that only a copy remained because Sim Heung-taek sent the original document to the acting governor of Gangwon-do.

Unfortunately, the copy that Professor Shin Seok-ho found is no longer in existence and it is not certain where it was gone. Perhaps it might have disappeared due to either central

or local government organization's negligence on document management in a time of turmoil from the 1948 government establishment to the Korean War followed by the April Revolution of 1960 and the May 16 military coup d'etat in 1961 (The coup's nature is controversial in Korea. Some people term it as the May 16 military revolution). Even though the original report is nonexistent, it does not necessarily mean the content itself disappeared. The same content was written in the extra edition號外 of the report that Lee Myung-rae, acting governor of Gangwon-do, sent to the Deputy Prime Minister. Accordingly, it is not a problem to verify the relevance of the fact. I regret that an important diplomatic document was managed with negligence. Professor Song Byeong-gi found the extra edition among the Gyujanggak (the palace library) documents.

Source: Russo Japanese war

The Gangchi at Risk

As Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo became effective in 1905, it was inevitable for the Gangchi's survival to be at risk. It was not an endurable ordeal, but an extinction that completely eradicated them from the Korean Peninsula. More opportunities were given to the Japanese who were now allowed to hunt the Gangchi contrary to the past when it was considered illegal.

The final task for Nakai Yozaburo中井養三郎 was to monopolize the fishing grounds of Dokdo as intended. Four days after the public notification of the territorial incorporation at Shimane Prefecture on February 26, he submitted an application for a fishing permit to hunt Gangchi. He was able to take such an initiative, leaving other competitors behind, because he completely understood the government's actions. As a result, he was able to use the fishing grounds of Dokdo exclusively from March 1905 to February 1915. The Japanese government may have thought it reasonable to compensate Nakai, who contributed the most to legislating the territorial incorporation, by giving him such a privilege.

Nevertheless, not everything went as easy as he had anticipated. The Oki fishermen who were aware of the goldmine-like value behind Dokdo's fishing ground did not sit idly by such exclusive rights. Thirteen fishermen, including Hashioka Tomojiro橋岡友次郎, Iguchi Ryuta井口龍太, Gato Shigejo加藤重藏 and others, also submitted applications for fishing permits to the Shimane Prefecture government consecutively. The evaluation process verified the fact that Hashioka, Iguchi, and Gato were also at the fishing ground of Dokdo at a similar time to that of Nakai or much earlier. As the situation became more aggravated,

Higashi Bunsuke, Governor of Oki Islands, tried to mediate by suggesting that Nakai use the fishing ground with other competitors in cooperation. Through this mediation, Takeshima Fishery Jointed Company was founded, in which Nakai was seated as the representative in consideration of his contributions to placing Dokdo under the jurisdiction of Shimane Prefecture. Such accounts were recorded in an official document composed by Higashi, the Governor of Oki Islands.

Nakai Yozaburo travelled to Tokyo last summer to directly communicate with the office in charge. And he requested it to grant him a permission to lease the fishing ground having this island incorporated to the Japanese territory. Nakai's contribution was undeniably large and his efforts made territorial incorporation possible. However, granting a monopoly over fishing to Nakai would have incapacitated the equipment utilized by the other three fishermen to facilitate fishing in the past (omitted).

If permission is given to each of the four persons individually, competition for more profit would be inevitable, consequently leading to excessive fishing. Therefore, a four person cartel was organized to ensure corporate protection for a specified term. (omitted)

Through this process, a fishery corporation obtained permission to conduct business at Dokdo. This company was established at Nishicho西町, Oki Islands in June 1905, located near the sea to be used as a port for reaching Dokdo with four ships under

▲ Japanese fisherman hunting Gangchi alive (1930s)

ownership. The amount Nakai invested was 1,200 Yen, which was 40% of the total capital. Even though he did not succeed in monopolizing the fishing ground, becoming president of the only company with permission to fish at Dokdo accomplished half his goal.

Nakai's fishery business ran smoothly without many difficulties. According to Shimane Prefecture records, 1,003 Gangchi were caught within the first year of business in 1905. Captured Gangchi were beaten with rods or shot by firearms, then the skin was peeled off and boiled in a caldron to extract oil as a source of income. The Russo-Japanese War drastically increased the demand for oil and leather, especially for military backpacks.

The quality of Gangchi leather was exceptional and thus sold at higher prices than cowhide. It was used to make luxurious bags or leather scoops for tea ceremonies. At the 1910 Japanese-British Exhibition in London, a bag made of Gangchi leather received a gold medal and is still exhibited at the Oki Natural Museum. All debts he accumulated before were paid off as the business in hunting Gangchi flourished. As news of his success in business spread, fishermen poachers from other regions appeared at Dokdo. There is a record showing that some Japanese fishermen from Ulleungdo were kicked out by Nakai.

Nakai's Gangchi hunting gradually became indiscriminate and excessive. According to the internal records of the Takeshima Fishing Company, the numbers of Gangchi caught were 1,948 in 1906, 2,094 in 1907 and 1,889 in 1908, respectively. These numbers far beyond exceeded the regulatory limit. Regulations stated for no more than 600 Gangchi to be caught, including 500 males taller than 8 *cheok* [242.4cm], 50 females and 50 pups. Nakai not only violated the total number limit established but also ignored the number limit in combination. Among the total of 1,948 Gangchi caught in 1906, he caught 401 male, 1,104 female and 443 pups. In 1907, Nakai caught 427 male Gangchi and a much larger number of 1,057 female ones. It was much easier to catch pregnant ones that had gone ashore or the less agile pups than large and aggressive male Gangchi. His actions were uncontrollable to the extent that his partner Ryota Iguchi accused him of being unable to bear its seriousness. Considering the differences in the numbers recorded between internal and official documents submitted to the government office, it reveals

that he actually reduced the number of fish actually caught.

Another piece of compelling evidence showing the seriousness of excessive hunting can be found in a warning notification sent to Shimane Prefecture in 1905 by Sasebo, who was in charge of Dokdo.

After skinning the Gangchi for its hide, the amount of Gangchi meat thrown into the sea is extremely overwhelming. As it decays, the color of water gradually turns brown, making it unbearable for ordinary people to tolerate the disgusting odor. Yet, while the headquarters must station a few workers to construct a facility, it is very difficult to do so for sanitation reasons. All of these violations and excessive hunting were contradictory to the justifications that Nakai addressed when he first filed the petition for territorial incorporation of Dokdo and its leasing. His petition submitted in September 1904 reads as follows:

"Unless appropriate regulation is enforced to encourage reproduction, the Gangchi will soon be extinct. However, it is impossible to expect the competitors themselves to carry out such directives since the fishermen's desires for greater profits is similar to ants that are prone to stick to sweet things. If many people know of the potential profits to be gained from Gangchi hunting,·· (omitted). Excessive competition will amount to excessive hunting and thus eventually extinguish the source of their profits. As a consequence, business will be doomed all together. I can suggest several plans for proper protection:

restrictions on the number and size of Gangchi to be captured should be made, while giving special care for both pregnant and infant Gangchi; and efforts to reduce the number of its prey, such as dolphins and sharks would be also helpful. (omitted)"

In fact, Nakai Yozaburo indiscriminately caught Gangchi without abiding by these regulations as promised in the above like an ant sticking to sweet things. In other words, he breached the contract before the ink of the signatures on the petition was dry. It was reported that the total number of Gangchi captured by the Japanese fishermen was approximately 14,000 for the six years between 1904 and 1909. The result of indiscriminate excessive hunting was obvious: the number of Gangchi caught declined to the extent that about 100 Gangchi were caught annually by 1915. Due to this decline, fishing operations became nearly impossible. During this time, Nakai Yozaburo moved his main fishing grounds near the Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Although his son Nakai Yoichi inherited the Takeshima Fishery Company and kept its name, it closed in 1928.

In fact, there were only a few fishermen who were interested in the Gangchi near Dokdo by this time because there was no competition over Gangchi hunting as it became obsolete. Instead, business men from strange places needed Gangchi for their sensational circus shows that are somewhat similar to today's sea lion shows at zoos or aquariums. In order to meet this demand, fishermen continued to catch live young Gangchi. Hashioka Tomojiro, the son of Nakai's partner, Tadashige忠重, sailed out to sea to catch 30 live Gangchi. Although he stayed for

50 days installing nets in the mouth of the cave that appeared to be the Gangchi's shelter, he was unable to catch enough Gangchi to meet the number ordered. This shows that the number of Gangchi near Dokdo had already declined sharply by that time.

Dokdo was a tragic place for the Gangchi because it was their last shelter on earth before extinction. Although researchers confirmed that the Gangchi inhabited a total of 37 areas including Dokdo after 1880, they speculated that Dokdo was the only breeding place with shelter after 1920. Even after the Gangchi in other areas had completely disappeared, they were still found at Dokdo. Until the 1950s, it is estimated that about 300 Gangchi around Dokdo survived and there were some witnesses who saw these Gangchi. Some coast guards stated that they often saw a herd of 20 to 30 Gangchi near Dokdo. A fisherman who has been living at Dokdo for more than 40 years said: "I seldom saw Gangchi before 1970; however, I have never seen any since then." There is no other record other than one, where a baby Gangchi was caught alive in 1974 at the tip of the north side of Hokkaido北海道. Since then there have been no reports of Gangchi sightings filed.

A newspaper article showed that there was an effort to restore Gangchi in 2006. The first step to restore a species at risk of extinction is to ensure the existence of a number of living entities. The National Biological Source Corporation started an investigation in search of Gangchi. They had searched all possible areas ranging from the sea near Russia and Japan for five years, but they were not able to find a single Gangchi.

Perhaps there was a slight chance some Gangchi survived outside of the investigated areas because they did not conduct investigations in the restricted areas of North Korea and Russia. The Korean government designated the Gangchi as a Level I species at risk in 1998. It seemed to be only a matter of time to officially declare their extinction if their existence could no longer be verified.

We can no longer find any Gaje Gangchi on top of the Gaje rocks. Where have all the Gangchi gone? This was the question raised in the beginning chapter of this book. Ever since Japan incorporated Dokdo into its territory, indiscriminate, excessive hunting led to the extinction of the Gangchi. A fisherman's greed played a key role in not only depriving Dokdo from us but driving the Gangchi that used to swim peacefully in the East Sea into extinction. Although we were able to regain Dokdo, the Gangchi have left us forever.

There is an uninhabited island called Ryanko Islands at eighty-five *ri* west of Oki Islands and fifty-five *ri* southeast of Ulleungdo of Joseon, which is made of two rocky islets, Islet A and Islet B, each with a circumference of about fifteen *cho*. The two islets face each other with a channel in between along tens of rocks sporadically laid around them. The west sides of the two central islets are steep cliffs rising toward the sky. There is little soil on top where few weeds grow with no trees growing anywhere on the islands. Although there is a sandy beach on the curvy costal line, the only one place for building a house is the area close to the channel of Islet A. In the middle of Islet A, there is a small point filled with brownish water. On Islet B, there is a place where slightly salty but clean water is dripping down from the cliff. Ships can be safe if they drop anchor in the channel, shifting toward the left or right depending on the direction of blowing wind.

This island is located on the route from our country, Oki Islands, through Ulleungdo, to Joseon's Gangwon-do and further to Hamgyeong-do. It would be convenient if someone lived on the island to manage the ships going through the islands. In cases when ships ran out of firewood, water or food, it would be helpful for taking care of such needs. I think it is necessary to manage this island in order to be useful today in support of our (Japan's) on-going promising fishery trade with Gangwon-do and Hamgyeong-do.

This island has been entirely untouched because it was merely a group of useless rocks rising toward the sky in the distant sea that are unlikely to have anything people want. However, I felt regretful about not doing anything when with the numbers of Gangchi I saw living there en route to Ulleungdo. Since then, I carefully planned with much effort and in the 36th year of Meiji (1903), I finally decided to invest in Gangchi hunting, so I built a fishery facility and pier on the island and also sent several fishermen there to begin business. At that time, many people mocked me saying it was reckless because it was the first time for a business to be built on an uninhabited island in the middle of the sea. Unlike my plans, I wasted a fortune as I lacked experience in utilizing equipment and proper hunting skills for Gangchi. However, after all the struggles, this year I was able to not only design a new method for Gangchi hunting, but also develop new markets. I confirmed that if their skin is preserved in salt, it can be used as a substitute for cowhide, which would increase its demand. The fresh oil that is extracted from their fat is equally compatible with that of whale oil in terms of quality and price. In addition, its remains can be used for producing glue, and its meat and bone are ground to manufacture fertilizer. In short, this island would be promising for a Gangchi hunting business. Moreover, we need to further discuss some other benefits that we may gain from fishery businesses other than Gangchi. I would like to investigate the resourceful location at the Sea of Japan in order to classify the various fish that congregate since it is impossible on land. If we are allowed to continue hunting Gangchi, I also anticipate the discovery of more beneficial and promising resources, in addition to the

merits from experimental exploration. In short, it is a promising business to invest in if we manage the island with sufficient capital and equip it fully.

But it is not determined where this island belongs. I cannot overlook the possibility that I may be involved in unforeseeable conflicts with other countries in the future. However, since there are no grounds for protection, it is too risky to invest a large amount of money to manage this island. In addition, Gangchi are not found on a consistent basis on this island. They gather to breed between the months of April and May (sometimes staying continuously for the two months) and soon after the breeding season ends, they scatter during July and August. Accordingly, we can hunt them only during this period. If we do not limit the amount caught to allow for reproduction, it is clear they will be soon extinct. Moreover, such restrictions or protections cannot be encouraged among the competitors since people seeking profits are similar to ants sticking to sweet things. If people know this island has the potential to create a considerable amount of profits, even those who mocked me will soon rise in this business to the extent to aggravate the competition that would amount to excessive hunting. In turn, it will contribute to the extinguishment of the primary profit source, and thus destroy all business. In other words, if we manage this island without territorial belonging, it will rather encourage excessive competition among Gangchi hunters, and thus place us in dangerous situations that will prevent us from success.

As I pointed out previously, the result of my numerous efforts



Dokdo Map attached to Nakai's Petition for Territorial Incorporation

in the past has convinced me that there is a potential gain for hunting Gangchi. Now I want to be at the forefront to increase the size of investment, while limiting the number and size of the Gangchi to be captured, protecting pregnant female and infant Gangchi, and catching more numbers of their predators such as dolphins and sharks. I am prepared to take various actions such as purchasing more specialized machines to facilitate equipment for fish harvesting and manufacturing. Moreover, I will conduct research on the possibility of other beneficial fish by prohibiting fishing in certain areas. However, I am discouraged very much because of the potential dangers I indicated above. As such it is disadvantageous not only to me as an individual, but also to our nation as a whole. Accordingly, in order to permanently ensure safety in business and source of profits, I cordially request to incorporate this island to our nation to accomplish its management. At the same time, I also make petition for a lease that would allow me to use the fishing ground for the next ten years with a map enclosed.

39th year of Meiji (1904) September 29
Shukichigun Saigocho from Shimane Prefecture
Nakai Yozaburo

To: Minister of Home Affairs, Viscount Yoshikawa Akimasa
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Komura Jutaro
Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, Baron Kiyoura Keiko

Many fishermen sailing toward Ulleungdo generally understand that Takeshima is a colony of the Gangchi. They quickly disperse whenever we attempt to catch them with a sudden attack, and even when we catch them, it is questionable for us to gain profits in that we have problems in their use and marketing. For this reason, sea lions have been left untouched in vain. However, since it can be the source of profits that we need to develop, I decided to start catching them regardless of profit gains. Through this development, I came to understand the fact that there is much more hope than we thought. A number of hunters suddenly gathered in competition which led to excessive Gangchi hunting, but we do not know the use of Gangchi and its market to sell. Accordingly, this may result in extinction in the near future. Therefore, I became desperate to think of possible solutions that would prevent such damage while maintaining the source of profits permanently through the proper administration of the island.

I thought this island was attached to Ulleungdo and therefore must be a part of Joseon's territory, so I travelled to Tokyo to request confirmation from the Japanese Residency-General in Korea. While I was working for this plan, I came to have doubts that it might not be a part of Joseon because of the caution that Director Maki at the Fishery Bureau pointed out. After being busy investigating the territorial rights of Dokdo, Hydrographic Department Director Kimotsuki confirmed that there is no

evidence showing any kind of territorial belonging with the island. So I filed my request to lease the sea by incorporating the island into Japan to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. The person in charge in the Ministry of Home Affairs could not approve the petition by saying that it was not an appropriate time to incorporate the barren rocky island that could be part of Joseon's territory: The benefit is relatively minor than the loss when this provokes several foreign countries' suspicions on our nation's ambition of annexing Korea, and thus any excuse or explanation would be inappropriate for the approval of the petition. At that discouraging moment, Nakai visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to see Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro to address his reasons. Yamaza told him that matters such as installing a watchtower and wireless or undersea cables are needed for the surveillance of enemy ships. Moreover, he said that since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the reason that the Ministry of Home Affairs gave Nakai irrelevant, he highly recommended Nakai to file a petition with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through this process this island was finally incorporated into Japan's territory.

Yamaza Enjiro and the Russo-Japanese War

Using Bird Hunting as a Pretext to Survey the Seoul-Busan Railroad

It is but fifteen hours' steaming from the harbor of Nagasaki to Fusan (Busan) in Southern Korea. ··· As seen from the deck of the steamer, a narrow up and down path at some height above the sea skirts the hillside for 3 miles from Fusan···. Seated on the rocks along the shore were white objects resembling pelicans or penguins, but as white objects with the gait of men moved in endless procession to and fro between old and new Fusan, I assumed that the seated objects were of the same species. By Isabella Bird Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors 1897」

In October 1892, the Hikomaru日向丸, a passenger line from Nagasaki, dropped its anchor in Busan. Most of the passengers who crossed the Korea Strait for fifteen hours were Japanese. Among them was a 26 year old young man, Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎, 1866~1914 taking his first step on the Busan wharf. The first impression of Joseon to his eyes was not much different from what an English woman, Isabella, perceived. The bare mountain and white clothed Joseon people were common in describing Joseon that not only westerners but also Japanese recorded in their journals as they were approaching Busan.

However, the determination behind this young man was something unusual. He was heading to his first post in Busan as a diplomat that was the profession he dreamt of and fostered throughout his school days. He was a promising elite who had graduated from the college of law of Tokyo Imperial University as the top student.

Yamaza's office was located at the Japanese Consulate to Busan

▲ Yamaza Enjiro in his youth

when Murota Yoshihumi(室田義文, 1847~1938) was serving his second term as Consul General. In 1887, Murota was first appointed as the Fourth Consul General to Busan, serving for three years before transferring to another position. He came to work again in Busan as the Sixth Consul General. Murota was deeply tied to Korea for several reasons. In 1909, when Ito Hirobumi(伊藤博文) was shot down by a Korean patriot Ahn Jung-geun, he was the one who evacuated Ito to a hospital. While Murota accompanied Ito, the bullet nearly hit his collar and he thus escaped disaster by a hair's breadth. One day Murota called for Yamaza presumably to discuss future ambitions and to find out about the internal affairs and political situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula. In Yamaza Enjiro's biography published in 1938, *Continental Diplomatic Frontier*, there is a dialogue between the two.

Murota: "You applied for a diplomatic post at the peripheral area at Joseon, so what are your plans here?"

Yamaza: "Joseon's independence is necessary for the development of Japan. If Joseon continues to be an agent of China to the extent of threatening Japan's security, we cannot hope to achieve peace in the Orient. As both an individual and a public official, I think I must endeavor with all our might to solve this problem. One important thing I would like to mention is that we must construct a railroad that connects Busan to Gyeongseong (Seoul).

Even though it will not be easy to construct a railroad in other people's land, I think I have to conduct research at least, and I am ready to devote my life to accomplish this important task."

Here we need to explain the meaning of 'Joseon's independence' that Yamaza mentioned. At that time, Japan considered Joseon's autonomy and its complete independence as one of its most important foreign policy goals. In other words, this meant that Japan would not acknowledge either the superiority over Joseon or the special relationship which China清 maintained with Joseon. Japan confronted the Qing Dynasty to secure a superior position and influence on Joseon. Nevertheless, through the Military Mutiny of 1882 (Imogunran) and the Gapshin Coup d'état of 1884, Japan's position was weaker than China's. In 1885, the Qing Dynasty had dispatched Yuan Shikai袁世凱, 1859~1916 as Minister General of Trade Negotiation who was deeply involved in not only Joseon's foreign affairs but also internal affairs. Although Shikai was in his twenties, his influence was compared with a sword that could pierce the sky. The Qing Dynasty claimed its superiority on the basis of the tributary relation with Joseon that had been continuously maintained ever since the founding of the Qing Dynasty. Subsequently, Japan's most urgent matter was to sever this 'special relation' that Qing asserted. This was Japan's definition of Joseon's independence. This view prompted the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 two years later and fighting for hegemony over the Korean Peninsula. Having won the war, Japan forced the Qing Dynasty to guarantee Joseon's full and complete autonomy and independence in Article 1 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki: China definitively recognizes

full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China, that are in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly cease for the future.

Let us go back to Murota and Yamaza's conversation. Murota was delighted to hear about the railroad construction plan that Yamaza, the newly appointed consul, suggested. It was one of the important duties that was already assigned to Murota. The official who ordered this important task was the Assistant Chief of Staff for the Japanese Army, Kawakami Soroku川上操六, 1848~1899. He was a jingoist who played a key role in colluding with Mutsu Munemitsu陸奥宗光 and was deeply involved in giving rise to the Sino-Japanese war. Under his direct command at the Japanese Imperial Headquarters in Hiroshima廣島, he led the Japanese to victory in the Sino-Japanese War and was later promoted to Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army. While Kawakami was concurrently appointed as the first chief of an advisory organization of the Railroad Association, he supported the so-called 'Military Railroad System' that endorsed first priority for transportation to soldiers and supplies. In 1891, he surveyed Joseon firsthand and concluded that the construction of the Seoul-Busan railroad was necessary. He ordered Murota as follows: "In emergency situations, it is unrealistic to transport arms and military supplies by ship unless we have command of naval power, so transportation can be conducted on land from Busan to Seoul. If so, the construction of the Seoul-Busan railroad has to be done with our hands. The first action to take

is to begin a survey. Although it is not so easy to conduct a survey on other people's territory, I advise you to work to push forward with such a survey." Here, of course, the meaning of 'emergency' indicates a war against the Qing Dynasty. Consul General Murota prepared all the procedures one by one. On one hand, he recruited funds from various sources to collect 700 yen as initial capital. On the other hand, he persuaded the Japanese government with this issue and as a result a surveyor named Tenba Kono was dispatched to work with several assistants soon after arriving at the Busan Consulate General. However, a problem remained because there was no way to conduct a public survey on the land of another country. If they could have obtained the right to construct a railroad from the Korean government directly, there would have been no problem. Unfortunately, Japan was yet to achieve such power during this period. Murota again consulted with Yamaza.

Murota: "Finally, we come to have professional surveyors; but, it seems almost impossible to conduct a survey on other people's land, obstinately digging and posting flags here and there. I wonder if you have any good suggestions. "

Yamaza: "First you need to say that you wish to travel from Busan to Gyeongseong to get a permit to travel from the Korean government."

Murota: "Would it be possible to conduct survey with a travel permit?"

Yamaza: "I have a clever scheme. Please tell them that you will

be travelling from Busan to Gyeongseong for the purpose of hunting with a rifle. You need to explain that Japan is an island nation, but Joseon's land is connected to the continent where many different animals and birds are available and you want to hunt them to make stuffed specimens to send back to Japanese museums. However, if you shoot the rifle while travelling, you are certain many Joseon people will gather together to see what is going on, which would not only make hunting itself difficult, but observers also expose them to danger. Therefore, it would be better not to allow Joseon people to come near where you are hunting."

Murota immediately put Yamaza's idea into practice. He met with Investigation, Interpretation and Negotiation Administrator 督辦交涉通商事務 Min Jong-muk閔種默, who was in charge of foreign policy negotiations for the Joseon government, and succeeded in getting a travel permit. Later Min Jong-muk was appointed to important posts, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Architectural Bureau and later received a noble title from Japan. Murota assured Min Jong-muk by saying, "I want you to order Koreans not to approach the perimeter of red flags that I will erect whenever I hunt during my travels." Min Jong-Muk did not understand his intention so he accepted his request without reservation. He was deceived by Murota's trickery, and as a result he rather assisted Japan's survey that was conducted in preparation of waging a war on foreign land.

The following steps were taken to complete Murota and Yamaza's plan. While Diplomat Murota pretended to hunt, holding a gun

for the first time in his life, Kono was able to survey without disruption. Three days later, Murota returned the shotgun to Yamaza and then came back to Busan. The Yamaza group then surveyed the land between Busan and Daegu for five days. It took them one and a half months to complete the survey to Gyeongseong and return to Busan. After that they copied the draft that Kono drew at the Busan Consulate Office. The three including Yamaza finally completed making three copies of the draft and reports in secret. Murota sent one copy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and another to the General Staff headquarters. The last copy was sent to the Japanese business magnate, Shibusawa Eiichi 澁澤榮 一, 1840~1931. The reason why a copy of such an important draft was sent to a civilian like Shibusawa was that the Japanese government could not afford to construct railroads, which costs an enormous amount of money. Even if granted such opportunity, it would be almost impossible without the financial support from such business men.

The Seoul-Busan Railroad was opened in 1905. However, Japan's preparation began long ago from the early 1890 because it was necessary to carry out its expansion to the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria.

The Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, which was right after the diplomats at the Busan Consulate General had conducted the secret survey. Since it was before the railroad construction started, it was not possible to transport soldiers and military supplies by train. Nonetheless, the secretly drawn maps played a pivotal role in the military operations of the Sino-Japanese War.

One day in 1938 a subscriber's letters were delivered to 'The Kyushu Daily Newspaper' when it was running a story about Yamaza Enjiro of Fukuoka. One of those letters was an episode of the Seoul-Busan railroad. Takeya Mitsuki武谷水城, who served as a doctor in chief at the third field army of the fifth division during the Sino-Japanese War, sent a map to the newspaper company. He received 42 maps of the surroundings of Korea and China's Seonggyeongseong盛京省, today's Liaoningsheng from the headquarters. Among these maps, he kept several as souvenirs even after the war. He stated: "Upon reading the article this morning, I finally realized why the maps were made and had to be kept in secret."

Japan began a full scale survey after it occupied the Korean Peninsula during the Sino-Japanese War. Although Dr. Senkoku Mitsuki仙石貢, who later served as the Head of the National Railroad, was in charge of the survey, it is certain that Kono's field work contributed to laying its foundation. Through this process Japan finally completed the construction of the Seoul-Busan Railroad in 1905. The founder of the Seoul-Busan Railroad Corporation is Shibusawa, who received the draft map in secret from the Busan Consulate. Murota conducted the whole survey in secret to create a map and was appointed a board member and supervisor of the Seoul-Busan Railroad Corporation. Kono's contribution was also recognized and decorated by the Japanese government for his surveying for the Seoul-Busan Railroad route.

The secret history of the birth of the Seoul-Busan Railroad is hidden. The proverb "Bury one's head ostrich-like in the sand"

is suitable to describe such circumstances. Our ancestors were easily mocked by Japanese tactics without protection 120 years ago. Although diplomats were supposed to contribute to the promotion of an amicable relationship between the two countries, Japanese diplomats deceived Joseon officials with their bird hunting scheme, and in this situation naïve Joseon officials approved what would support Japan's secret map production instead of preventing it. How could such deception be limited to this secret survey?

There is common ground between the seemingly irrelevant incidents of the secret survey of 1893 for the Seoul-Busan Railroad and Japan's territorial incorporation of Dokdo. Interestingly, the same characters appeared in these two different incidents. Yamaza Enjiro provided a solution for Consul Murota when he was struggling to find a way to conduct a survey of the land in Korea and later manipulated the greed of a fisherman, who was eager to monopolize the fishing grounds of the Gangchi, to incorporate Dokdo into Japan's territory when he was the Political Affairs Bureau Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the later part of this book, I will follow the traces of Yamaza Enjiro to reveal the whole processes involved until Dokdo was subjected to territorial incorporation by Japan in 1905 because I believe we can clearly understand which historical context and for what purpose it was achieved by examining the career history of a diplomat who played an important role in the incorporation of Dokdo.

Taking the First Step as Diplomat in Busan

A town named Jigyo地行 appears if you continue walking from Tenjin天神, the downtown of Fukuoka, passing through the Fukuoka castle and go further west. This place, which is now close to the Fukuoka Dome, the home stadium of the pro baseball team, Soft Bank, was a town where the lowest rank samurai used to live together with neighboring Nishijin西新 about 150 years ago. There are still several samurai's wooden houses in the Edo style preserved in the residential area. We can speculate about the life of older generations from the entrance. Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎 was born on October 26, 1866, in the town as the second son among two sons and daughters of a samurai of the lowest rank. In 1866, the Satcho Alliance was created between the Satsuma clan and Choshu clan to overthrow the Tokugawa Shogunate. Indeed, it was a most chaotic time nationwide during the turmoil of the Meiji Restoration. In the same year, Byeoninyangyo, which refers to an event in which the fleet of French Navy occupied the Gangwha Island occurred in Korea. In the following year of 1867, the last shogunate of Tokugawa, Yoshinobu慶喜 restored power to the Emperor and a new Meiji government was launched.

As a boy, Yamaza had a bossy character with a group of peers always following him and had the strong will to never be defeated by any one in his age. It was an everyday occurrence for Yamaza's mother to visit neighbors and apologize by saying, "I give up on Enjiro!" However, his school performance was outstanding due to his fervent desire for academic achievement. Soon after he graduated from primary school, he entered Tounkan藤雲館, which was a private school affiliated to Koyosya

向洋社, the former organization of Genyosya whose motto was expansionism overseas.
Perhaps due to the political atmosphere at that time, Yamaza seemed to have a great interest in political affairs during his school days. Political organizations, such as Koyosha and Genyosya in Fukuoka, emerged and held frequent street rallies. Yamaza organized a group named Tatsusosya 立魁社 mimicking such activities with his friends: He liked to arrange meeting places to have discussions and speeches.

At that time in Fukuoka, there were only one middle school newly built and a college of education so that he had to move to Tokyo to receive further education. The children of samurai of the lowest rank could not afford expensive tuitions, so it was common for them to aspire to become either a teacher or policeman. Yamaza also suffered from poverty when he was young. As the Meiji system launched, some of the samurai adapted and became government clerks or merchants. However, in the process of implementing government policy to abolish the clan system and to change it to hyeon (prefecture), which is a modern administration unit, most of them fell into unemployment. Although Yamaza's father was hired by Fukuoka Prefecture Office, he was hard pressed financially all the same.

This young man came to have a turning point in his life when he was 18 years old in 1883. He heard news that Ono Rutsuke 小野隆助 who became successful with the contributions he made for the Meiji Restoration was at his home in Tajaifu 太宰府 near Fukuoka. He ran about 20km to kneel down in front of Ono's mansion and begged him to arrange a way for him to study

in Tokyo. Impressed by a tenacious Yamaza, who ran to him through the pouring rain, Ono took him to the house of Terao Hisashi寺尾壽 in Tokyo, a professor at the Science College of Tokyo University, and arranged for him to live there during his studies.

Yamaza enrolled at the prestigious Kyoryu共立 School that was well known for its highest admission rate to prestigious universities, and Daiichikotochugakko First Higher School (the forerunner of the College of Arts and Sciences of Tokyo University). He was in the same class with Wakasaki Reijiro若槻禮 , who would later become Prime Minister; Ogawa Heikichi 平吉, who would be involved in the forced annexation of Korea to Japan and serve as the Head of National Railroad; and Mizuno Rentaro水野練太郎, who would work as the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Letters and the Director of State Affairs of the Governor General of Joseon. Natsume Soseki夏目漱石, who wrote *I am a Cat*, was also among his classmates. In his school days he spent time with influential characters that played a pivotal role in the Meiji and Taisho periods. He maintained high grades so he was accepted to the college of law of Tokyo Imperial University that was known for producing elites.

Yamaza left many episodes while studying in Tokyo. When his Fukuoka dialect slipped out during a presentation, he punched a classmate in the face for bursting out in laughter before returning quietly to his seat. Yamaza used to associate with the students from Fukuoka at the dormitory. Even after lights-out, he read books by candlelight late at night to escape the eye of the dormitory supervisor. One of his dorm mates, Akashi Tojiro明石

▲ Kaneko Kentaro

東次郎, who later had a career path in the army, reflected that whenever Yamaza revised his essays for him, he would almost always receive 100 points. As compensation, Akashi treated Yamaza to liquor.

Yamaza graduated from the college of law of Tokyo Imperial University when he was 26 years old in July 1892. In his senior year, his job was already decided. This was possible because he visited Murota Yoshihumi室田義文 with the recommendation of Kaneko Kentaro金子堅太郎, the representative of the House of Peers, and Political Affairs Bureau Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kurino Sinichiro栗野慎一郎: "This student is very promising so that I recommend you to meet him once." It has been known that the people from Fukuoka have a tendency to support each other between older and younger alumni more than those from other areas. With such support, Yamaza took his first step on Busan soil.

Genyosya's Continental Expansionism

Not many stories are known about the life of Yamaza Enjiro 山座圓次郎. This is because his life was short and he did not leave behind any memoirs or journals. He did not write journals for the same reasons as Komura Jutaro小村壽太郎. Yamaza once said to one of his favorite juniors, diplomat Hirota Goki廣田弘毅, "I do not keep journals. Neither does Minister Komura. He once said that evaluation on a diplomat's career should be done by posterity. In any case, we should not make self-excuses."

This may be the reason why there are only a few of Yamaza's writings and media reports. In short, the name of Yamaza Enjiro itself has long been forgotten. In comparison to the importance of his plans and decisions he made officially or unofficially, his name is relatively unknown. Historically, the values of his accomplishments were indeed underestimated. Perhaps he could not ascend to the top as a diplomat because of his early demise. If he became a minister of Foreign Affairs or if he could have made more decisions with his signatures, the whole situation could have been much different.

The only clue that we are able to know about his past careers remains in his biography entitled *The Frontier of Continental Diplomacy,* authored by Hasekawa Takashi長谷川峻. It was published posthumously in the local Fukuoka福岡 newspaper, the Kyushu Daily Newspaper, in memory of Yamaza Enjiro' 25 years after his death.

Ichimata Masao published a book entitled *The Biography of Yamaza Enjiro: A Practitioner of Continental Policy in the Meiji Period*

▲ Biography of Yamaza:
The Frontier of Continental Diplomacy

in the 1960s by integrating the biography of Yamaza with several other sources. This book highly regarded Yamaza's diplomatic activities. A common word appearing in both books is 'continental,' which was also central to his life. Yamaza encouraged Japan's expansion to the continent in support of the continental expansion policy as a diplomat.

If so, what was the origin of the creed of Yamaza, who was standing at the forefront of continental expansionism? It is impossible to explain his continental diplomacy without his involvement in Genyosya玄洋社. What type of organization was Genyosya? An encyclopedia contains the following explanation:

Genyosya is a nationalist organization that gathered the discontent of the ruined ex-samurai士族 due to the Meiji Restoration such as Toyama Mitsuru頭山滿 in 1881. In the beginning, it campaigned for nationalism and people's rights by participating in the movement of establishing a national parliament, but gradually distorted its agenda for its human rights movement and thus transforming into a nationalist

organization to push for a national parliament instead. During the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, it maintained jingoism with close ties to military. In addition, in support of Saigo Takamori's, [illegible] Justification of the Conquest of Korea, it prepared Japan's deprivation of the sovereignty of Korea and assisted the earlier China revolution. It also organized the 'Manchuria Militia' to support guerrilla activities in order to control political war and terror. In 1946 after World War II, the US Army forced it to be disbanded. (Dusan Encyclopedia)

As it can be noticed, the Meiji Restoration was a political reform that was accomplished by an alliance of several samurai clans with the Satsuma and Joshu domains at its center. At its peak, the new power was called 'Ungbeon'雄藩 of these allied domains. For this reason, we often identify the leading class of people at the center of the Meiji government as the *'Hanbatsu'*藩閥. When examining the members' origins of the first modern Japanese Cabinet, among the ten ministers in the first Ito Cabinet, there were four ministers each from the Satsuma domain and Joshu domain. The domains that resisted the leading power of the Meiji Restoration or were not strongly supportive became excluded into peripheral positions and thus

▲ Toyama Mitsuru

were naturally alienated from central posts. The shogunates, who were a privileged class in the Bakufu system, fell into an alienated group. In fact, those who were excluded from the privileged class came to form an anti-governmental power group.

There were divided opinions over the controversy of the Justification of the Conquest of Korea even among the different samurai domains. One of the most distinguished contributors of the Meiji Restoration, Saigo Takamori from the Satsuma domain, was pushed out from central governing power while claiming the Conquest of Korea. Upon returning home to Kagoshima, he instigated a rebellion and when it failed he committed suicide. Although there were several revolts that occurred in support of Saigo in the beginning of the Meiji period, in particular in Kyushu, all of them failed. Those who failed joined an excluded power group that opposed the government. These neglected classes resisted, claiming the Meiji government was similar to 'despotic government power.' In the earlier stages, they maintained a freedom and human rights movement by pushing for the establishment of a parliament. The earlier Genyosya was one of the associations with a political pledge that emerged in this changing political atmosphere.

However, in the 1890s, Genyosya broke away from those carrying out human rights movements and instead confirmed its nationalistic political line. This political color became clear when the Meiji Constitution was promulgated in 1889 while assembling the Imperial Parliament for the first time. With the

base of human rights established to a certain extent, the only task left was to enhance national power in order to promote Japan's expansionism overseas.

The initiative of those in support of expansionism was to maintain Japan's national pride by confronting the most powerful western countries to further maintain peace in the Orient for the promotion of Asian prosperity. In order to accomplish this, they thought that all nations including China, Joseon, Manchuria and Mongolia had to unite under a common goal and interest. In other words, it was a 'Pan- Asianism' ideology. However, in reality, the only Asian country that could confront western power was only Japan and making it the leader. This encouraged Japan's expansion overseas to evolve into a political line in support of advancing to the continent.

Specifically, they believed that the Joseon and the Qing Dynasties were too weak to stand against Western powers and thus Japan's intervention should be made. The reason why core members of Genyosya, including Toyama, supported the reformers, such as Kim Ok-gyun金玉均, and made an alliance with Chinese revolutionists, such as Sun Wen孫文 and Hwang Xing黃興, was in line with such justification. Through this process, Japan believed it should expand its power over the Korean Peninsula and to continental China. Its expansionism was followed by the invasion theory of the Korean Peninsula, Manchuria and Mongolia, which Japan thought it should be administered directly by its rule. The philosophy of the Genyosya members was that they could not leave this important task solely to the

politicians who were blind to power or busy to take a chance in the fluctuating international hegemony. Instead civilian leaders should take action with a strong commitment to their ideals to realize them.

Yamaza Enjiro came to develop a closer tie with Genyosya because he was from Fukuoka, where the Genyosya base was established. Yamaza spent his adolescent days at Tounkan 藤雲館, which was a private school affiliated to Koyosha the former organization of Genyosya. The first administrator of Tounkan was a core member of Genyosya, Hakoda Rokutsuke 箱田六輔. Yamaza was taught from the Nationalists and indoctrinated by 'the spirits of Genyosya,' which we can see from Toyama's memoir: "I wish for students to study the great principles 大道 in peaceful times and to train them to be soldiers in times of crisis." There is a document that explains that Tounkan also taught laws and English with textbooks in English. Genyosya had an organization of lawyers under its control to advocate on behalf of its organization members who were sometimes arrested for illegal actions.

There are several different opinions as to whether Yamaza was a regular member of Genyosya. According to *Pan Americanism and Toyama Mitsuru* authored by Ashitsu Utsuhiko 葦津珍彦 who was personally close to Yamaza Enjiro indicated that although he was not a member of Genyosya, he always kept a friendly relationship with its members. In contrast, Toyomi 瀧豊美 stated that he was a regular member whose name was listed on the official roster of Genyosya.

[illegible] Yamaza's name is inscribed on the pagoda established in 1972 at the Genyosya shrine of the precincts of the Kokuhon Temple in Fukuoka where Genyosya originated along with other 389 members' names. In addition, his name can be also seen in the Chronicle List of 397 members that the Sixth Genyosya president, Kitajima Atsushi喜多島淳, recorded. In this record there are passages that state: "Because of legal and other reasons there are some members whose names cannot be included in this list." Perhaps they might have been public officials like Yamaza. This shows that Genyosya was an organization that was monitored or checked by government organizations such as the police. It sometimes ran anti-government movements or illegal activities in violation of national laws. Perhaps Yamaza was not able to publically reveal his membership due to his job as a diplomat. For this reason, depending on the document he was described as "a person who received strong influence from Genyosya and was equally committed to its meaning though he was not a member."

The more important fact than Yamaza's official membership with Genyosya is that his career path was in the same line of its creed on Continental Policy. He associated with the core members of Genyosya, including Toyama Mitsuru, Hiraoka Kotaro平岡浩太郎 and Tsukiyama Shikemaru杉山茂丸, to develop close ties with them.

For example, let us take a close look in the case of Hiraoka Kotaro. Yamaza decided to work at the Busan Consulate General upon graduation and visited Hiraoka to inform him of

his departure on the way home to Fukuoka. When seeing the shabby clothes that Yamaza wore, Hiraoka gave him the suit he was wearing at the moment. It was also Hiraoka who arranged Yamaza's marriage. In this way, the ties between the two were special. Such ties were similar with Toyama Mitsuru. While tracing the path of Yamaza's life, we come across influential characters of Genyosya such as Toyama, Hiraoka and Tsukiyama.

Pound Pagoda at Canterbury

Ryozanpaku in Busan: Continental Ronin Club

Yamaza Enjiro was appointed as a diplomat at the time when Busan became the base of Japan's expansion to the Korean Peninsula and further to the continent. In 1884, when Gapshin Coup d'état happened and the three-day reign of Kim Ok-gyun 金玉均, 1851~1894 was terminated, Japan's political influence over Korean government began to wane while the Qing Dynasty's power grew larger every day. Despite this political situation, the number of Japanese on the Korean Peninsula grew dramatically around 1890 and Busan became the center for the Japanese. Since Busan is the closest port to Japan, Japanese naturally made Busan their base. Having the Ganghwa Treaty signed due to the Unyo incident in 1875, Busan became an open port along with two other ports, Incheon and Wonsan.

We can speculate about the influence of the Japanese people who settled in Busan through journals left by Hara Takashi原敬, 1856~1921, who became minister through the career of diplomat and journalist. In 1892, Hara was the Trade Bureau Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and travelled to Korea to negotiate with the Joseon government for compensation in relation with 'Grain Protection Decree Disturbance,' involving the Korean government's prohibition of grain imports and exports. When Hara was appointed to Minister, he had no experience travelling to Korea. Having departed from Tokyo on ship on September 27, he arrived at the port of Busan via Kobe, Nagasaki and Tsushima on October 3.

After being received by Consul General Murota, he slept at the Consulate for one night and then walked about the area where

Japanese people resided in Busan. He wrote his first impression of Korea in his journal with a tone of surprise: "Busan became the city of the Japanese numbering almost 6,000 people." The number of total Japanese residents in Korea was 9,379: 719 in Seoul, 5,347 in Busan, 2,547 in Incheon and 764 in Wonsan. The Japanese population in Busan was the largest in comparison with other cities. Before stepping down from the ship, Hara had composed a Japanese traditional poem, Haiku俳句, which consists of 17 syllables in three phrases as follows: "It was fishermen fishing at the coast though they looked like a group of herons from a distance." 遠近にむらがる鷺と見えつるは 磯邊にあさる海士にぞありける. The Koreans with white clothes were described in such a manner.

Hara's description was not an exaggeration at all. In 1879, the Japanese population in Busan was as small as 500 people;

Japanese Consulate building in Busan (front) and Police Station (to the right) (Busan Modern History Museum)

however, it continuously grew to about 3,000 in 1889 and came to exceed more than 5,000 Japanese in 1891. They settled at the Japanese residential areas at Daecheongdong, Donggwangdong and Gwanbokdong near Yongdu Mountain where the 'Waegwan 倭館' had been established since 1678. This area was a designated Japanese residential area where trading was permitted. The main items exchanged were Joseon Ginseng, Japanese silver, and Chinese silk. When the Waegwan was closed down and new ports opened, its area was transformed to a Japanese residence of concession where Japan independently exercised public administration, jurisdiction and police enforcement. Not only were there the public offices, such as Japanese consulate and police stations, but also schools and banks established one after another. The Japanese who gathered in Busan were merchants, businessmen and ruffians who dreamed of making a fortune at one stroke other than public officials. Among such people there was a group of Japanese people called the 'Continental Ronin' who settled in Busan.

Continental Ronin *(Daeryuk Nangin)* refers to a special interest group that emerged after the Meiji Restoration, which neither existed before its time nor will ever emerge again in the future since it was indeed the product of a particular era. They were civilians who led activities to advance to the continent from the Korean Peninsula to China to Siberia, with beliefs in the line of nationalism and expansionism overseas. One of the several important characteristics that showed the Continental Ronin's identities is that they were all commoners, not governmental officials, political leaders, or military officers. They called

themselves 'patriots'志士, as the descendants of patriots who succeeded in making Japan's changes under the slogan of 'upholding the Emperor's power and refusing Westerners' 尊王攘夷 in the end of Bakufu period. However, the difference between the two patriot groups is that while the goal of the Meiji Restoration patriots was to make internal changes, the Continental Ronin moved their stage overseas outside of Japan to carry out their activities.

They also maintained a certain distance from, and expressed contempt for, those who rose in the government. "Their value of life was not to rise to a high position in the new nation formed by the Meiji Restoration but to realize their great will after the demolition of the Bakufu system." In addition, the major members of the Continental Ronin were a class of people who were expelled from the power struggle due to their agenda to conquer Korea征韓論. However, their political color gradually changed to something different from its earlier identity: They showed ambivalence and sometimes pressured the government by mobilizing public opinion and collaborating with powerful political or military characters. The Continental Ronin showed activist tendencies to the extent that they did not hesitate to take illegal means or to risk their own life to achieve their goals. Although the word "Ronin"浪人 indicates warriors roaming around the nation, many may visualize the images of ruffians or gangsters. However, most of them were, in fact, well-mannered and highly educated.

What did it mean by 'the goal' that Continental Ronin swore

on their life? What actions did they take in detail? Although there were differences in the form of activities depending on the time and place, the earlier Ronin conducted spying activities to monitor political, social and economic situations and the movements of the military using Japanese residential areas in Korea and China as a base. There are some people who were travelling around disguising themselves as drug peddlers. Another task they carried out was to support the anti-government powers of Korea and China. In order to accomplish this task, they established a network to promote cooperation by turning local people over to their side and trained activists to have a better command of local language and circumstances. In Japan, they contributed to spreading public opinion for the Japanese government to be more active towards continental expansionism. They also influenced the establishment of hard line policy in the Japanese political field by establishing networks with the powerful. It is notable that their activities influenced the government's declaration of war through the promotion of public opinion in support of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Spying activities and espionage tactics that regular soldiers were not able to achieve were possible with the collaboration of the activities of the Continental Ronin activists and the invasion policy of the Japanese military.

Let us go back to Busan in 1892. Although we do not know the exact number of 'Continental Ronin,' it is certain that among 5,000 Japanese residents, there were quite a few. The person who sponsored them was Hiraoka Kotaro平岡浩太郎, 1851~1906, who was the first president of Genyosya. He was a mining conglomerate

from Kyushu and a fervent Pan-Asianist, who carried out continental expansionism to organize a militia to dispatch to Joseon when the Japanese delegation in Seoul was attacked in the Military Mutiny of 1882 (Imogunran). Later he travelled back and forth to China to support the Ronin but began to be more interested in Joseon around 1890. He highly encouraged the young members of Genyosya to go to Busan for their activities. Tsukiyama Shikemaru杉山茂丸, 1864~1935, who played a key role in waging the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, as well as Japan's forceful annexation of Korea, also sent his members to Busan. Among the Continental Ronin, those who worked in Korea were called the 'Joseon Ronin.'

Ojaki Shokichi大崎正吉 opened a law office in the Japanese residential area in August 1893. The main job of this office was to collect the debts from Korean borrowers for Japanese debtors in Busan. Ojaki, a graduate from the college of law of Tokyo University, came to Korea with a recommendation from Yoshikura Osei吉倉汪聖, a Ronin who had travelled to Korea before. An alumnus of Ojaki, Yoshikura was in Tokyo recovering from frostbite that he got while travelling various places in the Korean Peninsula. Since Ojaki's office was more likely the Joseon Ronin's living room, another name of 'Busan Ryozanpaku'梁山泊 was given to the group. 'Joseon Ronin' travelled to the capital and other regions from this base to study the public sentiment and to collect information about Korea's internal affairs and changes in its political atmosphere so they could exchange this information to further discuss how to take action in the future.

At that time Murota, Consul General to Busan, did not look favorably upon this office because he was concerned that the Ronin was causing trouble that could threaten public security. In Murota's view, Ryozanpaku were more or less likely a collection of blacklisted people. However, Yamaza Enjiro was different: he frequently associated with the members in full support of Ojaki from the earlier days of its organization. Yamaza's behavior was not appropriate for a diplomat. At the end of the Japanese Imperial period on July 22, 1944, Yamaza Enjiro was introduced in a series of articles: 'the People in the End of the Korean Empire History韓末國事' in the Korean newspaper published in the Korean language, *Mailshinbo.* In this article, he was described as follows: "More of his friends are Ronin than public officials, and his accomplishments are recorded more in private journals than official documents." From the fact that he had many Ronin friends and most records about him were private reports, we can say that Yamaza's social network was quite different from that of ordinary diplomats.

If so, why did Yamaza associate with those blacklisted in violation of Consul General Murota's official principle that demanded a certain degree of distance to be kept from them? Perhaps this is because Yamaza was not only a diplomat working for the government, but also a member of Genyosya who was not much different from the Continental Ronin. It would seem like he exchanged information while associating with the Joseon Ronin at Ojaki's office. He played a significant role in reporting information that the Ronin collected to the main office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In return, we can presume that he

provided the Ronin with the information regarding the movement of the Japanese government and gave them special favors for operations.

▲ [illegible]

It is known that among them Yamaza had a special relationship with one of the Ronin, Taketa Hanshi 武田範之, 1863~1911, who was a central figure of Ryozanpaku along with Ojaki. What is unusual about him was that he joined as a monk. He was born near Fukuoka to the Kurume 久留米 samurai family. While he was studying Buddhism at Genshoji 源聖寺 Temple in Jodoungjong 曹洞宗, he became fascinated with Pan-Asianism. In 1891, he went to Keumo Island off Yeosu in Jeolla-do with Uki Torakoro 宇喜虎五郎, who was in charge of finances for Genyosya, and managed a fisheries with Lee Ju-hoi 李周會, who was a retired military officer. Lee Ju-hoi had accompanied Kim Ok-gyun when he fled to Japan after the failure of the Gapshin Coup d'état of 1884.

Four years later in 1895, we see Taketa and Lee Ju-hoi were involved in the most tragic incident in the history of Joseon, the assassination of the Empress, which was too brutal to find an equivalent case in history. When Japan dispatched Miura Koro 三浦梧郎 as the diplomatic minister to Joseon after Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Taketa accompanied Miura as a staff officer. A little over a month later, Miura carried out Empress Myeongseong's assassination. Lee Ju-hoi, a retired

military officer turned to the Japanese side to raid the palace with the assassins, but was arrested and executed by hanging. It is thought that their first meeting in Keumo Island must have been the occasion that developed their involvement in this assassination. Takeshi Hanshi was accused as the puppet master of the incident, but he was released two months later from a Hiroshima prison due to a lack of evidence. Later he returned to Kenchoji to become the chief priest. In 1906, when Ito Hirobumi was appointed as Resident General of Korea, he came back to Korea to work for the annexation of Korea through the pro-Japanese organization, Iljinhoe, and the propagation of Buddhism. He died in Korea in 1911.

Specifically working on the Korean Peninsula, Takeshi Hanshi was one of the most representative 'Joseon Ronin' members of the Continental Ronin emerging after the Meiji Restoration. Considering the fact that he was involved in the assassination of Empress Myeongseong and espionage that contributed to Japan's forceful annexation of Korea, we can understand that the mission of the Continental Ronin and his ill-fated connection to the Koreans toward the end of the Korean Empire.

In his youth, the novice diplomat Yamaza Enjyo frequently visited Pyozanpaku, which was used as a safe place for the Continental Ronin since it was easy for him to associate with those from his hometown of Fukuoka. It is natural that the friendships made in one's youth tend to affect the rest of one's life to a great extent. The young diplomat Yamaza was in his mid-20s having just graduated from college when he was

assigned to his first influential position overseas where he would create a deep relationship with the Continental Ronin that would highly influence each other. Their relationship with each other was more likely to be that of comrades who shared the common interests and goals.

Tenyukyo, the Roots of the Black Dragon Society and *Yamaza*, its Sponsor

An opportune time came to the Ryozanpaku Ronin who had been vigilantly waiting. As the Donghak Peasant Uprising occurred in March, 1894 and began to spread, they spotted a chance to topple the Min's Power so they could establish a government in favor of Japan instead of the existing Anti-Japan and Pro-China policy, and thus gaining Japan's superiority on the Korean Peninsula.

The Ryozanpaku Ronin responded quickly to grasp such a chance. They integrated all the information they collected traveling around and sought a way to assist the farmers who raised the Donghak Uprising. They thought if the farmers could defeat the Min's Power, they could reverse China's superior relationships over Korea to Japan's. In order to accomplish this goal, they established a scheme to participate in a battle to assist the farmers' troops by way of supplying weapons after establishing an amicable relationship with the Donghak farmers' troops.

In early June, the news of Joseon's request to the Qing for a dispatch of auxiliary troops to Joseon was heard by those in Busan. They could no longer delay taking action. The problems the farmers faced were that they lacked weapons, and needed to recruit more comrades as well as more funds. Ojaki's mission was to solve these problems. He went to Japan from Busan and the first person he met was Suzuki Tengan鈴木天眼, 1867~1926, chief editor of the *Irukshinbo*, which was first published in 1893 and had the highest number of subscribers. It was particularly a popular newspaper for young people as it was called the 'The Newspaper of the Young.'

The *Irukshinbo* propagated the inevitability of the Sino-Japanese War every day. Chief editor Suzuki promoted the justification of advancing to Joseon and China through *The Perspectives and Answers to Questions* (Ipshinmundap), which became a bestseller. He was enthusiastic for continental expansionism, so he encouraged Honma Gyusuke本間九介, Ronin closely associated with Ryozanpaku, to contribute to the *Irukshinbo* an episode he wrote on the basis of his experiences in Joseon. In the article, the following words were found: "Japan should be assigned to rule the entire Asian continent and the two continents (Europe and Africa) and the areas of the South and North Americas should be ruled by European nations and the United States of America, respectively. The South Sea Islands should be split in accordance to each nation's deserved portion." Soon after Suzuki expressed his agreement with Ojaki's suggestion, he began to gather members.

On the other hand, there was another incident in Japan that stimulated the 'patriots' of the civil society and those who advocated the Sino-Japanese War. It was Kim Ok-gyun's assassination that occurred in Shanghai, China. After the failure of the Gapshin Coup d'état of 1884, Kim Ok-gyun, who had been in exile for ten years in Japan, was roped into travelling to Shanghai with Hong Jong-u洪鍾宇, 1854~1913, who departed with him in February 1894 and shot

▲ Kim Ok-gyun

him with a gun on March 27. Both the Japanese government and the public considered the Qing's control to be behind the scenes, so the sentiment to retaliate against the Qing grew. The corpse of Kim Ok-gyun, was moved by the Qing's naval ship and was dismembered (bugwanchamshi) at Yanghwajin, Korea. Some of his hair was sent to Japan and his funeral was conducted grandiosely on May 20 in Tokyo.

The day after Kim Ok-gyun's funeral, one of the Genyosya staff, Matono Hansuke的野半介, visited Foreign Affairs Minister Mutsu Munemitsu陸奥宗光. Matono used to be close to Kim Ok-gyun to the extent that he visited Kim Ok-gyun to console when he was exiled to Okasawara in the farthest sea. Matono urged Minister of Foreign Affairs Mutsu to declare war against China. Using his words sparingly, Mutsu suggested that Matono discuss the matter with Kawakami Soroku川上操六. At their first meeting, Matono talked to Kawakimi as follows:

"Ever since our empire was humiliated by the Qing in Joseon in 1882 and 1884, such humiliation has been frequent. The cruel action that the Qing took on Kim Ok-gyun cannot be simply considered as treatment of an exile. Instead, we should understand it as a challenge to Japan in an attempt to accomplish its ambition to encroach into Joseon. Our empire should send a delegate to punish the Qing with a strong warning of possible consequences." While listening to his statement, Kawakami gave Matono a meaningful answer.

"I totally agree with your opinion; however, Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi伊藤博文 is against declaring war and thus it is practically

▲ Kawakami Soroku

difficult to start a war at this point. According to Mutsu's recommendation, I heard you are a staff member of Genyosya, which was an expeditionary part of Dasajeje多士濟濟. In order to reverse the policy to resolve the current problems, somebody has to go across the ocean and start a fire. I wonder if there is anybody who could start a fire. If someone initiated such work, I will readily take care of our duty of extinguishing the fire. In a situation where the power is in the hand of anti-war sentiment politicians, it seems too difficult to bring about a war other than through a sudden incident."

Of course the incident of Kim Ok-gyun was merely an excuse to agitate public opinion in support of starting war. The awareness of Japan's position for war against the Qing Dynasty as inevitable had long been pervasive, and hard liners such as Kawakami insidiously prepared for war. At that time, the Donghak Peasant Uprising occurred. As soon as the Joseon government requested reinforcements from the Qing, Japan took procedures to dispatch its troops to Joseon. Soon after the Qing's troops arrived at Asan on June 8, 1894, Japanese troops landed in Incheon the next day. This action was possible because of the Tianjin天津 Treaty that the Qing and Japan signed in 1885 after Gapshin Coup d'état of 1884. Article 3 of the Treaty of Tianjin nominally put Japan and Qing on equal footing on the Korean Peninsula and stipulated that, when either of the two decided to send troops to Korea

in the future, the other signatory had to be notified. In other words, it was a concession that if one of these two nations sent troops to Joseon, the two countries would equally dispatch their own troops. Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, who was more careful about dispatching soldiers, could no longer oppose it because he was the one who signed the treaty. However, he tried to minimize the number of troops, emphasizing that the purpose of sending troops to Joseon was not to confront the Qing, but to maintain the balance of power between Japan and the Qing over the Korean Peninsula. About a decade later, this stipulation triggered the first Sino-Japanese War. Nevertheless, the hardline activists such as Kawakami contributed to sending a large scale of military power to Joseon in consideration of waging a war against the Qing.

Kawakami's words to Matono were: "I want you to take care of the work of starting a fire." It implied that someone had to commit a crime to initiate violent clashes. Kawakami's words "extinguishing a fire" means that by making an excuse with a sudden incident, Japan would wage a war.

Matono delivered this message to the two leaders of Genyosya, Hiraoka Kotaro平岡浩太郎 and Toyama Mitsuru頭山滿, and a few days later Hiraoka visited Kawakami with Matono to reconfirm Kawakami's will. At the similar time, Sutsu Dengan who also received a request for assistance from the Ryozanpaku Ronin in Busan also asked for help from Hiraoka. The two supported the Ryozanpaku Ronin to carry out the 'task of starting a fire' and for this end they sent Uchida Ryohei内田良平 (a nephew of the first

president of Genyosya, Hiraoka) and Ohara Kiko大原義剛 (also a relative of Hiraoka) to Busan, and thus five additional Ronin went to Busan to join Ryozanpaku. This group of people were the first members of the Ronin organization, Tenyukyo天佑俠, on the Korean Peninsula at the time of the Donghak Peasant Uprising and the Sino-Japanese War.

Tenyukyo was a team of commandos consisting of 14 members: 9 Ronin members selected from the Ryozanpaku members and another five came from Japan. Toyama had a plan to continue to reinforce the Genyosya Temple so many Continental Ronin could be recruited. In fact, members of the Genyosya Temple, Sekiya關屋悠太郎 and Nishimura西村儀三郎, travelled back to Japan to recruit more members and to prepare supplying weapons. However, the eight Ronin, including Sekiya, were arrested and thus the plan failed.

In the Tenyukyo manifesto, it clearly states: "In order to demolish the repressive Min's Power and to save people suffering in distress, we purport to remove the power of the Qing that controlled the Min's misrule from the Korean Peninsula. In order to perpetuate peace in East Asia and not to ignore the fall of our neighboring country, Japan came to send righteous men to assist Joseon who share a common heritage and origin with us." This manifesto clearly shows that the goal of Tenyukyo was to eliminate the Qing's power from the Korean Peninsula.

Toyama, who was in support of waging war, ordered Tenyukyo members to rise in Asan, where the troops of the Qing Dynasty were stationed. However, the first place that the members raided

was the Donghak Peasant Army in the Honam area (today's Jeolla-do) where the Donghak peasant soldiers were stationed. Tenyukyo claimed that to accomplish their goal of toppling the Min's Power that was anti-Japanese and pro-Qing, it should collaborate with the peasant army.

Considering one of the slogans that the peasant soldiers publicized was "Rejecting Japanese and Barbaric Westerners斥倭洋夷", the plan Tenyukyo had seemed reckless in a way. However, their common goal of overthrowing the Min's Power prompted them to be united.

The most urgent matter was to rise in arms. They discussed a way to seize weapons from the Consulate to Busan, but it was not an easy plan. The idea they came up with was to rob the Yongdam gold mine at Changwon near Busan. A group from Busan attacked it on the night of a full moon. Pointing a gun at the back of the mine owner Maki Kenzo, they tied him and robbed him of 10 pounds of dynamite as well as gun power and blasting caps. Because of this incident, Tenyukyo members were placed on the wanted list, being accused of 'the possession of illegal weapons and robbery,' and this was the beginning of their violent activities that were subject to the Japanese police.

Now the only thing left for them was to join the Donghak Peasant Army to confront the allied army of Joseon and the Qing that was organized to repress its uprising. Tenyukyo, who had seized dynamite, headed for the Honam area where the Donghak Peasant Army was stationed. On the way to Honam, they had some incidents clashing with provincial officers, but

all 14 members arrived safely at Namwon on July 7 and rested at Gwanghanru. The next day on July 8, they visited the base of the Sunchang Peasant Army and had a talk with Kim Bong-gyun金奉均, 'the chief of Donghakdo.' It is said that Kim Bong-gyun expressed gratitude when they showed their determination to support Joseon's revolution and to drive out the Qing's power, and demonstrated the explosion of dynamite.

It was recorded that Kim Bong-gyun was the alias for Jeon Bong-jun, who was the head of the Donghak Peasant Army, in the literature of memoirs and biographies that Tenyukyo members left. However, some researchers point out that it is unlikely for the Donghak Peasant Army, who supported the 'Rejection of Japanese and Barbaric Westerners,' to have met with the Japanese Ronin. In addition, the fact that the Tenyukyo members exaggerated an account of their military exploits in their memoir also cast doubt on the credibility of such an assumption. In contrast, there are other research results showing the meeting between Jeon Bong-jun and Tenyukyo was more likely true through comparison studies on various documentations. It appears in the historical records of the Cheondogyo. In *The Cheondogyo Foundation,* the following story was recorded: "When heading to Sunchanggun, a group of 15 Japanese including an observer, Taketa, asked for a meeting, showing respect with the gift of one gold watch and one glass ball. Jeon Bong-jun discussed the current situation with them without hesitation." Here, Taketa indicates Taketa Hanshi, the core member of the Busan Ryozanpaku and Tenyukyo without question.

▲ Jeon Bong-jun

Regardless of their meeting with Jeon Bong-jun, it seems to be true that they attempted to cooperate with the Donghak Peasant Army. However, it is certain that the Tenyukyo Ronin were unable to actively participate in military clashes as desired because the Donghak Peasant Army already signed a pacification agreement. Considering this situation, the peasant soldiers were not situated to battle provincial officers. The members of Tenyukyo spread out all over the nation for spying activities and a part of them joined the Japanese army that fought against the Qing's troops. After Uchida and Ohara completed their activity in three months, they returned to Japan.

While the Japanese army stationed in Seoul established a pro-Japanese government, other Japanese troops continuously swept the war winning all the battles against the Qing's army. The Japanese army that claimed superiority over the Qing extensively destroyed the the Donghak Peasant Army, who arose again in a second uprising in October 1894. Accordingly, Tenyukyo's plan to ally with peasant soldiers became unrealistic because its members may end up in a position where they have to confront the Japanese army. At that point, as most of the Min's Power was demolished and already pro-Japanese rose while the Qing's troops repetitively retreated, it was almost likely to accomplish the goal that Tenyukyo established.

The Ryozanpaku Ronin chose to return to Busan. However, the police were already waiting for them. Oshikira was arrested at Milyang while returning to Busan and imprisoned at the Busan Consulate and accused of being the prime suspect for robbing dynamite from the Changwon gold mine. The rest of the Ronin were also on the run with their names on the wanted list.

At this difficult time, a savior appeared. It was Yamaza Enjiro of the Busan Consulate. While Yamaza worked at Shanghai Consulate between March and August of 1894, he took care of the aftermath of Kim Ok-gyun's assassination.

The assignment that was given to Yamaza soon after returing to the Busan Consulate was to interrogate Yoshikura, who was arrested for dynamite robbery, and to bring him to court. It was a situation where Yamaza and Yoshikura, who were once the members of Ryozanpaku, met each other as an investigator and a suspect. However, Yamaza acted more like Yoshikura's lawyer. Yamaza persuaded the mining owner, Maki, to withdraw the case so he could drop the charges. He also worked to get a witness statement in favor of Yoshikura. Through this process, Yoshikura was released with a deferred judgment in January of the following year.

Uchida Ryohei was ill while he was hiding from the police at that time. It was also Yamaza who arranged a way for him to escape to Japan without being caught by the Japanese police and military. Furthermore, he refused the Joseon government's request to arrest the Tenyukyo members. Because of several deterrent causes, the investigation of this incident came to be void.

The Tenyukyo organization was disbanded as the Sino-Japanese War ended. Nevertheless, the strong ties connecting its members led to forming the Black Dragon Society that would play a key role in Japan's annexation of Korea later. Uchida Ryohei founded the Black Dragon Society in 1901 by organizing the members of the Continental Ronin. The main members were Yoshikura Osei, Taketa Hanshi, and Kuzuu Shusuke, who were either Tenyukyo members or Ryozanpaku Ronin. The Black Dragon Society led by Uchida came to be deeply involved in waging war and Japan's annexation of Korea. Uchida contributed to shortening the time needed for the annexation by controlling Lee Young-gu and Song Byeong-jun of Iljinhoe in the back after he came to Korea as an assistant to Resident-General Ito Hirobumi in 1909. Although the Black Dragon Society was mandatorily dissolved in 1945 by the Allied Command, its spirit continues to this day and it's thought to be the precursor to today's Japanese Right Wing.

As seen in the previous chapters, Yamaza was a supportive sponsor of the Busan Ryozanpaku and Tenyukyo. Uchida, Yoshikura, Taketa and Kuzuu all received his help in their younger days.

Main members front row from the left Uchita, Taketa, Kuzuu: back row from the left Inoue, Yoshikura. All these people worked at Busan as activists in 1894

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: Accomplishments of the Political Affairs Bureau Director in His Thirties

The Sino- Japanese War ended in a succession of Japan's victories on land and sea. It was the first battle that a newly rising nation, Japan, fought after the Meiji Restoration, which contributed to transforming Japan into a nation-state. Japan would not have confronted the powerful nation of China without its modernization. The Japanese islands were engulfed with a heat of enthusiasm and patriotism; however, without the time to celebrate its victory with a toast, Japan had to surmount difficulties due to the Triple Intervention.

Japan concluded the Treaty of Shimonoseki with the Qing in April 1895. Article 1 clearly states that "the Qing Empire recognizes definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea," which means the Qing had to cease maintaining its special relations with Joseon and to remove their influence over it. Article 2 provides that the Qing cedes to Japan in perpetuity full sovereignty of the Penghu group澎湖島, Taiwan and the eastern portion of the bay of Liaodong Peninsula遼東半島, together with all fortifications, arsenals and public property.

Nonetheless, Russia, which was eager to advance to the Far East, could not tolerate Japan's aggressive encroachment into the continent. Russia pressured Japan to give up Liaodong Peninsula in alliance with Germany and France. Japan could do nothing but accept this since its power was not strong enough to fight against a powerful coalition. As a result, it came to be deprived of the prize that it obtained in a bloody war. Japan's disappointment was large enough to infuriate the Japanese against Russia, but their military power was still inferior to that

of Russia in reality. The so-called sentiment of 'Russian Phobia 恐露症' became pervasive in Japanese society. The only solution to this turmoil seemed to be more patient until a later day to come practicing 'Washinsandam臥薪嘗膽: drinking bitter juice to prepare a chance to take revenge' when the Japanese army was enhanced as a full-fledged military power. In addition, the Triple Intervention immediately influenced the internal affairs of Joseon. Accordingly, the Min's Power changed its policy to a pro-Russian position.

At dawn on October 8, 1895, Gyeongbok Palace turned into a stage of carnage. The Ronin, in groups armed with sabres, pillaged the palace and brutally murdered Empress Myeongseong. It was a cruel action infringing upon a nation's sovereignty that was never heard of before. Because of this atrocity, Japan was put on the defensive diplomatically. The person who was in charge of orchestrating this assassination was Lieutenant General Miura Koro三浦梧樓 who was a legation official replayed by Komura Jutaro小村壽太郎, 1855~1911, Political Affairs Bureau Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs newly assigned as Minister Resident in Joseon. Komura had arrived at Incheon port and headed for Seoul to proceed to his new post.

▲Komura Jutaro

Yamaza, who started his career from Busan General Consulate, encountered his second most opportune chance in the third year as a diplomat. A fateful meeting that would determine his

diplomatic life was made when Yamaza transferred from the Busan Consulate to the Incheon Consulate in May by receiving an order to escort Komura, a newly appointed minister to Korea. The Incheon General Consul at that time was Jinta Sutemi珍田捨巳, who would later be promoted as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Yamaza addressed his own perspectives on Joseon which he had developed through daily experiences, and Japan's Continental Policy. While listening attentively to Yamaza, who was a novice diplomat at that time, Komura carefully observed Yamaza. The conversations they exchanged indeed determined the fates of both men. In fact, it was the first meeting that would forge the relationship between Komura and Yamaza. This connection affected the whole process of determining the destiny of Japan ranging from the Russo-Japanese War to a peace treaty.

Two months later in December 1895, when Yamaza had worked for more than three years in Joseon, he was appointed as third secretary at Japanese Consulate to Britain. While serving at the Consulate in London, he received praise from Kato Takaaki 加藤高明, 1860~1926 due to his prudent attitude and talent. According to Hirota Koki's 廣田弘毅 memoir, who was later promoted to Prime Minister of Japan, there were quite a few important documents made by Yamaza's hands among the documents that Minister Kato sent to the main department. Particularly, he recalled that Yamaza sent an opinion regarding the possibility of contracting the Anglo-Japan Alliance in documentation, which became the foundation of the later Anglo-Japan Alliance Treaty. Having served for three and a half years, Yamaza returned to Korea via

Japan in May 1899. The new position given to him was a consul and first secretary at the Japanese Legation in Korea.

Two years later in September 1901, the relationship between Foreign Affairs Minister Komura and Yamaza blossomed. When Komura was chosen as Minister of Foreign Affairs while serving as minister at the Japanese Legation in Qing, he invited Yamaza as Acting Director of Government Affairs and soon in December, Yamaza was officially appointed as Political Affairs Bureau Director taking off the prefix of 'Acting.' The hierarchical system of the Foreign Affairs Ministry included a Minister and a Vice Minister that administrated only two Bureaus: the Political Affairs Bureau and the Trade Bureau, and thus this shows that the Political Affairs Bureau Director was the most core position. Unlike today's governmental system, which has several deputy vice ministers and about 10 to 20 directors under the ministers in the hierarchy, the director position in his time was incomparably an important one. Indeed it was exceptional that an official at the young age of thirty-five was assigned to such an influential job in the entire government apparatus. What would be the reason that Komura unprecedentedly chose Yamaza? To answer this question, let us examine the circumstances that affected Japan's diplomatic policy.

In June 1895, all the bureaucrats led by Minister Ito Hirobumi 伊藤博文 resigned because of financial problems, and a new Cabinet headed by Katsura Taro was organized. Komura rose to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Contemporaries labeled the Katsura Cabinet as the 'Vice-minister Cabinet' or the 'Doncho

Cabinet.' (Doncho means the curtain drawn on the stage.) This shows that there was an invisible hand that controlled everything behind a curtain to tease the relatively weak power of Katsura, who relied on an elder Yamaka Aritomo山縣有朋, who made nick names for his cabinet. Those who cared about Komura's talents opposed his will to work for such a Cabinet. Komura's small and weak 156cm frame earned him the nick name of 'Rat Minister.' Nevertheless, at Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura's existence was as enormous as a giant. He was a powerful character who graduated from Harvard University and went through all the important official positions ranging from Consul to Korea, the United States, the Qing and Russia to Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Komura's supporters advised him not to join the Katsura Cabinet, which suffered from a poor reputation worrying this might rather effect to shorten his political career as it seemed only a matter of time until he would rise to the position of Minister. Nonetheless, Komura firmly said, "It does not matter to me whether it is the Cabinet Vice Minister. If my term lasts only three months, I will surely take it because I have something important to do in that time."

▲ Katsura Taro

What he was determined to accomplish was the realization

of the Anglo-Japan Treaty. In order to accomplish this goal, he gathered all the talented offices spread out overseas at the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yamaza was one of many chosen for this reason. Let alone his talents, his creed and passion for 'Continental Diplomacy' was associated with those of Komura and thus Komura concluded Yamaza was the most appropriate person whom he could cooperate with to achieve such a goal.

In the system of Minister Komura there were the vice minister, Jinta Sutemi and the Trade Bureau Director, Sugimura Fukashi 杉村濬, who was involved in the assassination of Empress Myeongseong while working as first secretary in Gyeongseong. Although he was brought to court, he was released due to 'lack of evidence' along with other accomplices. Those who assisted Yamaza as subordinates were Counsellor Sakata Jujiro坂田重次郎, Secretary Honda Kumataro本多熊太郎, and Affiliated Councilor Kurachi Tetsukitsi倉知鐵吉. Among these subordinates, Kurachi was promoted to Political Affairs Bureau Director following Yamaza and submitted petition for Japan's forceful annexation of Korea. This group worked together during a turbulent period, in which the most important Japanese diplomatic tasks were made, ranging from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and waging the Russo-Japanese War to its peace treaty, the Treaty of Portsmouth. The most important task for both Komura and Yamaza was the Russo-Japanese War, a plan to advance into the continent of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria.

If so, why did Komura consider the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to

be the most urgent diplomatic matter to be addressed? In 1901, when he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the most important issue was how to confront Russia's gradual expansion of power in the Far East. Russia stationed large numbers of soldiers in Manchuria due to the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Even after quelling the rebellion, it continued to station troops in Manchuria reneging on its promise to withdraw after this problem is resolved. Clashes between Japan, which was eager to advance northward to the continent, and Russia, which attempted to advance southward to the Far East, were inevitable.

As previously seen, after the Triple Intervention, the resentment both in the Japanese government and the public grew to the extent of vowing to confront Russia. However, they were uncertain as to how to confront Russia's military power. When it comes to the wrath that arose due to the Triple Intervention, there was no other person whose anger was greater than that of Ito Hirobumi 伊藤博文, who had signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki himself. The Triple Intervention clearly showed him that there was nothing much Japan could do without strengthening its military power, and thus Ito concentrated on building arms in Japan's army and navy in collaboration with Yamakata, a senior military authority. However, he maintained a serious attitude regarding waging war against Russia. He also emphasized the importance of solving problems with Russia through negotiations. What appeared in this process of negotiations was an acknowledgment of Russia's rule over Manchuria in exchange for Japan's superiority over Korea, the so called 'Manchuria-Korea滿韓 Exchange Theory.' In short, the reason he enhanced

Japan's military power was not to confront Russia, but rather to take a more superior position in the diplomatic negotiations and settlement. Some criticized Ito's perspective claiming that he adhered to the Avoiding War Theory rather than the Anti-War Theory. Inoue Kaoru井上馨 from Joshu長州 Prefecture, a senior state man in the Meiji Restoration, shared a similar position with both Ito and Yamakata.

On the contrary, Yamaza believed that Japan's waging war against Russia was inevitable. Minister Katsura was also in support of the Pro War Theory主戦論 like Yamaza. Public opinion to support the Early Waging War Theory, which justified taking an immediate action against Russia, became widespread among the people, including the Continental Ronin and nationalists. Nonetheless, influential figures in the government posts like Yamakata reasoned it would be impossible for Japan to confront Russia alone. Thus, the strategy of making an alliance with Britain, which was a country where the sun never set, was its alternative choice. Soon around this time, the Ito cabinet in support of the Anti-War Theory withdrew from power and the Katsura Cabinet came into power and defended the Waging War Theory in line with Yamakata. Komura who was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the new cabinet also found it necessary to fight against Russia. The collaboration between Komura and Yamaza allowed the Anglo-Japan Alliance to proceed step by step as it was planned with the assistance of Minister Hayashi Tatatsu林董 from the Japanese Consulate in London. Although there were ongoing negotiations in secret, Komura's inauguration accelerated the negotiation process. Both

Japan and Britain had common interest to restrain Russia from further advancing into the Far East. Because Russia already had established an alliance with France, the Anglo-Japan Alliance was meaningful to balance power against the alliance of Russia and France. In addition, Britain needed Japan's support to protect its privilege in China, such as coastal trade near Yangtze River. In case of emergencies such as the Boxer Rebellion, Britain could benefit if Japan responded swiftly with its power.

At this time, Ito Hirobumi crossed the Atlantic Ocean. The purpose of his travel was to attend the second centennial ceremony of Yale University and receive an honorary degree. However, he had a plot in mind that he would visit Russia on the way back home from the United States to negotiate on rights in Korea and Manchuria. Before his departure in September, there was a farewell party at Minister Katsura's residence. At that party, fierce arguments were exchanged between the two major politicians in Japan, Ito and Yamakata, making the atmosphere quite serious. As soon as Ito discussed his plan to visit Russia, Yamakata affirmed his objection stating, "You cannot decide an important matter arbitrarily." Soon after Ito's plan was revealed, Britain was doutful whether Japan disguised its intention to deal with Russia in the pretense of pushing forward with the Anglo-Japan Alliance. Government Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza confirmed Japan's official perspective to quell such doubts, "There is no change in the Japanese position, so Ito's visit to Russia will not affect the progress of making the Anglo-Japan Alliance." Britain became more aggressive to make an alliance with Japan when seeing the internal competition between the Pro-Russian

and Pro-Anglo parties within the Japanese government.

While Ito was away from Tokyo, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance accelerated without delay. Minister Komura presented a 'Statement for Anglo-Japanese Treaty' at a conference of elder statesmen held at Minister Katsura's vacation home in Hayama 葉山, which was drafted by Yamaza and edited by Komura in part. The beginning of the statement was as follows:

"Korea's fate is more likely a question that affects Japan's rise and fall and thus it should not be undermined even in a blink of an eye. Russia's favorable progress in the operation of Manchuria would definitely give significant influence on the issue of Korea. (omitted) In order to make Russia respond to our suggestions about the Korean issue, simple diplomatic negotiations are unlikely to accomplish resolution and thus the only hope that we have is to ally with a third nation or to show our determination to fight a war."

This clearly shows that Japan was going to wage a war. This was, indeed, Komura and Yamaza's belief. At a meeting where Ito was absent, senior statesmen agreed on signing the Anglo-Japan Alliance. On the contrary, Ito gained no substainal benefits from his visit to Russia. Accordingly, Ito's overseas trip resulted rather in the acceleration of the Anglo-Japan Alliance.

Through this process, the six articles of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty that would affect the fate of Korean Peninsula were signed in London on January 30, 1902. With this treaty, Japan's privilege over Korea was recognized. The main point of

the treaty was that if either of the allied countries was involved in war, the other country would declare neutrality to prevent aggressive actions. In addition, they promised obligatory support if either signatory became involved in a war with more than one power. These articles were made with the possible war between Japan and Russia in mind. In the event of a Russo-Japanese War, Britain would not only maintain its neutrality, but also conduct its duty to prevent another country's intervention. The whole world knew that if another country supported Russia, Britain would also fight the war to support Japan. As a result, this treaty contributed to preventing a third nation in participating in the Russo-Japanese War. In fact, France did not take part in the war due to its alliance with Russia.

▲ Yamagata Aritomo

▲ Ito Hirobumi

Due to the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was able to escape diplomatic isolation that had lasted for a long time since the Triple Intervention. It was Japan's strategic move to secure its interests in the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria prior to the unavoidable

clashes with Russia. Now Japan was able to fully focus on preparing a war without fear of intervention of the powerful nations that had occurred during the Triple Intervention.

Source: Russo-Japanese war

Ito Hirobumi's Sword: Cut Me if you can!

On October 26, 1909, seven shots rang out at Harbin哈爾濱 Station in Heukryonggang黑龍江 Seong. Three of these shots that Patriot An Jung-geun fired hit Ito Hirobumi伊藤博文 in the chest. He died at the age of 68 in a foreign land. Right after the patriotic deed occurred at Harbin, there was a groundless rumor looming in Japan that Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎 might have been behind An Jung-geun. However, since Yamaza was already transferred to Counsellor in London from the Political Affairs Bureau Director position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of assassination, he can in no way be held accountable for the killing. When he did not have any chance to meet Patriot An, how could such doubts loom in Japan? This is because Yamaza once went around swearing, "I will assassinate Ito Hirobumi."

In 1902, after the Anglo-Japan Alliance was signed, the Japanese government was still cautious about waging a war against Russia. Not only Ito Hirobumi, who advocated peaceful relationships, but also Yamakata Aritomo and Minister Katusra Taro, who were at the front lines of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, had a similar perspective because they could not make a hasty decision on waging war against Russia without securing their full preparation for it. This serious government attitude seemed to be nothing but weak diplomacy in the eyes of the patriots outside of the government system. Minister Katsura seemed to be a patient suffering from "Russia Phobia恐露病者" to them, and Ito was considered a coward in favor of the 'Anti-War' position, so they thought he should be eliminated.

Between May and June 1903, the Japanese society was engulfed

in a heated debate as to whether it should declare war against Russia. Russia did not keep its promise to completely withdraw its army from China that was stationed there due to the Boxer's Rebellion in Manchuria and instigated the wide expansion of firm Pro-War supporters. Russia had promised earlier that it would withdraw its army in three phrases because of pressure from powerful nations. However, Russia only fulfilled the first phase withdrawal in October 1902, without carrying out the second withdrawal in April 1903.

Retired political figures and civic leaders formed various organizations nationwide, campaigning to apply pressure on the government. The most representative organization was the Anti-Russia Comrade Society that was established in July 1903. Konoe Atsumaro近衛篤麿, who worked as principal of the Hakseupwon, was the spiritual leader, and Komuchi Tomotsune 神鞭知常, 1848~1905, a parliament committee member, worked as a chairman. The initial members were Toyama Mitsuru頭山滿, Hiraoka Kotaro岡浩太郎 Kumamoto, Satsa Tomohusa佐佐友房, head of Kukgweondang, Okawa Heikichi小川平吉 and Otake Ganichi大竹貫一. Komuchi, Chairman of the Anti-Russia Comrade Society, was Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza's father-in-law.

A group of leading Japanese scholars of six Tokyo Imperial University professors, such as Tomitsu Jironto戸水寬人, Terao Toru 寺尾亨 and Nakamura Shinko, a professor at the Hakseupwon, who was called 'The Seven Doctors,' joined this organization. This group of scholars submitted an opinion statement to Prime Minister Katsura and Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura to urge

▲ Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza in his office

an early declaration of war in May 1903. This statement, which condemned the weak diplomacy軟弱 of the Katsura Cabinet and claimed that 'they should invade all the way to Lake Baikal,' greatly influenced public opinion. Among the seven doctors, Terao Toru was well known as the first scholar to lecture about international law in Japan. Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro knew him well because he was brother of Terao Hisashi寺尾壽, professor at the School of Science at Tokyo Imperial University, who accepted Yamaza as a student when he first came to study in Tokyo.

There were groups of people who were dissatisfied with the Katsura Cabinet's cautious attitude in the government and military. Among these groups, the most significant was Kogetsukai湖月會, which consisted of hard liners in the army and navy as well as junior or senior officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The officers and diplomats, who had complaints

on the prudent policy of the leading members of government, organized to discuss what they could do to change the trend of government. The name of Kogetsukai was given, since they held meetings at a high class restaurant named 'Kogetsu'湖月, which is pronounced 'Howeol' in Korean. Although the name was not used when they met initially, it was later given at the celebration party for the victory of Russo-Japanese War.

The first meeting of Kogetsukai was held on May 25, 1903. The attendees were Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro and five other officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including his subordinate, Honda Kumataro, Captain Yashiro Rokuro八代六郎, Lieutenant Major Kamiizumi Tokuya上泉徳彌 and Major Akiyama Saneyuki秋山眞之 with six army officers, including Major General Iguchi Seiko井口省吾, Major General, Fukushima Yasumasa福島安正, who was not able to attend this meeting but approved of it, delivered his grim determination through a representative: "If we do not fight against Russia, it will advance to Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, thus threatening Japan. In case of losing the war, Japan will be deprived of Manchuria and have to pay a substantial amount in restitutions; however, even in this worst scenario, Japan will not perish. Even if we lose the war, a time for revenge will come in less than one hundred years. Negotiation can never be an option."

Yamaza Enjiro played a pivotal role along with Captain Yashiro, Second Lieutenant Kamiizumi, in Kogetsukai. His activity was not only to facilitate the exchange of information between the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to arrange plans

to advocate war, but also to contact prominent figures outside the government to provide information about the government movements. He worked as a mediator to arrange meetings with high government officials. All this was possible because Yamaza was able to continue to maintain a relationship with the Genyosya Ronin who upheld continental expansionism.

The staff members of the Anti-Russia Comrade Society, including Konoewa Komuchi, Toyama and Satsa urged Ito Hirobumi and Minister Katsura, urged the government to make its determination to wage war. One of the crucial reasons that they were able to give pressure on the negotiation with Ito or Katsura was because they were able to collect information on government movements in detail. This was the product of Yamaza's close monitoring of the movements of the military through Kogetsukai that he provided to Toyama, head of Genyosya.

The Secret History of the Russo-Japanese War 機密日露戦史, which was published in 1925 after the war, evaluated the Kogetsukai's activities as follows: "Government authorities, particularly elder statesmen and influential figures, lacked determination. Although the younger politicians with intellectual capability recommended war with possible projections of the future, they did not pay attention to such recommendations. The army authorities and younger group's constant efforts contributed to accomplishing the goal, although it was not sufficient." Here, the 'younger group' refers to Kogetsukai.

Yamaza had meetings frequently travelling between the young military officers and opposition leaders. The pro-war supporters' meetings naturally became a stage of denunciation of Ito, a moderate regarding a war against Russia. Around this time, Yamaza once said, "In order to start a war, we must assassinate Ito Hirobumi." It was the words that he spoke out in a hot blooded temper at a drinking party, and finally Ito heard about what he said. One day, Ito called Minister Komura and Yamaza to his official residence. Without knowing the reason, Komura rushed to see him with Yamaza. Ito put the point of knife to Yamaza saying, "Well, you may cut me if you can! Otherwise you'd better rip up your own stomach." Turning deadly pale, Komura and Yamaza apologized bowing down to the ground. Thereupon Ito burst out laughing magnanimously and said:

"My grim determination for waging war would be no different from yours. Nonetheless, in order to obtain concessions from the world, justification is the most important thing, and thus we have been so patient to establish such justification. As all the nations in the world come to understand the tyranny of Russia, we may rise in arms in the burst of anger making an excuse of self-defense. Although Japan's Empire wishes to maintain peace fundamentally and does not want to have a war, it has now become unavoidable. In this case, our allied nation, Britain will fully support our situation without reservation, while the United States, Germany and France will maintain strict neutrality."

Even Ito Hirobumi, who was known as a negotiator, also revealed a strong determination for war as a last means, which

he had kept secretly in mind. This episode is the most famous one among many episodes that Yamaza Enjiro left. Although there can be some difference in the content according to the records, the story summarizes that Yamaza happened to have an embarrassing experience due to him bragging about his determination to assassinate Ito. Regardless of the exact account, it shows how Yamaza was passionate about starting a war against Russia. Six years later in 1909, this was the reason why the groundless rumor floated about Yamaza being behind An Jung-geun's bullets bringing down Ito.

Ito Hirobumi, who had been consistently cautious, was now strongly determined to have a battle against Russia so the only option left was to wage a war. Four members of Ito, Yamakata, Katsura and Komura gathered together on April 21, 1903, at the Yamakata summer house located in Kyoto to have a meeting called the 'Murinam無隣庵 Conference' to discuss Russia's breach of contract as it did not withdraw its troops from Manchuria. At this meeting, those who exchanged arguments and suggestions finally established Japan's basic policy against Russia. The four agreed at this meeting as follows: (1) We will solve the problem of Korea by solving the problems of Manchuria at this chance. (2) We will not concede Japan's superior rights over Korea. (3) In exchange, we may acknowledge Russia's superiority over Manchuria. In other words, Japan's marginal line was that it would continue negotiations with Russia, but could not give up its rights over Korea. This summarizes Japan's view that if Russia does not acknowledge Japan's superiority over Korea, Japan would wage a war. Although this idea seemed to have

compromised Ito's opinion with Yamakata's, the major trend was waging a war since Russia was unlikely to accept Japan's offer. All these measures were approved on June 23 at the meeting of Council of the Royal with senior statesmen.

On the basis of this 'Open War Diplomacy' Japan began its last negotiation with Russia from August in consideration of a possible war in case of its failure. Russia sent a counterproposal that suggested making the area above the 39 north latitude a neutral region through Russian Consul, Roman Rosen. Manchuria would be Russian territory; yet, Japan's boundary would be reduced to the southern part of the Daedong River. This suggestion was contradictory to what was concluded at the meeting in front of the Emperor: "Japan will not concede." And therefore the failure of negotiations made the outbreak of war inevitable.

There was another reason why Japan stalled in concluding final negotiation terms. Japan needed more time to make complete preparations for war. Japan was buying time for the fleet, Nitshin 日進 and Kasuga春日, to arrive at the naval base of Sasebo. Japan also negotiated with Britain to make a loan contract for war preparations.

The only task left was to make a decision on D-day. On February 4, 1904, at the conference before the Emperor, the termination of negotiations with Russia and the last decision to wage war was concluded. On February 6, the Japanese Consul to Russia, Kurino Shiichiro栗野慎一郎, officially informed the

severance of diplomatic relations with the Russian government. Simultaneously at Tokyo, Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura called Russian Consul Rosen to inform it. Rosen asked as to whether the severance of diplomatic relation indicates war with a blank expression and then left the reception room.

On February 8, the Fourth Squadron commanded by Lieutenant General Uryu Sotokichi爪生外吉 bombed the Russian cruiser Varyag and gunboat Koreitz embarking at the Incheon harbor and this sudden attack made them sink the next morning. On February 9 at 0:20, a Japanese combined fleet shot 16 torpedoes at·Ryojun旅順 port in the dark night and soon when the sun rose in the morning it began to fiercely pour bombs in its peripheral areas. Attacked unawares, Russia declared war against Japan on the 9th. And Japan declared war against Russia on the 10th immediately afterwards, as if it had long been waiting for it. The person who wrote the declaration of the war was Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro.

Preparing for War against Russia

To expansionist Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎, the Russo-Japanese War was the most important task in his life without question. By the selection of Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Jutaro小村壽太郎, he was appointed to Political Affairs Bureau Director of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was involved in the whole process of fighting the war to its end. There is an interesting episode that can show how carefully Yamaza prepared for the Russo-Japanese War.

Here is a picture in which there are two gentle Korean noble men in the official dress of the Joseon period. Carefully scrutinizing their looks, we can see that they are still young. If so, perhaps they may be sons of aristocrats or young bureaucrats who were quickly raised to high positions by passing the civil servant exam. However, if these two Koreans are Japanese, the whole assumption has to be changed. Who would these young men in this picture be? What story can this picture tell us?

▲ Hirota Koki and Hirata Tomoo

The person sitting on the chair on the left is Hirota Koki廣田弘毅, 1878~1948. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs four times and ascended to Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, Hirota's final days were tragic. He was indicted as a Class A war criminal and was sentenced to be hanged at

the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal by the Allied Forces when the Pacific War ended in Japan's defeat. At the tribunal, there were 25 war criminals who were indicted, but only seven of them were executed. Among them, Hirota was the only civil servant. Hirota served as Minister of Foreign Affairs when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937. The key factor that sentenced him to death was the Nanjing Massacre, which Japanese army was responsible for. However, it was recently revealed that there were several judges who were opposed to giving him the death sentence. Hirota endeavored to stop waging the Sino-Japanese War in his second term, but he was not able to make his opinion heard due to the power of the military authorities. At last, among the eleven judges, six agreed to execute Hirota. All through the trial, he did not defend himself and refused to bargain for appeals, but accepted the death penalty without saying a word. The life story of Hirota was described in the novel *The Sunset Was Blazing* 落日燃ゆ by Shiroyama Saburo, and it was also produced as a television drama and movie.

The person on the right in this picture is one of Hirota's old friends, Hirata Tomoo, who attended high school and university together with Hirota and also entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs by passing the diplomatic service exam. Until Hirata passed away in 1918 due to illness, they were the dearest friends who spent most of their days together. Another famous peer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was Yoshida Shigeru吉田茂.

The identification of the person in the picture aroused even

more curiosity. There must have been a special story behind this picture since Hirota, whose life was panoramically posed in the traditional Korean costume, was in it: he rose to the prime minister position as a commoner's son, but was executed. Hirota was born in 1878 as the first son to a mason in Fukuoka. The young Hirota was destined to run a masonry business and carry on the family business. However, those who considered his talents and brilliance that were already prominent in elementary school, recommended him to continue studying. In a zinzya (temple) located in downtown Fukuoka, there is a sign inscribed by Hirota, which was known to be written in his elementary school days.

He studied at Shuyukan修猷館, which is the equivalent to today's middle school, and received training from senior members at the Meitogan明道館, which was a Judo school affiliated with Genyosya.

Although Hirota's earlier dream was to become a military officer, he came to change his career goal later due to the Triple Intervention in 1895, which showed him that Japan had to succumb to the pressure of powerful countries in spite of its victory. He had sent an application to the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, but did not enter the school. Instead he went to Tokyo with one of his best friends, Hirata, in April 1898 and studied at Jeil High School and later at Tokyo Imperial University. It was Hiraoka Kotaro平岡浩太郎, a member of the House of Representatives and the first president of Genyosya, who sponsored their education. At that time, Hirota and Hirata came to meet Yamaza by the recommendation of Toyama

Misturu頭山滿, a Genyosya leader. The common ground for all of them was that they were from the Fukuoka region and associated with the Genyosya organization. Yamaza Enjiro fully supported Hirota and Hirata without reservation because they were not only from his hometown, where they attended the same secondary schools and college, but they were also eager to take the same career path as his.

Yamaza called Hirota and Hirata, who were in the their second year at the Imperial University, to his official residence in the summer of 1903. Unlike other days, Yamaza looked very serious. Yamaza gave a clandestine order to them with more than 30 recommendation letters and travel expenses: He ordered them to investigate the areas of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria in secret. In particular, he wanted to know how Russian troops were stationed in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria, as well as the borderline of Siberia, and their movements. Traditionally, such spying activities were the duties of army agents. Nevertheless, Yamaza assigned this task to the two reliable young men from his hometown. Recommendation letters were prepared in case of an emergency so that they could receive aid from the Japanese Consulates located on the Korean Peninsula and in Manchuria. The assigned areas were divided into two: Hirota travelled to Manchuria through the Korean Peninsula, whereas Hirata went to Vladivostok to investigate the Siberian region. Hirota traveled further north via Daegu, Gyeongseong and Pyeongyang having landed in Busan. He entered Andong, which is currently Dandong, across the Yalu River from Sineuiju and collected information regarding the

local situation while staying at Yokogawa Shojo's 横川省三 house for a week. Yokogawa, who was an active war correspondent for the Asahi Newspaper朝日, was carrying out his special duty of spying into the local area.

Hirota's next destination was Yongampo Port, located at the mouth of the Yalu River, which was a symbolic place of Russo-Japanese conflicts about the Korean Peninsula. As Russia pushed toward the south having refused to evacuate the Manchuria area in April 1903, Japan showed their great concern regarding Russia's southern advancements. Having crossed the Yalu River, Russia not only started logging at Yongampo in the Korean territory, but moved a part of military troops to Yongampo in May. Subsequently in the beginning of June, it started undersea cable水底電線 construction. When all this information was revealed, those with a hard line policy decided that it was time to wage a war with justification.

There was an interpretation that Russia's invasion on Yongampo should be considered as a violation of Article 1 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which acknowledged Japan's sole interests over the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, from the position of Japan, who had long been watching a chance to wage a war against Russia, the most urgent matter was to understand the current situation in the region. One of the important reasons why Yamaza sent Hirota was to learn about the ongoing situation in the Yongampo region. Hirota conducted spying activities on the local level by disguising himself as a logger while staying at the loggers' camp. However, he happened to be discovered by

a Russian soldier, so he fled to Tatungkau大東溝, where he was assisted by a civilian named Oki Teisuke沖禎介.

Later Hirota recalled the incident at Yongampo and said, "I woke up from a dream middle in the night and walked outside of the door. To my surprise, there stood two Russian military detectives conducting surveillance under the blue light of the moon of July. They were on guard with glaring eyes in search of me. I felt my mind and body were shrinking with tension." To further elaborate, Yokokawa and Oki—from whom Hirota received help in Manchuria—were executed in Harbin, as they were caught trying to blow up the railroad for shipping Russian military supplies while being disguised as Rama monks.

Next, Hirota hid in Ryojun旅順, which was a Russian military base in Manchuria. After three months of espionage activities being disguised as a laborer at a harbor construction site, he escaped to Sandongseong山東 Zhupu芝罘. Soon after he arrived in Japan, he submitted to Yamaza his activity report that he recorded for the last three months. Satisfied, Yamaza sent a copy of the report to Toyama, who had introduced Hirota to him, along with a letter of appreciation. Since Hirota was appointed as diplomat, the special relationship between Hirota and Yamaza, which began with the investigation of Manchuria and Joseon in the summer vacation of 1903, continued for more than ten years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Perhaps the picture in which they dressed up in Korean costume might have been taken at this time.

The following year when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, Yamaza assigned another task to Hirota, who had successfully completed his first mission for Yamaza. It was the surveillance of Russian military activities to collect information through a Polish prisoner of war. Among the Russian soldiers in the Manchuria area, there were Polish soldiers who were forcibly conscripted. At that time, when Japan operated a POW camp in Shikoku四國 Matsuyama松山, the number of Polish soldiers transported steadily increased. They were forced to be mobilized, but they had anti-Russian sentiments. As a result, there were many Polish soldiers who surrendered even before engaging in the war. Hirota was dispatched as a translator for the Matsuyama POW camp and investigated the movements of the Russian arms, food supplies and defense of Bongcheon奉天 from the prisoners. Yamaza delivered the information that Hirota collected from the prisoners to Fukushima Yasumasa福島安正, a major general in the Japanese army. After the war, both Hirota and Hirata passed the civil exam for diplomats in 1906. Among these two, Hirata married the sister of Yamaza's wife and thus Hirata became Yamaza's younger brother-in-law. However, he passed away while he was working in

▲ Hirota Koki

Russia at the age of 39. Yamaza was especially fond of Hirota and in turn Hirota considered Yamaza as his role model throughout his diplomat career. Hirota admired Yamaza recalling his earlier days saying that his tactic was cautious enough to disguise Hirota and Hirata as student travelers to avoid the eyes of the enemy and the two students were dispatched to the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria. Also, his scrupulous plan to explore the internal affairs of Russia using the Anti-Russian sentiment of the Polish was something that no ordinary man could even imagine.

Source: Russo-Japanese war

Iljinhoe's Sabotage: Collaboration between Father-in-law and Son-in-law

▲ [illegible]

eldest daughter of Komuchi, the Minister of Legislation under the Okuma administration, when Yamaza was 33 years old and Shitsuka 21. The person who arranged the marriage was Hiraoka Kotaro 平岡浩太郎 who was the first president of Genyosya, who debuted in the field of politics as a member of the House of Representatives around that time.

Komuchi had a satisfied smile when he met Yamaza prior to the approval of marriage saying, "I came to have a son-in-law like Doyeonmyeong 蘇東坡 with the knowledge of western studies." It was a praise indicating that he was not only a talented man like the ancient Chinese scholar, Doyeongmyeong, but also an expert in the Western civilization who became familiar with them throughout his diplomatic life. There is a record that at the first meeting the two put aside the discussions for marriage and instead political discussion led them to become intoxicated. Perhaps their mutual understanding of continental expansionism encouraged them to do so.

Yamaza was appointed to the Japanese Legation in Seoul as first secretary in December, and moved to Seoul with his wife. He served for two ministers, Kato Matsuo 加藤増雄 and Hayashi Kontsuke 林権助 in turn. Yamaza returned to Tokyo when he was selected as the Political Affairs Bureau Director by Komura Jutaro 小村寿太郎 in 1901 as previously explained.

Around this time, Yamaza's father-in-law, Komuchi, participated in various organizations in support of overseas expansionism as a key member and led hawkish policies. We can see the strong

determination of Komuchi in the letter that a diplomat named Aoki Shujo青木周藏 wrote to the Minster of Foreign Affairs. He stated: "The credit that the Japanese government established in the last several years since the first year of Meiji fell to the ground because of some people's misconduct, such as Komuchi, Nishimura and Shigeki"

He contributed to forming the Overseas Comrades Society with Hiraoka Kotaro and Satsa Tomohusa佐佐友房 in 1894 when the Sino- Japanese war occurred, and participated in the associations similar in character such as Dongahoe and Dongadongmunhoe. He was also responsible for forming the People's Alliance in 1900 whose slogans were 'Preservation of the Chinese Land' and 'Supporting扶植 Joseon.' This means that Japan should occupy Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula in the confrontation of Russia that attempted to extend its power by moving south to have its superiority over these areas.

The People's Alliance was once dismissed, but reorganized in 1903 under the name of the Anti-Russia Comrades Society in which Komuchi was seated as president and ever since then it strongly suggested waging a war against Russia. At that time, the Japanese government thought it would be better to maintain a balance of power through cooperation rather than by waging war, so it was inclined to support Ito Hirobumi's 伊藤博文 Cooperation with Russia Policy. In this process, the 'Manchuria-Korea滿鮮 Exchange Theory' emerged, which means that Russia occupies Manchuria in exchange for Japan's occupation of Korea. Nevertheless, those who supported a hardline overseas policy

and anti-government organizations spread the public sentiment of the Open War Theory through propaganda. One of the key characters who participated in such movement was the military centered around Yamakata Aritomo山縣有朋, a senior member of the Meiji Restoration and a political enemy to Ito Hirobumi. Before the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, there was a controversy in the political field between the moderate line of Ito Hirobumi and the military supported by the hardliners outside of the government. In this process, both father-in-law Komuchi and son-in-law Yamaza played a pivotal role in their respective fields.

Another organization in which Komuchi was involved was the Black Dragon Society. Ever since Uchita Ryohei established it with Toyama Mitsuru頭山滿, Hiraoka Kotaro and Inukai Tsuyoshi犬養毅 in 1901, he continuously supported it as a sponsor. As previously indicated, the Black Dragon Society was an organization supporting continental expansionism and played a central role in carrying out Japan's annexation of Korea. It has been identified as the root of Japan's Right Wing. Komuchi's more direct intervention in the issues of Korea started after he visited Korea soon after the Russo-Japanese War. In the beginning, Komuchi was supposed to visit China whereas Hiraoka planned to travel to Korea. Their mission was to organize Pro-Japanese acquaintances through informal diplomacy that the government could not perform through official channels. However, Ito opposed Komuchi's traveling to China thinking it was inappropriate. So they had to switch their destinations, and as a result Komuchi came to visit Korea. In

fact, it was his son-in-law, Director Yamaza who had arranged all of his travel to Korea.

When Komuchi first came to Seoul in May 1904, he was accompanied by about ten members of the Anti-Russia Comrades Society. He stayed at Paseonggwan巴城館 located in Jingogae, which was an affluent Japanese residential area, and met numerous bureaucrats and influential characters outside of power. Since Komuchi was known to come to Seoul with a confidential message from the Japanese government, he was allowed to have a meeting with Emperor Gojong. The person he met was the most representative Pro-Japanese, Song Byeong-jun who was working as a translator during the Russo-Japanese War., and the person who introduced him to Komuchi was Joseon Ronin, Sase Kumatetsu佐瀬熊鐵 who had participated in the assassination of Empress Myeongseong in 1895.

The group that stemmed from this meeting was the Pro-Japanese organization, Iljinhoe. Song Byeong-jun agreed with Komuchi's assertion that in order to preserve the independence of Korea, Korea must ally with Japan. Komuchi also asked Song Byeong-jun to help organize a kind of political group that would seek the independence of Korea by relying on Japanese power. Komuchi also met Lee Yong-gu in addition to Song Byeong-jun. Lee Yong-gu later recalled, "What Komuchi said pierced my heart." Through this process, Iljinhoe was founded in August 1904, and in December it was integrated with the Jinbohoe, a Donghak organization, headed by Lee Yong-gu and thus facilitated regional organizations. With regards to establishing

▲ Lee Yong-gu

▲ Song Byeong-jun

Iljinhoe, Komura first made suggestions to be more cautious about launching its activities concerning the possible oppression of the Korean government; however, once it was organized, he urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support it several times.

When it was first formed, Iljinhoe prudently carried out the promotion of public opinion to support the Japanese army in the Russo-Japanese War and supply activities, including recruiting laborers. The laborers who were recruited to construct Gyeongeuiseon, the railroad for the military, were members of Iljinhoe. However, Komuchi thought he would assign more important tasks to members of Iljinhoe later.

Komuchi returned to Japan because he became ill while he was staying in Seoul when he visited Korea again in April 1905. The letter that he sent to Okawa Heikichi小川平吉 around this time clearly shows how Komura wanted to utilize Iljinhoe later:

"When I prospect the future on the basis of the current situation, the best possible solution to the problem of Korea is to make

it a protectorate state before the war ends.(omitted) Here I have one suggestion. This organization is the only group that I could recommend to the emperor of Korea to have a great new determination and would publically allow him to engage the lineage of the Korean loyal family with the grace of the Japanese emperor, so it could preserve its nobility. By releasing all the great political affairs to the Japanese emperor, it will help Koreans to prosper as civilized people for a long time··· (omitted)···on our knees we beg."

Okawa was in the same class with Yamaza Enjiro when he was a student and wrote in his journal that he showed Yamaza the letter that he received from Komuchi. The words that appeared in this letter, "the only group," indicates Iljinhoe without question.

In fact, history moved on as Komuchi had planned; but, he died without knowing the final conclusion. In succession of Komuchi, Mochizuki Ryutaro望月龍太郎 and Sase Kumatesu were in charge of Iljinhoe. On November 5, 1905, Iljinhoe announced the statement of the 'Declaration of Protectorate State' that claimed it was necessary for Korea to be under the protection and instruction of Japan. The person who wrote the first draft of this declaration was Sase. Korea was forced to be deprived of its diplomatic rights due to the Eulsa Treaty that made Korea Japan's protectorate state on November 17.

The business that Komuchi carried out in 1904 and 1905 while staying two times in Korea was assigned to the chief-

editor of the Black Dragon Society, Uchita Ryohei, in 1906 who was appointed as secretary to assist the first resident general Ito Hirobumi. His official title was 'Korea National Funeral Investigation Commission' which was assigned to him to find out the current situation of Korea. Uchita pushed forward a tactic stating, "We incorporate Korea into Japan by the request of the Koreans." As soon as he was seated in an adviser position, he began controlling Iljinhoe members as puppets. Song Byeong-Jun and Iljinhoe played an equally significant role in the 1910 Japanese Annexation of Korea and the 1907 abdication of Emperor Gojong, as they did in the Eulsa Treaty.

Taking all these processes into consideration, Komuchi's visits to Korea, the establishment of Iljinhoe, and making Korea a protectorate state were all a part of careful steps planned to accomplish the forceful annexation of Korea. Behind this work, there was an expert of overseas policy, Yamaza Enjiro, Komuchi's son-in-law. Uchida, who succeeded Komura, also received his assistance over issues regarding Iljinhoe.

Source: Russo-Japanese war

The First War over the Korean Peninsula
in the 20th Century

On February 6, 1904, Japanese Minister in Russia, Kurino Shinichiro栗野慎一郎, informed the Russian government of its severance of diplomatic relationships and left St. Petersburg. This date was considered the first day of the Russo-Japanese War. The first war of the 20th century broke out as Japan's military mobilized troops to the Korean Peninsula and to Ryojun旅順 Port (Port Arthur). However, Russia viewed that a severance of diplomatic relations did not necessarily mean war because no formal declaration of war was pronounced.

The Japanese troops that moved toward the Korean Peninsula on the front line was the 4th squadron of the Combined Fleet of 16 ships that consisted of four cruisers, including Naniwa浪速 and 8 torpedo boats. They arrived at Jemulpo (Incheon) harbor on February 8. The mission was given to the 4th squadron led by Lieutenant General Uryu Sotokichi瓜生外吉, who was to command 2,200 soldiers boarded on three transport ships to land at Incheon Port.

At that moment, Cruiser Varyag and Gunboat Koreits Koreits means 'Korean people' in Russian, which belonged to the Russian fleet, embarked at Incheon Port. During the night, Lieutenant General Uryu requested the Russian fleet to leave the port while carrying out the landing operation at the same time.

When morning broke on February 9, Varyag and Koreits were slowly escaping from Incheon Port. It was their misjudgment to believe that no war had been declared. Japanese warships began bombarding them. When the Russian vessels were approaching

Palmido, located off Incheon, Varyag resisted desperately but it was helpless. One hour and forty minutes of firing engulfed it in flames and smog. The commander of Varyag, Vsevolod Rudnev, decided to destroy the ship and not surrender the ship to the Japanese Army. While it was burning, he ordered all crew members to leave the ship and to retreat to Sowolmido. Those who were aboard the Koreits also escaped from the ship. These Russian soldiers were saved by other countries' ships that had also embarked at Incheon Port. The naval battle at Jemulpo, which would become the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War, had a tragic ending for Varyag which was destroyed. Although the Russians were defeated, they were treated as heroes upon returning home for their honorable defeat.

Tzar Nicolas II was at St. Petersburg Station to greet the rescued crew members. At the coastal wharf at Incheon, a monument was erected in 2004 for Varyag in memory of the centennial year of the Naval Battle of Jemulpo.

Within the day of bombardment carried out by the 4th squadron off Incheon, the Japanese Army succeeded in its landing operation and advanced to Seoul by the Seoul-Incheon Railroad occupying all the main office buildings. Shortly before, on January 21, 1904, the Korean Empire declared its neutrality in fear of the possibility of Korea becoming a proxy battle field for big powers. However, when facing the military power of the Japanese army, the declaration of neutrality turned into a false hope. On February 23, the government of the Korean Empire was forced to sign the 'Korea-Japan Protocol,' an alliance treaty

of attack and defense, under pressure from the Japanese. If the independence of Joseon came under threat due to a third nation's invasion or domestic uprising, Japan would immediately respond to such emergencies by occupying important locations temporarily. In other words, Japan could build military facilities anywhere to conduct the Russo-Japanese War in Korea and the Korean government needed to cooperate with Japan.

Having waged the Russo-Japanese War with a pre-emptive strike, Japan focused on assaulting Ryojun, located at the tip of the Liaodong Peninsula. This location was considered very important because it was a strategic entrance for Japan to encroach into Manchuria. Meanwhile, Russia stationed its army around Ryojun, which was the primary port for the Russian Pacific Fleet and forts with battery sites, trenches and bastions were built on the peaks of the mountains surrounding the port. The early battle situation was fierce between those who were eager to attack Ryojun and those who wanted stubbornly to defend it.

The commander of the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Admiral Togo Heihachiro東郷平八郎 blockaded the port with a sudden attack on February 8. Japan succeeded in seizing Ryojun Port by blockading the Russian Fleet, concentrating all its naval power and thus obtaining control over the Yellow Sea. On April 13, the most brilliant naval strategist, Stepan Makarov, sank to his death with the Russian ship Petropavlovsk that was attacked by a Japanese mine. The next day Admiral Togo ordered the flags to be raised at half mast to offer condolences for the

▲ Togo Heihachiro

death of the enemy general. Makarov's tragic death was very fortunate for Japan. The mine was installed by Akiyama Saneyuki秋山眞行 whose name appeared in the novel, *Clouds over the Hills* authored by Shiba Ryotaro司馬遼太郎. The Ryojun Port blockage strategy also came from Akiyama's idea. Akiyama was also a member of Kogetsukai湖月會, which was a group of younger diplomats and officers.

Soon after the naval blockade was complete, the army's landing operation was initiated. The first group of troops that landed on the Korean Peninsula was able to push north without much resistance. These soldiers succeeded in advancing to Manchuria after battling with Russian soldiers on the coast of the Yalu River in early May. Having obtained control of the Yellow Sea, the second group of troops soon landed on the Liaodong Peninsula to occupy Darien大連 to isolate Ryojun. In June, Japan established the general headquarters of the 15 divisions in mobilization to mount offensive attacks.

However, the amount of casualties for the Japanese Army was staggering. May 15 was the worst day for the Japanese Navy. The battleship of the most cutting edge technology that Japan

boasted about, the Yashima八島, a ship with a displacement of 12,000 tons, and the Hatsuse初瀬 of 15,000 tons sank after they had struck Russian mines, thus reducing the number of battleships from six to four. A fratricide also occurred when Yoshino吉野 crashed with Kasuga春日 while moving in thick fog. The Japanese Navy happened to lose a third of their naval power in a single day.

The situation in the East Sea was even more serious. Japan's Navy focused on strengthening its power in the Yellow Sea in the beginning of the war, and as a result, the East Sea was almost unoccupied. On the other hand, Russia had stationed the Vladivostok Fleet consisting of four cruisers. Since it first appeared at the Tsugaru津輕 Strait between Hokkaido and Honshu on February 11 under the command of Admiral Izen, the Vladivostok Fleet was dispatched to the East Sea and attacked Japan. Admiral Togo moved the Second Fleet consisting of five armed cruisers from Ryojun to the Korean Strait to confront it. However, the Vladivostok Fleet navigated all over the East Sea with little caution. It moved further south to the Tsushima對馬 Strait, destroying three Japanese transport ships including Sato佐度 and Hitachi常陸, which all sank on June 15. While they traveled alone without any escorting Japanese Navy ship, they were struck by the Vladivostok Fleet at a vulnerable state. As a result, 2,000 army soldiers including rear national guards disappeared in the sea along with siege guns攻城砲 that were supposed to be used for attacking the Ryojun fortress.

Although more powerful cruisers of the 2nd squadron were in

pursuit, they were unable to locate the Vladivostok cruisers. The following morning, it returned to the home port having passed the sea near Dokdo. The admiral of the Second Fleet, Kamimura Hikonojo, made an excuse saying it was defenseless due to the thick fog. However, a member of the House of Representative bantered about it: "It may not be because of 'thick fog' but because of 'incompetence'." In the Japanese language, the pronunciation of 'noumu'のうむ (thick fog) becomes 'munou'むのう in reverse.

The attack carried out by the Vladivostok fleet severed the supply line between Japan and Manchuria, deterring the Japanese Army from carrying out its military operations. Its army paid a dear price for pursuing an assault on the Ryojun fortress when it was not appropriately backed up with the necessary military power. In July, there was an incident where three major ships of the Vladivostok Fleet appeared near Tokyo東京 Bay having passed by Tsugaru津輕 Strait.

It was August 14 when Japan overpowered the Vladivostok Fleet that had caused much trouble. The 2nd Squadron dropped bombs off Ulsan to sink the Russian cruiser Rurik and to damage the rest of the vessels. Four days earlier on the 10th, the Combined Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked the Russian Navy in the Yellow Sea that attempted to demolish the blockade at Ryojun Port to escape; however, the Russian Fleet could do nothing but return to Ryojun Port.

Russia fell into panic due to its continuous defeat to Japan,

thus a meeting of admirals was held on August 30, where it was decided to dispatch the Baltic Fleet to the Far East. Japan obtained information on September 13 that the first group of the Baltic Fleet had departed from the Kronstadt port. Japan needed to prepare to confront the Baltic Fleet, which consisted of a total of 38 ships, including eight battleships. In order to prepare for the final battle, Japan needed to move its Combined Fleet that had embarked at Ryojun Port to Japan for repairs. Accordingly, the combined fleet had to destroy the Ryojun fortress before it withdrew. This was the reason why Admiral Nogi Maretuke 乃木希典 chose to assail in haste at the cost of tremendous military losses. Advancement of the Baltic Fleet, the pride of Russia, towards the east, had become an important turning point in the Russo-Japanese War that centered on the battle for Ryojun.

The Destiny of Dokdo in Turmoil during the Russo-Japanese War

It was around this time that Nakai Yozaburo中井養三郎, a Gangchi hunting fisherman, visited Yamaza Enjiro, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The date he submitted 'Territorial Incorporation of Ryanko Islands and its Leasing Petition' was September 29, 1904. Accordingly, the date Fisherman Nakai met Director Maki must have been between the end of September and the beginning of October. This is also the time when the Russo-Japanese War was developing into a turning point due to the Baltic Fleet advancing eastward. Japan was worried when it heard the news of its heading along with its delay to conquer Ryojun. In addition, there was news that the Vladivostok Fleet was also advancing to the East Sea to join with the Baltic Fleet, having repaired the damage made in the battle off Ulsan on September 21. The meeting between Nakai and Yamaza was made during tense times.

We have examined the beliefs and accomplishments of Yamaza Enjiro as a diplomat previously. We have also studied the jobs he engaged in since he was employed as a diplomat. Taking such things into account, let us rethink the meeting between Nakai and Yamaza mentioned in the earlier part of this book. The war situation in September 1904 can give us a clearer picture of what Yamaza stated.

He (Political Affairs Bureau Director) thought that the current situation rather requires urgent territorial incorporation, which would allow for the construction of a watchtower and wireless or undersea cables. Since it could be very useful for enemy surveillance, they should not take what the Ministry of Home

Affairs said into consideration. And then he suggested that Nakai submit the petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with confidence.

Right before Nakai met Yamaza, he was discouraged because he had received a letter from the Ministry of Home Affairs rejecting the petition for territorial incorporation. Nakai was also informed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce that there was nothing much it could do for him once they found out about the Ministry of Home Affairs's disagreement. However, he came to hear a surprising answer from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when he walked in without high expectations. The Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed an opposite opinion from Secretary Inoue of the Ministry of Home Affairs and rather encouraged him to rush to file his petition at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The current situation that Yamaza indicated in the conversation that he had with Nakai meant the eastward movement of the Baltic Fleet in the Russo-Japanese War. If so, why did he mention that erecting a watchtower and undersea cables was important?

Throughout history, the most important factor in winning battles at sea was to find out the movement of one's enemy so it could quickly respond to the enemy's strategy to gain an opportunity to strike first. For this reason, naval ships are equipped with cutting edge technology including radars, observation equipment, and detecting equipment without concern for costs. Between 1904 and 1905, when the Russo Japanese War broke out, there were no combat aircraft. The

discovery of an enemy ship relied on binoculars. So the only way of detecting the movement of enemy ships was to erect a watchtower for around-the-clock monitoring of the main navigation routes and using high speed ships to monitor the enemy's movements. When it came to communication networks, using cable communication was considered more secure and safe over wireless communication.

Even though Yamaza was a diplomat, he understood completely about the ongoing war situation in the Russo Japanese War and the navy and army movements because he had all the information that was transmitted closely between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Imperial Headquarters. In addition, through his personal connection to Kogetsukai, he was aware of internal military affairs. Among the high-ranking officers, he maintained relationship with several advisory staffs ever since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. Particularly, he maintained a close relationship with Navy Commander Kamiizumi Tokuya 上泉徳弥. Kamiizumi often visited Yamaza's office, and they enjoyed drinking alcohol instead of tea. While drinking, they always discussed the current issues of the Russo-Japanese War. There is an episode where those who heard his answer were surprised with his keen analysis of the war front. Before the war, at one of Kogetsukai meetings, an officer once asked Yamaza a question: "When and at which point will the war end?" Yamaza answered: "If we push over to Harbin, Russia will surrender." Those who heard his answer were surprised with his sharp awareness of what was occurring in the war. Taking everything into consideration, Yamaza's suggestion to

erect a watchtower and undersea cables was possible due to his accurate judgment of the war situation.

In fact, Japan carried out the construction of watchtowers at the strategic point of Jukbyeon and Ulsan on the coast of the East Sea, Geomun Island and Jeju Isalnd on the South Sea and installed cables between these points. At Ulleungdo, two watchtowers were built on the southeast and northwest points, respectively, and these towers were used from September 2. The subsequent construction of undersea cables that connected to Sasebo佐世保 through Jukbyeon was completed in the end of September. The basis on which Japan was able to install military facilities all over the Korean Peninsula in 1904, prior to Japan's forceful annexation of Korea, was the Japan-Korea Protocol that had been concluded soon after initiating the Russo-Japanese War.

However, soon Japan came to understand that erecting watchtowers in Ulleungdo and the coast of East Sea would not be sufficient enough to carry out strategic operations. An important record was documented in the Nitaka新高 Activity Log 1 of September 25 with regards to this limitation. Nitaka was carrying out its duty to escort Okinawamaru沖繩丸, who was constructing undersea cables between the Ulleungdo watchtower and the Jukbyeon watchtower off the coast of Ulleungdo. The Nitaka and Okinawamaru both returned to Busan having finished their mission on the 25th. They had quickly escaped to Busan upon receiving information that the Vladivostok Fleet departed from its port on the 21st. An officer on the Nitaka left a

record in the activity log of the 25th on what he had heard from a civilian whom he met at Ulleungdo before it withdrew to Busan with a sketch of Dokdo.

The fishermen who crossed from Matsushima to hunt Gangchi used a Wasen 和船 that can load as much as 60 to 70 *seok*. They built a temporary shelter and stayed there for about 10 days each time, and thus made a substantial amount of income on each occasion. In addition, there were times when the number of fishermen was between 40 and 50, but no one reported a lack of fresh water. This year, they crossed several times and on June 17 they witnessed three Russian battle ships that were temporarily drifting, navigating northwest bound.

This log was entitled, 'Information Collected from a Witness of Dokdo at Ulleungdo.' It is assumed that the witness was a

▲ Dokdo Sketch attached to the Nitaka Log

▲ Tsushimamaru's report

Japanese fisherman who stayed at Ulleungdo after the Gangchi were hunted. Also, the three Russian ships must have been the cruisers of the Vladivostok Fleet. Although the Kamirura 2nd Squadron was in pursuit, it evaded detection in the thick fog and was instead spotted by the fisherman. Of course, there was no way for this fisherman to report his sighting to the Japanese Navy. What would this fact, indeed, mean? If there was a watchtower equipped with cables erected at Dokdo, Japan could have destroyed the Vladivostok Fleet. And therefore it is not so difficult to infer that Japanese Navy came to re-evaluate the value of Dokdo as a strategic point on the basis of the report.

This assumption is also substantiated by the order that the navy headquarters to Tsushimaru called for on November 13. It ordered Captain Sendo Takehite of the Tsushimamaru對馬丸 that was patrolling in the Korean Strait: "Investigate Ryanko Islands to find out whether it is appropriate for a cable post. At 7:20 on the morning of November 20, the Tsushimamaru landed

at Dokdo and carried out its investigation. This investigation was the first one done by the Japanese government and not by a civilian. The vice captain of the Tsushimamaru, Lieutenant Yamanaka Shibakichi仙頭武英, landed on Dokdo and examined the island for three hours. On the basis of this examination, the Tsushimamaru reported that there were adequate locations to erect watchtowers on the east and west islands, but due to lack of drinking water, fresh water needed to be supplied. The one who received this report was Kimotsuki Kaneyuki肝付兼行.

Later, Japan constructed watchtowers on Dokdo and connected it with undersea cables. In June 1905, through another close investigation, it concluded where to place the watchtowers and their constructions were completed in August. The reason why these constructions were delayed following the investigation of the Tsushimamaru was because of the cold winter, which made such a project rather difficult. In November, the cable lines from Ulleungdo to Matsue in the Shimane Prefecture through Dokdo were finally connected.

Yamaza's prediction that contributed to reviving the rejected territorial incorporation was indeed realized by constructing watchtowers and cables that turned out to be useful for the Japanese Navy. Could it be a coincidence? Yamaza strongly supported the war against Russia more than anyone else, and once the war broke out, he made all efforts to bring about Japan's victory. In the final steps, he played a key role in writing the peace treaty more favorably for Japan. It is unlikely that such a cautious person would have missed the opportunity to claim

▲ Map for watchtowers at Dokdo

Dokdo.

In this respect, the answer of Hydrographic Department Director Kimotsuki was similar with Yamaza's in that he was the one who proposed Nakai to submit the petition for territorial incorporation. While he was reviewing Nakai's request, he must have already calculated the strategic value of Dokdo. Furthermore, he might have already figured out such strategy through the information documented in the report about the Vladivostok Fleet that had escaped through the sea off Dokdo. Although all these series of events occurred coincidently, Nakai turned in the petition for territorial incorporation on September 29, only four days after an officer on the Nitaka cruiser recorded the result of his investigation in the activity log

recorded on September 25. There is a possibility that the officer might have orally reported to Kimotsuki the information that he had collected from Ulleungdo, in addition to submitting the journal. The job of the Hydrographic Department officers was to understand such crucial information.

The name of the receiver to whom Matsumaru reported the result of the field study of Dokdo on January 20, 1905, was the Director of the Hydrographic Department, since the field investigation was conducted under Kimotsuki's supervision. In other words, the director who had made a suggestion to a fisherman, Nakai, and the person who received the investigation results for the construction of the watchtowers was the same individual. This is quite interesting because eight days later, a report that there was a site available for erecting a watchtower was made on January 28, 1905, which was the same day the Japanese government approved the territorial incorporation of Dokdo at the cabinet meeting. This could be a coincidence; however, we can point out at least the following two facts in these events. One point is that the Japanese government actually carried out the plan to construct military facilities on Dokdo for four months from the time when Nakai submitted a petition for territorial incorporation to its approval. Another point is that the person who clearly understood the correlation between the submission of the territorial incorporation and installation of the watchtower was at the important post of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the director of the Hydrographic Department was also involved in these two events.

When considering such evidence, we can conclude that the territorial incorporation and the installation of naval facilities were not treated as separate events. The strategic importance of Dokdo was a significant factor for determining territorial incorporation. This is the reason why we disagree with the Japanese government's claim that Japan's annexation of Dokdo in 1905 was merely the result of a petition that happened to be filed to solve the problem of a fisherman.

Source: Russo-Japanese war

The Last Battle of the Russo-Japanese War:
the Sea off Dokdo

As the Baltic Fleet was approaching the Far East on October 15, 1904, the situation of the Russo-Japanese War had become a battle against time. Japan had to decide what it would have to confront first between fighting against the Baltic Fleet and the Siege of Ryojun. If it arrived before Japan took Ryojun, it was obvious that Japan would be driven into a corner. There was nothing but to confront the pincer operation of both the Ryojun fleet, whose damage was relatively insignificant and the augmented force of the Baltic Fleet. In this case, the severance of the military supply route of the army would throw Japan into a situation where it could not even continue fighting against Russia. On the other hand, if Japan was able to capture Ryojun prior to the arrival of the Baltic Fleet, the Japanese Army would be fully prepared by gathering all its military might to confront the Baltic Fleet.

The man responsible for such a crucial decision during this crisis was Nogi Maretsuki乃木希典, who was appointed to the Third Division Headquarters with the experience of participating in the Ryojun attack in the Sino-Japanese War. However, the Ryojun fortress, equipped with modern Russian defenses, was quite different from that defended by the Qing troops. On the other hand, the attack strategies employed by Admiral

▲ Nogi Maretsuki

Nogi were basically similar to those of ten years ago. Togo followed the confrontational method in the first clash of August 19 in which Japanese soldiers dashed toward the hill with bayoneted rifles. Russian soldiers responded with machine guns, grenades, and bombs in exchange. The most powerful weapon was the new Maxim machine gun that was the first automated machine guns with a fire rate of 500 bullets. It was inevitable for Japan to sacrifice with firm determination many soldiers charging into hailing bullets. In the first attack alone, there were 5,000 deaths and 11,000 injuries. On October 26, he used an attack method by digging trenches, but Japan failed to capture the hill resulting in a tremendous amount of loss.

On November 26, Admiral Nogi launched an all-out attack and finally on December 5, the Japanese Army was able to post the flag of the rising sun on the 203 Meter Hill. It was a victory that cost an enormous amount of sacrifice. Nogi cited a poem the following day at the 203 Meter Hill: "The bullets and blood that covered the mountain changed its shape. 鐵血山を覆うて 山形改まる" As described in this poem, the battle caused thousands of casualties. For 155 days during the Ryojun attack, 130,000 soldiers were deployed and the number of casualties counted was about 60,000. Among those killed, there were two sons of Admiral Nogi, who became a war hero after the 203 Meter Hill siege. Eight years later in 1912, he was held in high esteem being elevated to 'God of Army軍神.' Nogi and his wife committed suicide殉死 shortly after Emperor Meiji's funeral .

The conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War hinged on the siege of



▲ 203 Meter Hill

203 Meter Hill. The Japanese Army constructed an observatory from which it demolished the Ryojun Fleet with a full-fledged bombardment of 280mm artillery and howitzers. On New Year's day in 1905, Russian commander Stessel finally surrendered to the Japanese generals.

On the other hand, the Baltic Fleet's eastward proceedings continuously delayed. In December 1904, Commander Rozhestvensky received a surprising order when he arrived at Madagascar via Cape Town stating that he needed to wait until the arrival of Third Pacific Squadron that was dispatched having reorganized the ships at the home port. As a result, Commander Rozhestvensky had to fight against the heat at the equator for three months. It was May 26, 1905, when the Baltic Fleet showed

up at the Shanghai Port having navigated around half of the globe. Meanwhile, Ryojun was at the hands of the Japanese and therefore it had to go through the narrow channel of the Korean Strait to reach its destination.

Admiral Togo had been patiently waiting for the appearance of the Baltic Fleet for the past three months since February 21, having fully prepared for combat. Waiting at Jinhae Bay in assembly, the Japanese Fleet advanced near Tsushima Island 對馬島 on May 27 and confronted the Baltic Fleet around 1:30 pm in the afternoon. The result seemed to be clear because the Baltic Fleet had left its home port seven months ago and had travelled approximately 37,000 kilometers, which had made the crew exhausted with fatigue. The Commander of the Combined Fleet, Saneyuki秋山眞之 stated: "The battle was won in the first 30 minutes." The Baltic Fleet suffered a devastating defeat, suffering damage from three fierce encounters in a day. It barely escaped to the Korean Strait near Tsushima Island. The flag ship Suvorov was damaged and the commander, Rozhestvensky, was seriously injured.

The Japanese Fleet assembled near the Ulleungdo coastal line to chase after the Baltic Fleet. In the dawn of the following day, rising smoke was seen through binoculars on the southeast side of the sea off Dokdo. The Japanese Fleet immediately attacked the Baltic Fleet and intercepted its retreat. Rear Admiral Nebogatov, who took over Admiral Rozhestvensky's command, surrendered in this battle. Among 38 ships, only two ships were saved and the rest of Russian soldiers did not have the strength

to fight and thus the Russo-Japanese War ended.

The Russo-Japanese War, which was the first war of the 20th century, broke out in the sea off Incheon and ended in the sea off Dokdo. It is ironic that the fate of Dokdo, which was forced to be incorporated into Japanese territory, became the last battlefield of the Russo-Japanese War.

It was the last day of the war when the name of Dokdo was first introduced to the world media. When each country's broadcast reported that the Baltic Fleet had surrendered to Japan, the sea off Dokdo was mentioned. Of course, the name that the Western media used was 'Liancourt Rocks'. As I previously explained, even a Japanese official marked 'Ryankorudo Rocks,' so it had to be changed to 'Takeshima' several days later.

Japan won subsequent battles: Driving with vigor as it did during the Siege of Ryojun, it also won the battle of Mukden in March, which is today's Shenyang. Although Japan overpowered Russia by winning a series of encounters, including the battles of Ryojun, Mukden and Tsushima Sea, it could not continue waging war because Japan was also extremely exhausted and the loss of its military power was too immense to continue on with the war. The number of officers was insufficient, let alone soldiers. War expenditures were depleting resources to its bottom. Forty percent out of Japan's 1.7 billion Yen for war preparations was supplemented by foreign loans from Britain and the United States. At the moment when the Battle of Mukden ended, the number of bullet supplies was in serious shortage. Japan

calculated that it would take 10 more months until the attack of Harbin哈爾濱, but the amount of military supplies would last only a few months. If the Russian Army was replenished with military supplies through the Siberian Railroad, all victories could have been in vain. The war situation was likely to be more unfavorable to Japan if it held back. If the war was prolonged, such change would adversely affect Japan's war situation and thus the justification for a peace treaty began to be discussed in the military organization. If Japan initiated negotiations when it was in a more powerful position, it could maximize its terms. In this negotiation, Uchida Ryohei, the president of the Black Dragon Society who pushed for the war against Russia, strongly recommended a peace treaty so he proposed the following to Ito Hirobumi and Katsura Taro.

"If we win 60% of the war, it is more likely to win a complete victory." This is an immortal saying by Taketa Shingen武田信玄, 1521~1573, in the Warring States period. "Since Japan has already won more than 60% of the war, we do not need to continue battling. If we prolong the war, our national power will be completely depleted. In this case, even if we overpower Russia, we will not be able to confront other powerful nations like Britain, America and Germany. This is like defending against a wolf at the front door, to be prey to a tiger in the backdoor."

If war is the role of soldiers, negotiation is the diplomats' part. It was around this time when Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎, the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, became busy. Komada Kentaro児玉源太郎, who was the commander in

Manchuria, returned to Tokyo in secret soon after the Battle of Mukden on March 28, 1905, to deliver his opinion that negotiation for peace should be hurried since the Japanese military power almost had reached its limit. This was the time before the Baltic Fleet arrived when it had dropped anchor in the Kamran Bay in the Indochina Peninsula. In other words, the Japanese military considered ending the war as an option, even before it went to battle against the Baltic Fleet.

When Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza visited Kotama's residence, Kotama said, "We do not need to replenish even one soldier, what we need now is only peace." However, Yamaza claimed, "If we sign a peace treaty as-is now the consecutive victories on seas and land will be in vain and the balance of power would be equal five to five, and therefore we should demolish the Baltic Fleet before we enter negotiation. This is the intent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." This meant that Japan could stand in a stronger position when triumphing against the Baltic Fleet. Such view was accepted by the Imperial Headquarters. As previously mentioned, the battle against the Baltic Fleet at sea ended with a stunning victory for the Japanese Fleet.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also suggested other several orders for the military army to execute. Among these orders, there was an order to eliminate the remaining pockets of Russian soldiers in Hamgyeong-do across the Tumen River on the north side of Korea. Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Jutaro小村壽太郎 asserted: "Until today, we neglected them assuming they would

not affect the war situation; however, the whole situation would be different once we start peace negotiations. If we allow the enemy soldiers' stationed on land near the river that is a sort of our land, it would adversely impact negotiations, so we must push them out." As can be seen in the expression of 'a sort of our land,' the Japanese viewed the land of Korea as a part of their land.

Diplomatic negotiations were ongoing in the United States. Japan's diplomacy with the United States was very careful and cautious. Japan dispatched a special envoy, Kaneko Kentaro 金子堅太郎 to the United States, as it was waging war against Russia and he stayed there during the war. Kaneko was a classmate of Theodore Roosevelt 1858~1919 at Harvard University and they were close enough to exchange Christmas cards. When Kaneko gave Roosevelt the English version of the book entitled *Warrior's Code* 武士道 as a gift, Roosevelt became deeply interested in Japanese culture, so he invited a Japanese martial arts master to the White House three times a week to take Judo lessons. For this reason, Kaneko was able to frequently visit the White House. "I cannot intervene in the matters between Japan and Korea for Koreans in that Koreans did not try to throw a punch to Japan for themselves." I suspect that Kaneko might have influenced Roosevelt's advocacy of Japan.

In the previous chapter, Kaneko's name was mentioned once. He was the one who wrote a recommendation letter to Consul Murota Yoshihu室田義文 to Busan on behalf of Yamaza.

Both Kaneko and Yamaza were from Fukuoka, and they collaborated as Japanese Special Envoy and Political Affairs Bureau Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, respectively, during the Russo-Japanese War. Japan requested the United States to mediate the peace treaty through several channels, including Kaneko. Ten days after the Baltic Fleet was destroyed in the East Sea on June 9, 1905, President Roosevelt delivered the same letter of advice to both of the American Ministers to Japan and to Russia. Russia's situation was urgent as well. The defeat of the Baltic Fleet contributed to aggravating the revolution prompted by 'The Bloody Sunday' incident. Riots and protests were spreading uncontrollably all over the nation. The great hit movie, *Battleship Potemkin,* described the incident that occurred around this time. Russia accepted Roosevelt's advice without reservation, as it was eager for such conclusion.

Korea's Dependence on Japan

On July 8, 1905, Yokohama Port横浜 was overcrowded with huge waves of Japanese flags and the roar of 'Hurray for the Japanese Empire.' A number of people who gathered to say farewell to the delegation including Minister Extraordinary Komura Jutaro 小村壽太郎 and Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro 山座圓次郎 thronged the dock. The delegation was bound for the United States in order to negotiate a peace treaty with Russia. We can easily imagine how excited the Japanese people were when seeing that 'Asian dwarf won the war against a giant Russia consecutively.' Without a doubt, they were all overwhelmed anticipating an enormous amount of restitutions and territory shares as the reward for their winning a series of wars, including Ryojun, Mukden and the East Sea against Russia.

In contrast, the delegate members already realized there was a huge gap between what the people expected and the reality they would face when departing from the port, leaving the roar of people behind since they understood wherever there is a gain there is a loss in the game of diplomacy. It was almost impossible to meet the excessive expectations of the Japanese people who were elated by the victory

▲ Victory paraded at Yokohama City

that would seem to be near at hand. Yamaza said to Komura while on board: "Although we are now leaving with a warm farewell, when returning from Portsmouth, perhaps, this port may turn into our grave yard."

The negotiation started at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard located north of Boston on August 10. Since Komura's eyesight became seriously weak, Yamaza was practically responsible for most of the jobs. The Russian representative, Minister of Finance Sergei Witte, persistently maintained that 'Russia would give neither a piece of land nor one ruble since there is no winner or loser in this war.' The seemingly unsolvable negotiation came to its end with the mediation of the United States, but the result was no better than what Yamaza had predicted. Without receiving any remuneration, Japan had to return half of Sakhalin it had occupied to Russia.

Nevertheless, there was a marginal line that the Komura team defended during the negotiations: The first proviso was the evacuation of the Russian military in Manchuria; the second one was to take over the rights to use the railroad and territory lease in the area occupied by Russia; and the last one was to obtain Japan's absolute superiority over the Korean Peninsula. Article 2 of the Portsmouth Treaty on September 5, 1905, clarified that "Russia agrees that Japan has its exceptional profits over Korea's politics, military and economy and thus Russia will not intervene in Japan's control of Korea in terms of instruction, protection and supervision." This article clearly shows the reason why Japan had to endure ten years of bitter experiences

ever since the Triple Intervention in summary.

▲ Japanese Negotiation Team

The response of the Japanese crowd to such an agreement was as expected: street rallies were called to contend the immediate void of the agreement made through 'Humiliated Negotiations,' and subsequently riots broke out one after another. Angry mobs gathered for a public rally at Hibiya Park in central Tokyo. 364 police stations, which was about 80% of the total, had to be called in. Consequently, martial law was proclaimed in Tokyo. The Komura team was not sure about their security in this situation, so Director Yamaza returned with the original copy of the agreement and Komura planned to return several days later. When he arrived in Yokohama, the protestors who heard about the news of his arrival gathered at the dock. Yamaza appeared in front of them half drunk and said, "I admit the peace treaty is a failure. I am so upset that I cannot tolerate it." When the people listened to what he was saying, their anger changed into sympathy. Meanwhile, his subordinates grabbed the treaty agreement and rushed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Of course, all this was Yamaza's pretense.

The determination of Komura, who followed Yamaza later, was resolute. One day earlier of his arrival at Yokohama, Komura

called one of his subordinates and ordered him to take down a note on the ship: "If some accident occurs at Yokohama tomorrow you do not need to protect me. Instead, I want you to move quickly to pass this document to Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza. After that you tell him to do his best to accomplish the national policy國策."

On the following day, the guard at the Yokohama port was under tight security. Because of this cautious guard, fortunately no incident occurred. The document that Komura prepared entitled *The Principle of Korea-Manchuria Facilities,* which, he thought, could be his will. In translation, this can be interpreted as the basic rules for the implementation of policies in Korea and Manchuria. This plan discussed several topics from facilitating local offices under the Residency General Office and to finance, defense, various public utilities, and protection of foreigners. In fact, most of the plans recorded in this document were almost realized after the Eulsa Treaty. This indicates that Komura continuously worked for accomplishing these plans soon after returning home. The first part of *The Principle of Korea-Manchuria Facilities* begins as follows:

'As a result of the peace treaty between Japan and Russia, Korea came to lie under the control of our sovereignty and Manchuria was divided into two pieces so that Japan could rule the half of Manchuria. The Japanese Empire's policy on ruling Korea is to ensure the protection of Korea's sovereignty as well as its maintenance, and to seek the development of the economy to help Manchurians to be self-sufficient, maintaining its power

over Manchuria.'

This letter clearly shows that Korea would be completely under the control of the Japanese Empire and thus Korea's sovereignty belonged to Japan. This is the reason why Japan waged war against Russia and strived to keep this marginal line at Portsmouth negotiations without submitting to other nations.

The Japanese determination to govern the Korean Peninsula was clear even prior to the Russo-Japanese War. In the cabinet meeting that approved the war against Russia, the cabinet members agreed as follows in December 1903: "In any case Korea should be under our rule." As Japan initiated war, it gradually bolstered its ruling power over the Korean Peninsula. On the first day of the war, February 8, 1904, the Japanese frontline soldiers advanced to Seoul and occupied public offices. On February 23, the Korea-Japan Protocol, which would grant Japanese use of the land of the Korean Peninsula, was signed.

On May 30 in the senior meeting where Ito Hirobumi伊藤博文 and Yamakata Aritomo山懸有朋 attended, "Policies for Korea" was announced with the approval of the Emperor: "We now consider our economic prosperity in Korea rather than protecting its political and military rights." When "The Korea-Japan Agreement" was signed on August 22, Japan came to exercise the practical rights on behalf of the finance and diplomacy of Korea. Japan forced the Korean Empire to accept Japanese advisers in regards to the matters of finance and diplomacy. As a result, an American adviser, Stevenson was dispatched, but he

was assassinated by Jeon Myeong-hun and Jang In-hwan in San Francisco later.

As the war situation turned to be more favorable toward Japan after the siege of Ryojun, Japan placed more efforts to be internationally acknowledged over its rights to rule Korea. One of such effort can be seen in the secret treaty signed between Minister Katsura Taro and the Minister of the U.S. Army, William Taft, which guarantees Japan's rule over Korea in exchange for acknowledging America's power over the Philippines. From Japan's perspective, it confirmed that the United States did not have any objection in the case of Japan's ruling Korea as its protectorate state. Although this confidential treaty was signed in August 1905 by President Roosevelt, its existence was revealed to the world two decades later in 1924.

Soon after Japan signed the secret treaty with the United States, it enhanced its alliance with Britain by signing 'The Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance' on August 12. At this meeting, Japan also confirmed its rights to instruct, audit and protect Korea to promote its national interests over Korea. The content of this treaty was almost similar with that of Portsmouth. In conclusion, the Portsmouth Treaty was the last step to endorse Japan's superiority over Korea.

Following the United States and Britain at the peace treaty with Russia, Japan was acknowledged of its rights to rule Korea. The next step that Japan was going to take was unquestionable. While Korea was struggling to hold its national identity with

its last breath, it had already become a part of Japan with the strategic plans designed by the Japanese think-tankers. The only thing they need to do was to realize such plans.

The meaning of the terms in the second article of the Portsmouth Treaty such as 'instruction, protection and supervision' was clearly revealed within two months of concluding the treaty. Japan, which had thrown the power of Russia out of the Korean Peninsula, forced Korea to sign the Eulsa Treaty, which officially deprived the Korean Empire of the diplomatic independence. As a result, Korea virtually became the colony of Japan.

Yamaza's Fall on the Continent

Yamaza Enjiro山座圓次郎 served as the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1901 and 1908, which overlaps with the period in which Imperialist Japan continuously expanded its power. His tactful skills and energetic devotions were central topics among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees: "There is no better person than Yamaza among the people above or below his position." He was at the center of the Russian War: He was involved in the series of important events from the signing of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, through the declaration of war to the last negotiation for the peace treaty at Portsmouth. Other than these official achievements, Yamaza closely associated with influential politicians outside of power, as well as army and navy major generals.

The next step that Japan was going to take was the complete incorporation of Korea. Although it speculated such annexation would be a matter of time, it showed a more cautious approach to such steps to avoid unnecessary conflicts. In the discussion of justification and methods to minimize tough resistance of the powerful nations, there arose controversies that led to divided opinions: some argued for speedy action, while others suggested taking a more gradual and cautious action.

In June 1907, the Hague Secret Mission incident occurred when Emperor Gojong dispatched Lee Jun李儁 and Lee Sang-seol 李相卨 as Secret Mission to the Second Peace Conference at the Hague in the Netherlands. Emperor Gojong was going to appeal to the Permanent Court of Arbitration that Eulsa Treaty was against the will of Korea. However, this plan failed due to Japan's

such as Toyama Mitsuru, ...

... regard to the most urgent diplomacy of ... Japanese Empire we urge the Japanese government to take one of the two possible choices to immediately proceed:

1. Korean emperor should restore the sovereignty of Korea to the Japanese Empire and the two nations could be incorporated.
2. The Korean emperor should succeed his throne to the loyal prince and simultaneously give an exhortation to assign the sovereignty to the Japanese Empire.

... to make the second suggestion that received the approval of Emperor Gojong. However, instead of directly imposing such ... by himself, he ordered Lee Wan-yong and Song Byeong-jun in the front. Later, according to the Okawa's reflection, Ito said, "Basically, I do not have any opposition to annexation; nonetheless, I am not certain as to whether hasty annexation would be an encouraging strategy or not." Okawa criticized [illegible] saying, "It is an appearing policy for peaceful conciliation." History was written as Ito planned. Emperor Gojong finally resigned due to the unbearable pressure from Lee Wan-yong who was supported by Ito. On July 24, in the third Korea-Japan Treaty (Jeongmi Treaty), Korea ceased its rights to rule internal affairs along with its diplomatic rights. Thus, the sovereignty of Korea was like an empty cocoon.

Yamaza served as the Director of Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... after the end of the Russo-Japanese War



Yamaza's funeral in Beijing